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Populism, stabilitocracy and multiculturalism are three social phe-
nomena which have recently been in the spotlight of political science 
professionals, while simultaneously also capturing the attention of a 
wider public. Studying these phenomena is important not only in order 
for us to better understand their nature, but also to be able to confront 
the consequences they produce. Stabilitocracy and multiculturality 
comprise political and social habitus of populism in Serbia, while liberal 
democracy and multiculturalism constitute political goals which lead to 
a well-regulated state and free society.
Populism in Serbia, i.e. manifestations of Serbian populism primarily 
through glorification of the people, anti-elitism and anti-pluralism com-
prise the central part of this book, in addition to considerations of the 
institutional and political framework in which this populism is manife-
sted – stabilitocracy. In order to better understand populism in Serbia, 
the study includes the results of an empirical research concerning the 
perception of politics, the attitudes of citizens towards the people and 
political elite, and their attitudes towards representative democracy, 
leader and “dangerous others”.
 
When in multinational societies populists homogenize the people, they usu-
ally homogenize their own national group, while the rest of the people are 
at the very least excluded, or even more frequently treated as “dangerous 
others”. A consequence of the populist homogenization of the people is 
anti-pluralism which erodes liberal values in political communities, since in 
multicultural societies, the fight for pluralism is the fight for the harmony 
of diversity, while multiculturalism is the manner of diversity management 
which leads to harmonisation of the political community and society. 
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Introduction 
Populism, stabilitocracy and multiculturalism are three 
social phenomena which have recently been in the spotlight of 
political science professionals, while simultaneously also captu-
ring the attention of a wider public. This is particularly true of 
Serbia, where all the flaws and shortcomings of the political 
community, concerning political culture, constitutional, legal 
and political system, as well as political life in its wider and 
narrower senses, are reflections of these three phenomena. 
Studying these phenomena is important not only in order for us 
to better understand their nature, but also to be able to con-
front the consequences they produce. 
The central topic of this book is populism, including: the 
term, usage, definition, manifestations, interpretations, types 
and nature of, and approaches to populism, as well as compo-
nents, causes and consequences of the occurrence of populism. 
Stabilitocracy and multiculturality comprise political and social 
habitus of populism in Serbia, while liberal democracy and mul-
ticulturalism (i.e. interculturalism as its more advanced form) 
constitute political goals which lead to a well-regulated state 
and free society. Populism is manifested in different ways in di-
fferent circumstances, while in turn also affecting those circum-
stances, which is an important aspect of perceiving and valuing 
this phenomenon in the book. 
Furthermore, the book indicates the flaws of representa-
tive democracy, which facilitate the rise of populism, and stres-
ses the structural and external causes for the expansion of po-
pulism in Europe, with a special emphasis on authoritarian 
populism. A separate section of this book is dedicated to 
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pro-European and anti-populist resistance, where the concept 
of Europe as a safeguard against the “Populist International” is 
considered. 
All over the world, democracy and populism are intertwi-
ned, equalized, or made mutually exclusive, so their correlation 
is highly significant in understanding today’s political trends. In 
this sense, it is particularly important to study the misbalance 
between democratic and liberal values in modern democracies. 
What could be learned from the populists? Can populism stimu-
late strengthening of democracy? What are the consequences 
and reach of economic populism? These are but a few questions 
which challenge the dominant attitude that populism is merely 
a negative phenomenon which erodes the foundations of de-
mocratic society. What is not arguable, however, is the fact that 
the widened gap between political elites and citizens is certain-
ly an impetus for the occurrence of populism and its expansion 
in the societies involving different systems and levels of demo-
cratic development. 
Populism in Serbia, i.e. manifestations of Serbian populi-
sm primarily through glorification of the people, anti-elitism 
and anti-pluralism comprise the central part of this book, in ad-
dition to considerations of the institutional and political fra-
mework in which this populism is manifested – stabilitocracy. In 
order to better understand populism in Serbia, the study inclu-
des the results of an empirical research concerning the percep-
tion of politics, the attitudes of citizens towards the people and 
political elite, and their attitudes towards representative demo-
cracy, leader and “dangerous others”. 
When in multinational societies populists homogenize 
the people, they usually homogenize their own national group, 
while the rest of the people are at the very least excluded, or 
even more frequently treated as “dangerous others”. Due to 
their diverse nature, multicultural societies become fields of 
political confrontations concerning identity issues. In this politi-
cal context, populism has advantage over multiculturalism 
when there are no rules involving democratic political culture, 
the rule of law, effective separation of powers and strong insti-
tutions protecting public interest. A consequence of the 
Introduction
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populist homogenization of the people is anti-pluralism which 
erodes liberal values in political communities, since in multicul-
tural societies, the fight for pluralism is the fight for the har-
mony of diversity, while multiculturalism is the manner of diver-
sity management which leads to harmonisation of the political 
community and society. In that context, the book explores mul-
ticulturality and multiculturalism, civic identity and values, Eu-
ropeanization and national identity. 

POPULISM 
The term, usage, definition, manifestations, inter-
pretations, approaches to populism, types of popu-
lism, the nature of populism, components, causes 
and consequences of the occurrence of populism.

In political science and social sciences in general, once a 
discussion on or studying of populism is initiated, it usually goes 
hand in hand with much tentativeness, where this term is quali-
fied as elusive, and being hard, almost impossible to define in a 
generally acceptable way. The “elusiveness” of populism is par-
ticularly contributed to by the fact that the phenomenon oc-
curs in a wide range of manifestations, as well as in various so-
cial and political circumstances. There are many authors who 
consider it to be one of the least elaborated terms, or political 
concepts of our times (Taggart, 2002).
Not so long ago, theoreticians of politics ignored, negle-
cted, or underestimated the significance of studying populism. 
In early 21st century, there were still few theoreticians that en-
gaged seriously with this phenomenon. One of the reasons, 
apart from its elusiveness, is the multifaceted meaning of the 
term populism, referred to as “the many headed monster” (Hill, 
1974: 181-204) 
Even though its manifestation in the political practice co-
uld be traced back to the USA at the end of the 19th century, 
and a movement aimed at preserving the social foundations of 
the time,1 in modern political science, populism has only recen-
tly become a subject of any serious studying. Margaret Canovan 
is one of those who pointed to the need of systematic studying 
of populism, as she attempted to emphasize the importance of 
a more thorough and versatile studying of this phenomenon, 
1  When it comes to political practice, populism first occurred in the USA, 
where the People’s Party engaged voters with the motto that there was no 
difference between the Republicans and the Democrats, and that both of 
them are parts of the corrupted political elite which “stole” democracy 
from the American people. They failed to establish themselves as a lasting 
political force, even though they practiced easily digestible populism. 
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certainly wider than mere examination of populist movements 
and treating populism as a symptom of certain social patholo-
gies (Canovan, 2004: 241-252).
Approaches and Major Characteristics  
of Studying Populism 
Populism is a general phenomenon manifested in autho-
ritarian societies, developed democracies and transitional socie-
ties. In modern scientific literature, populism is analysed as a 
political style, manner of political communication, political disco-
urse, strategy of political mobilisation, manner of political organi-
sation, and increasingly, as a thin-centred ideology. 
An eclectic mixture of elements of different ideologies is 
articulated in populism through its major characteristics which 
remain constant, independent of the type of the concrete sym-
biosis of ideological elements in question. The major characteri-
stics of populism include: invoking popular will, together with 
contesting and relativising representative democracy’s instituti-
ons, and antagonistic attitude towards elites and “dangerous 
others” who jeopardise the state and/or nation. 
In both consolidated and unconsolidated democracies, 
and especially in societies which are still in the initial phases of 
becoming developed democracies, populism may be present as 
a thin-centred ideology, quasi-ideology, or merely a technique, 
i.e. government style without ideological foundations of any 
depth. Social and political context essentially establish the li-
mits and determine the nature and range of populism, and ac-
cordingly also its consequences. Anti-pluralism, media control 
and absence of a relevant autonomous civil society are gene-
rally among the characteristics of authoritarian populism in un-
consolidated democracies. 
The causes for the occurrence of populism in consolida-
ted democracies are various and range from those originating 
in the very structure and manner of functioning of developed 
democratic societies, down to those concrete (contextual) whi-
ch occur in times of political and/or economic crises. 
Populism
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It is exactly this eclectic nature, different manifestations, 
or “chameleonic” nature (Taggart, 2004: 275) which cause po-
pulism to be interpreted and defined in different ways and in-
spire different studying approaches: it is at times studied as a 
political discourse, or a manner of political organisation (Taggart, 
2004; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), it is at times identified 
with the populist movement (Canovan, 1999: 3; Torcuato di Tella, 
1995: 985), sometimes it is a subject of studying as a political 
mobilisation strategy (Jansen, 2011: 75, 82), or merely as a 
manner of political communication (Tarchi, 20002; Moffitt and 
Tormey 2014), or a political style (Taguieff, 1995, Tarchi, 2002). 
Studying populism as a political mobilisation strategy 
(Jansen, 2011: 82) is oriented towards mobilisation of margina-
lised parts of the society into a political force. The mobilisation 
is primarily implemented through nationalist and anti-elitist 
rhetoric, glorification of the people and contesting present po-
litical condition and order.  
The approach to studying populism through political dis-
course is based on the presumption that it is necessary to study 
the practice of political parties and movements in order to iden-
tify them as populist or not, whether they are articulated arou-
nd the keyword ‘the people’, or some other keywords (non-po-
pulist, or anti-populist) such as class, nation, freedom, natural 
environment. Another important determinant is the degree to 
which the image of the society they portray is antagonistic, and 
whether they divide the society into privileged elites and un-
derprivileged people (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014: 123). 
When approaching populism and a manner of organisati-
on of political parties, Taggart emphasises a high degree of 
centralisation and the key role of charismatic leader. However, 
these are not exclusively the characteristics of populist parties. 
Those who perceive populism as a political communica-
tion discourse (Werner Wirth-Frank Esser and others, 2016) or 
political style (Taguieff, 1995, Tarchi, 2002, Moffitt &Tormey, 
2014) define populists as those who claim that they represent 
the interests of the majority of ordinary citizens, regardless of 
their ideology and manifesting simplicity and directness when 
invoking the people and claiming to work for the people. They 
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deem populism to be lacking crucial values, such as freedom, 
equality, or social justice, so they thus believe that populism 
cannot be an ideology. 
Populism as a frame of thought, or relational concept. 
Combination of the ideas present in the work of Ernest Laclau 
(Laclau, 1980: 86) and the proponents of the framing theory, 
resulted in proposed rejection of the approach to populism as 
to a thin-centred ideology, and to simply perceive populism as a 
discursive (cognitive) frame. Discourse, interpreted through an 
objective framing analysis, becomes the right candidate to re-
place ideology and contribute to a superior analytical and met-
hodological perspective (Aslanidis, 2015: 1-17).2
Most definitions of populism suffer from “inherent in-
completeness” (Taggart, 2004: 275). One of the reasons for it is 
the fact that populism manifests differently depending on con-
textual conditions (Priester, 2007). Populism will be argued 
here within the context of contemporary political reality of Eu-
rope and Serbia, starting with the notion that populism is “a 
distinct set of political ideas” (Hawkins, 2010: 5) which manifest 
in different ways. It therefore seems appropriate to consider 
populism as a relational concept (Priester, 2012; Rooduijn, 
2013; Werner Wirth-Frank Esser and others, 2016). In order to 
describe constitutive elements of this concept and their mutual 
relations, we shall however use the definition of populism as a 
“thin-centred” or weakly founded ideology. 
A relational concept is inherently determined by the rela-
tions among the involved constituents. Relational network of 
populism can in short be described in the following way: soverei-
gnty of the people is located in the centre of the network, as 
the main motive for all the assertions and activities, as well as 
2  It is proposed that populism is rather conceptualised as a discourse, than 
an ideology. However, discursive conceptualisation of populism does not 
imply unselective application of Laclau’s concept. On the contrary, the 
“flaws” are mended by implementing the framing theory perspective on 
studying populist discourse. The introduction of the term of “populist 
frame” deals with cognitive aspects of the populist argumentation. The 
implementation of framing analysis on populism may stimulate empirical 
efforts, especially quantitative analyses, creating avenues for a compara-
tive cooperation within a wide interdisciplinary research project. 
Populism
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the principle of connection, or subject of consideration of all ot-
her elements included in the network. The remaining elements, 
i.e. people, elite and populist create a loose triangle surrounding 
sovereignty, where each of them holds its unique position in re-
lation to this centre and individual relations. In short, populist 
ideology asserts that the people are entitled to sovereignty, eli-
te and dangerous others threaten to deny the people this right, 
while populists aim to protect or return sovereignty to the peo-
ple (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 408). Therefore, the antagonisms 
between the people and the elite, or others are naturally esta-
blished (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3; Mudde, 2004: 543), 
while populist maintains positive, or close relationship towards 
the people, as well as a negative or distanced relationship 
towards the elite and dangerous others (Barr, 2009). 
The proponents of populism as a “thin-centred” (weakly 
founded) ideology rightly emphasise that populism can be com-
bined with other ideologies, such as socialism, in order to crea-
te a more comprehensive outlook on the world. While populism 
as a “thin” ideology refers to the relation between the people, 
elite and populists, the populism as a “thick” ideology determi-
nes who is included in, or excluded from these groups. Left-
wing populism, for example, defines the people as a class and 
perceives them as an opposition to economic elite; right-wing 
populism, conversely, defines the people as ethnos and percei-
ves them as an opposition to political and cultural elite. 
Sovereignty of People 
Sovereignty plays an important role in any given concept 
of democracy, yet within the populist ideology, it is the essen-
tial principle. When criticising the weaknesses of representative 
democracy, the rule of the people represents the central popu-
list argument. The populist conception of democracy differs 
from the constitutional and liberal. While, according to these 
two lines of reasoning, the area of power should remain “an 
empty space” (constitutional democracy, or be “replaced with 
entirely anonymous rule of law” in liberal democracy, the popu-
list reasoning implies that the people should exclusively occupy 
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that area. Politics should be based on a direct expression of the 
general will of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 406-408). 
Elites are accused of denying the people this right, and this is 
the core of the antagonism which populists give primacy to, 
attempting to impose themselves as a natural solution for the 
antagonism, while simultaneously presenting direct democracy 
as a way to overcome this antagonism. 
People 
People are the holder of sovereignty and as such, repre-
sent the key actor of populism (Taggart, 2000: 9; Stanley, 2008: 
102; Panizza, 2005: 4; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 6; Cano-
van, 1999: 4). In populism, the people are designated as homo-
genous (Stanley, 2008: 102; Rensmann, 2006: 64; Albertazzi & 
McDonnell, 2008: 4), a monolithic group (Taggart, 2000: 92), 
which form social unity, or community (Baumann, 2001: 12; Jan-
sen, 2011: 84). The people are endowed with certain virtues 
and described as an inherent and most important good (Tag-
gart, 2000: 93; Jansen, 2011: 84; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 
6). Taggart claims that the people can be deemed “silent majo-
rity”, while populists are those fighting for the people’s voice to 
be heard over the “clamouring minority” (2000: 93). 
However, according to Mudde, the people in the populist 
sense are neither real, nor all-inclusive, but rather a mythically 
built sub-set of the total population (Mudde, 2004: 546). Such 
conception of the people originates in the “heartland concept” 
(Taggart, 1996), an imagination casting glances backwards in an 
attempt to construct what has been lost by the present (Tag-
gart, 2000: 95). Priester (2012) uses “Middle America” or “La 
France Profonde” as the examples of the heartland. Bearing in 
mind the many possible interpretations of the people or the he-
artland, to create a universal definition seems impossible. ‘The 
people’ can instead mean different things to different populists 
in different circumstances. 
Three separate conceptions of ‘the people’ have been 
identified in the populist discourse: the first is the political, 
describing the people as being sovereign, as demos, or “United 
Populism
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People”. The people as demos consist of all the people in a sin-
gle political community. The second conception is the cultural 
one, perceiving the people “as a nation”, or as “our people” (Ca-
novan, 1999: 5; Kriesi, 2013: 3). This is the people in the ethnic 
sense, while populism excludes all those who do not belong to 
the ethos (e.g. foreigners, or others). The third conception – 
economic – describes people “as a class” and makes distinction 
between the people and the elite. 
Elite 
In the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, elitism is defi-
ned as a “belief in a selected group, or advocacy for leadership 
or domination of the selected group”. Those who support their 
speciality and above-averageness (elitists) believe them to be 
the natural social leaders, while their naysayers describe them 
as self-reproducing, exclusive and non-meritocratic. Elitism is 
the rejection of populism, just as populism is the rejection of 
elitism (Skorupski, 2000), not only when not based in meritocra-
tic principles, but even then, since in their essence, elites are 
perceived as alienated, egotistical and prone to corruption. 
Due to the negative connotations of the term elitism, the 
term meritocracy is increasingly used among liberal democrats 
to designate the system of social organisation where one’s po-
sition within the community is based on their ability, rather 
than wealth, familial descent, or affiliation with a class. In short, 
this is the society ruled by the most capable. Its critics, the po-
pulists being the most vociferous among them, believe that this 
is merely another way to legitimise the dominant roles of elites 
in the society. 
Within the populist relational network, the people con-
front “elites” (Mudde, 2004: 543). The antagonistic relationship 
between these two groups is a characteristic of every type of 
populism (Hawkins, 2009: 1042; Decker, 2006: 12; Meni & Surel, 
2002: 12); is “the main element of populism” (Panizza, 2004: 4; 
Stanlei, 2008: 102). The antagonism is so powerful and unreso-
lvable that it is described as Manichean (Mudde, 2004: 544). 
The people and the elite are perceived as originating from two 
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different realms, those of the good and the evil, the light and 
the darkness. 
Depending on the context and structure of the power, 
“elites” can be designated as a rather diffuse and heterogeneo-
us groups (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5). They are usually 
classified as political elites (government, or political establish-
ment), economic (bankers, managers), cultural (media), intelle-
ctual (scientists, authors). What they do have in common are the 
attributes ascribed to them, making them homogeneous in the 
populist narrative: elite is represented as “corrupt” and “exploi-
tative” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 4), “immoral” (Jansen, 
2011: 84), “selfish” and “arrogant” (Rooduijn, 2013: 6), or being 
characterised by “incompetence” (Meny & Surel, 2002: 9). 
In populism, the identity of elites is simply reduced to 
alienation from the people, which makes them homogeneous in 
relation to the people. Conceptualised as the people’s antago-
nist, elites are accused of betraying the people (Jansen, 2011: 
84) or for being “unable to deliver on the promises they have 
given” (Meny & Surel, 2002: 9), or merely working in their own 
interest and representing themselves only. Abusing the power 
vested in them by the people, corrupted elites have usurped, 
deformed and exploited democracy, sometimes to the point of 
its total degeneration (Albertazzi i McDonnell, 2008: 4). The pe-
ople, as the true democratic sovereign, lost their rightful place 
(Rensmann, 2006: 64). 
Populist 
The third actor in the populist relational network is the po-
pulist, the one criticising the elite for usurping sovereignty of the 
people (Rooduijn, 2013: 102) and strives to return the power to 
the people and to represent them (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 
4; Rensmann, 2006: 64). In literature, populists are represented as 
a movement (Kriesi, 2013), parties (Mudde, 2004), or a single per-
son: charismatic leader. Some scientists believe the existence of 
charismatic leader to be inherent to populism (Albertazzi & Mc-
Donnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Decker, 2006; Hartleb, 2014; Kriesi, 
2013). Others see such leaders as a frequent ingredient of 
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populism, but do not believe them to be its essential component 
(Hartleb, 2014; Mudde 2004; Panizza, 2005). Charismatic, eloquent 
spokespersons of the people are often outsiders of the political 
establishment (Kriesi, 2013: 7). They implement the people’s will 
(Barr, 2009: 40) and present themselves as people’s representati-
ves (Hartleb, 2014: 52).
Dangerous Others 
In addition to elites, dangerous others are also excluded 
from the people: national religious and linguistic minorities, as 
well as immigrants – they all compromise the homogeneity and 
purity of the people, they jeopardise and can become a threat 
for the people. Thus certain authors (Albertazzi & Mc Donnell, 
2008: 5) classify them as one of the crucial terms in defining po-
pulism, while others do not perceive them as a necessary ele-
ment, but connect them to radical right-wing populism, i.e. just 
one of the manifestations of populism. It seems, however, that 
dangerous others cannot be connected exclusively to radical ri-
ght-wing populism, providing that left-wing populism, for exam-
ple, also has its dangerous others, such as big corporations, 
banks and large capitalists perceived as a threat to the people. 
The enemies of the centrist, moralist populism are those that 
undermine the values and moral of the society, and are not re-
duced merely to elites. 
Populism as a Thin-Centred Ideology 
For the purpose of this book, we shall use the conception 
of populism as a thin-centred ideology. The term “thin-centred 
ideology” was first introduced by Freeden in 1996, using it to 
define thin, weakly founded ideology which becomes complete 
only in combination with some real and well-founded political 
ideologies, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, or natio-
nalism (Freeden, 1996). Political ideologies are interpreted here 
as political conceptual maps intended for citizens to allow them 
to better navigate and understand political space (Freeden, 
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2003) or “more or less coherent set of ideas that provides a ba-
sis for organized political action” and its central features are 
an account of the existing power relationships (Heywood, 
2002: 43). They mutually differ in relation to the three major 
components: 1. account of the existing order, 2. vision of the 
ideal society and 3. manner in which the existing condition co-
uld be overcome (Heywood, 2002). When it comes to populism, 
one might say that it shares the core of these three compo-
nents, yet it differs from other ideologies in these three aspe-
cts: 1. it blames alienated and corrupted political elites for the 
bad existing condition, 2. it imagines the ideal society as a so-
ciety in which the will of the homogeneous people is exercised, 
and 3. believes that the way to achieve this is for the people to 
take the matter into their own hands and decide on all the im-
portant political issues (Šalaj-Grbeša, 2017: 328). 
Apart from the concept of populism as a thin-centred 
ideology, we shall herein take into account the typology of po-
pulism, including essentialist (radical) and instrumentalist (ma-
instream) populism, as well as the fact that in practice, the phe-
nomenon of populism is characterised by a number of special 
traits, and that there is a continuous thread connecting these 
ideal-typical models. The space between liberal democrats and 
essentialist populists is quite wide in the political sense, and it 
accommodates different elements and modes of the populist 
style, action, or thin-centred ideology. Thus conceived, populi-
sm is not only a political discourse, or style, but also a kind of 
political map which makes it easier for the citizens to navigate 
the political space, and it will primarily be considered as such. 
Starting from the definition of populism given by the 
Dutch political scientist Mudde (2007) and accepted by an in-
creasing number of authors who perceive populism as somet-
hing more than the manner of political communication, political 
style, movement, or political mobilisation (Meny and Surel, 
2002; Albertazzi & McDonell, 2008; Mouffe, 2013), populism 
can be designated as a thin-centred ideology which at its core 
has the idea that politics should reflect the will of the people, 
the politics which positions pure and moral people in oppositi-
on to corrupted elites, as well as dangerous(unwanted) “others” 
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who, through their action, jeopardise, or compromise the rights 
and values of the people. 
The central idea of populism is that of the existence of 
pure, honest people and corrupted elites, thus neglecting clas-
ses, special interests and individual need. Margaret Canovan 
perceives this central idea of people’s sovereignty as an empha-
sis of democracy, or the direct reflection of the political will of 
the majority, contrary to the politics as the art of negotiation, 
agreement and compromise. Simultaneously, populists perceive 
themselves as the only true democrats (Canovan 2002: 25-44).
The starting definition that we used is value neutral 
when compared to those that perceive populism solely as a 
defect of democracy, such as that proposed by Jan Werner 
Müller who claims that the populist politics (democracy) is a 
kind of anti-pluralism, this being its characteristic wherever it is 
manifested (Müller, 2017). According to this perception, populi-
sm renders itself negative, providing that it is anti-pluralist in 
orientation, while the consequences of it are negative for the 
society. However, in principle, populism can also have positive 
effects, providing that it serves as an inspiration for the corre-
ction of negative phenomena, when, for example, it opposes 
the efforts of the political and economic elites to usurp the in-
stitutions and mechanisms of representative democracy. 
So, populism can, on the one hand, seriously compromise 
the democratic process and have a negative impact on the pro-
tection of human rights, while on the other, it could in principle 
create options for the recovery of democracy. In other words, 
populism should be considered within the context, not as an a 
priori threat to democracy, but is also a serious warning about 
disturbances in democratic processes, or a symptom of the cri-
sis of democracy. Namely, populism can warn about the flaws 
and weaknesses of democratic orders, as well as about the 
disturbed relationship between citizens and their political re-
presentatives. 
Through their radicalisation and simplification of politics, po-
pulist actors can disturb traditional democratic standards and values, 
but can also initiate processes towards de-escalation of social inequ-
alities and motivate a greater number of citizens to become involved 
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in political processes. Populism can render visible the advocacy for 
the inclusion of certain groups of citizens into political life, those 
that have previously been excluded from political processes, while it 
can also mobilise the society to repair the existing defects and thus 
contribute to democratisation of the political community. Further-
more, in principle, depending on the aims it adopts, its method and 
manner of action, populism can be more or less reactionary, or pro-
gressive (it can advocate for social justice and more just distribution 
of wealth), and more or less democratic (vying to involve in the deci-
sion-making process those who have been involuntarily excluded 
from it), or non-democratic (urging for certain social groups to be 
excluded from the process of making important decisions). 
Symbiotic Nature of Populism  
as a Thin-Centred Ideology 
It can be said that symbiosis is a term which is inextricably 
linked to the phenomenon of populism in both sense and essence: 
on the one hand, due to their “chameleonic nature”, the funda-
mental elements of the thin-centred populist ideology are symbio-
tically bound to elements of real ideologies, while on the other, 
the leader, as the unavoidable implementer (or creator) of the po-
pulist idea and programme, is in a symbiosis with the media, via 
which he/she reaches his/her followers. Populism can, therefore, 
conditionally be called a symbiotic phenomenon. 
Providing that, apart from the conceptual core of peo-
ple-elite and wider core which involves its attitude towards 
representative democracy – dangerous others, the remaining 
concrete elements of populism are filled with different con-
tents, depending on the political and social circumstances, po-
pulism is often eclectically merged with the elements of other 
ideologies. Thereby, for example, opposition to the elite as an 
important element of populism can be manifested in different 
ways: if elites are liberal, populists act from the right-wing posi-
tion, and if elites are conservative, populists occupy a part of 
the left-wing political spectrum. The attitude towards the 
unwanted “dangerous others” can be either reactionary or 
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progressive, “leftist” or “rightist”. As evidenced by history, po-
pulism can also be a foundation for a national movement of he-
terogeneous organisational structure, but also be connected to 
a single political party, or a number of them, related to workers’ 
unions, and be either urban or rural phenomenon. 
Special types of populism have developed in Latin America, 
due to specific historical and socio-economic circumstances. The ru-
lers there often utilise the populist discourse, style and manner of 
government, without firm ideological foundation, or they seek their 
ideological foundation through eclectic collaging of often disparate 
elements of both left-wing and right-wing ideologies. Often quoted 
as the most famous example was Peronism in Argentina, which chan-
ged the elements of its thin-centred populist ideology depending on 
the requirements of certain historical moment (Stanišić, 2014: 31-
55). The fact that a populist movement such as Peronism can easily 
replace the essential elements of its contents, supports the thesis of 
populism as a thin-centred ideology. This is evident in the example of 
economic nationalism and opposition to elites and “dangerous ot-
hers”, where Peronism as the general populist movement gave pri-
macy to different ideologies, named after its currently dominant lea-
ders (classical Peronism, Menemism and Kirchnerism were all 
different variants of the general populist movement). Namely, since 
its establishment, the Peronist Party changed its ideological grounds 
a couple of times, depending on the economic and political situation 
in the country and the power balance between the fractions, and ac-
cordingly, a charismatic leader would take the leadership of the par-
ty and change the crucial elements of the thin-centred populist ideo-
logy at will (Stanišić, 2014: 31-55).
Idealisation of the People 
and the Heartland (State) 
In addition to elitism, pluralism is also confronted with 
populism. The central idea of populism is that of the existence 
of the pure, honest people and corrupted elite, and such con-
ception neglects classes, special interests and individual needs. 
Paul Taggart connects the populist conception of the people 
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with the concept of heartland, implying the idealised communi-
ty tailored by and for the populist. That community is often not 
the ideal to be strived for, but rather an idealised community 
which used to exist before it was corrupted by political and bu-
siness elites (Taggart, 2002; 2004). 
Essentialist populists believe that the people have (or 
need to have) the universal and clear will which is properly re-
presented by them only, and this does not leave space for di-
versity. Political opponents are negated legitimacy of being aut-
hentic representatives of the people’s will. For essentialist 
populists, politics is not harmonisation of different interests 
though political institutions and procedures, but rather “the 
clash between the good and the evil” where any kind of com-
promise is undesirable. The populist concept of the rule of the 
people represents criticism of the institutions of representative 
democracy, which are fertile ground for the corruption and alie-
nation from the people’s will. The established political parties 
are particularly targeted by the populists who perceive them as 
the source of artificial divisions of the people, the generator of 
corruption and usurpers of the public interest. 
Everything is much easier in populism than in life, or esta-
blished politics. Even though in principle it should not have only 
negative connotations, populism in practice often manifests its 
negative traits, sooner or later, which resultes in the fact that 
when referred to in everyday conversation, populism today 
commonly implies ostentatious style, demagogy, unrealistic 
promises and unprincipled sycophancy towards the people (Lu-
tovac, 2017a: 50). Just like kitsch in art, populism lacks originali-
ty and is showy, cheap, colourful and snazzy, and accessible to 
all. Populist ideology, weakly founded, but often represented in 
the media as a grandiose political creation, is commonly but a 
soap bubble deprived of lasting value. 
The attraction of populism is based on calls for immedia-
te implementation of the people’s will, simple folk speech, uni-
fication of the people, or homogenisation in relation to some 
important issues. It is therefore quite similar to the idea of de-
mocracy, yet with simplified interpretation and reduced to the 
will of the majority, simultaneously marginalising the essentially 
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important respect for the minority. Instead of pluralism, pushed 
to the fore are the necessity of people’s unification, and direct 
communication in place of respecting “complicated” procedu-
res (Canovan, 2002: 26).
Those who study populism as a political ideology reduce 
the essence of populism to the idea that society is divided into 
two homogeneous, mutually opposed groups – corrupted elite 
and honest people. Unlike other political ideologies, populism 
neglects social differences among individuals, including social 
status, profession, class, or any other socio-cultural or so-
cio-economic diversity. All those differences are negligible for 
populism, when compared to the common antagonising positi-
on in relation to political elites. “Simultaneously, political elite, 
i.e. political class is treated as a homogeneous category, whe-
reby it is emphasised that there are declarative differences 
between certain political elites, so we have Christian demo-
crats, liberals, or social democrats, yet there are no true diffe-
rences among them” (Šalaj - Grbeša, 2017: 326). 
Therefore, the mobilisation of the people is aimed at es-
sential changes within the society and political system, towards 
the abolishment of monopolies and domination of the elite and 
with the ambition to impose the will of the people. The concept 
of sovereignty of the people’s will is, thus, an important se-
gment of the thin-centred populist ideology. Instead of the alie-
nated and corrupted politicians, the management of social and 
political processes should be taken over by the people, of cour-
se via people’s (populist) representatives – i.e. “non-politicians”, 
political volunteers dedicated to interpreting and exercising 
the people’s will. 
Essentialist (Radical) and Instrumentalist 
(Mainstream) Populism
For a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of po-
pulism, theoretical scientific literature differentiates between 
populism in the narrow sense (radical or essentialist populism 
and populism in a wider sense (mainstream or instrumentalist 
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populism). The former is a “people’s” anti-elitist and anti-syste-
mic thin-centred ideology which divides the society into “us” 
(just people) and “them” (opponents – enemies of the people); 
it tends to avoid the common democratic processes and thus 
weaken political institutions. So, radical populists call into que-
stion, and often even reject altogether the model of represen-
tative democracy and democratic institutions. Instead of the 
pluralist political model which is characteristic of liberal demo-
cracy and unconsolidated democracies on their path to be tran-
sformed into liberal democracies, radical populists tend to crea-
te a black and white picture of politics and the society, a 
representation in which they are the true representatives of 
the people, opposed to the alienated political elite which, with 
the aid of alienated democratic institutions, presents its own in-
terests as the interest of the people. 
In addition to political elites and ideological opponents, 
for the right-wing essentialist (radical) populists, the category 
of unwanted others (“those that we exclude”), i.e. “enemies of 
the people”, also includes foreigners, immigrants, or national 
minorities. Empirical research (Mudde, 2007; Flecker and ot-
hers, 2004; Norris, 2005) has shown that the persons who incli-
ne towards the right-wing radical populism, apart from the an-
ti-elitist attitudes which are characteristic of every type of 
populism, also have affinity to authoritarian positions, xenop-
hobia and nationalism. In other words, they make a symbiotic 
connection between this thin-centred ideology and some ele-
ments of the extreme right-wing political discourse, imposing 
themselves as authentic representatives of the national inte-
rest and interpreters of the people’s will. 
Right-wing essentialist (radical) populism is not a pheno-
menon associated exclusively with the poor part of the popula-
tion, as it is often implied in the public discourse. A major share 
of the citizens with the affinity to right-wing populist parties 
are those who do not wish to lose their socio-economic positi-
ons, whatever they may be, due to, for example, influx of immi-
grants (Mudde, 2007). Essentialist populist parties gain support 
when they succeed in mobilising the voters on the basis of the 
instigated fear, and quite often to supplement their radically 
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right-wing programmes or rhetoric with some left-wing attitu-
des when it comes to the socio-economic aspect (opposition to 
austerity measures and proposing some elements of a strong 
social state) in order to win over as much voters as possible 
(Lefkofridi and others, 2014). Right-wing radical populists base 
their action on the production and exclusion of “unwanted ot-
hers” on the one hand, while on the other they champion enc-
losing into the boundaries of the national. As a result, the space 
is cleared for the advent of authoritarianism, while pluralism is 
being stifled either indirectly, or immediately. 
For the right-wing populists, the dangerous others (prima-
rily immigrants and minorities) are also economically dangero-
us, as they steal jobs from “the people”, as well as culturally inti-
midating, as they jeopardise the culture of the people. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the left-wing popu-
lism, the unwanted or dangerous others are often large capita-
lists, or world powers who exploit the people in collusion with 
the exponents of their politics in the country. The left-wing po-
pulists leave class approach in their political discourse, placing 
the people into the centre of their politics, looking to involve 
as much people as possible. Simultaneously, left-wing populi-
sts are not averse to minorities and immigrants that their ri-
ght-wing counterparts perceive as dangerous others. 
What left-wing and right-wing populists have in com-
mon are anti-elitism and appealing to people, with dangero-
us others being social groups not belonging to political eli-
tes, yet not being a part of the people either, who are 
dangerous as they jeopardise the people and/or the state. 
Another common characteristic is their political capitalisation 
on the fears from “dangerous others”, as they found both their 
political programmes and their prioritised values on this con-
cept. There are also politicians whose discourse does not conta-
in the concept of dangerous others (like Miro Cerar in Slovenia), 
so some theoreticians classify them as centrist populists. In 
the centre of their attention is ideologically neutral need of 
returning moral values into politics. 
Relationship towards other is the composite element of 
identity, i.e. the perception that only in relation to other, one can 
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build awareness of oneself. This is also applicable to peoples and 
states. Max Webber wrote that ethnic identity is built on differen-
ce, that the awareness of belonging is not created in isolation, but 
on the contrary, by emphasising differences in the process of esta-
blishing ethnic borders (Veber, 1976: 323-337; Gadamer, 1989; 
Eriksen, 2004). Here lies a great potential for the development of 
populism and its inherent concept of dangerous others. The exam-
ples of the states created in dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia con-
firm this thesis (Lutovac, 2015: 23-28; Popov, 1993).
Targeted by the radical populists are political elites, as 
well as some liberal democratic institutions. What fuels these 
attacks is the criticism of implementing democracy in practice, 
perceived in the context of “true democracy”, democracy as 
they perceive it (Meny & Surel, 2002: 8).
Essentialist (radical) populists polarise societies, disquali-
fy their opponents in different ways, generate fear of forei-
gners and incite hostility towards “people’s traitors”, presen-
ting themselves as the voice of the people which would 
“remove” all that is standing in the path of people’s prosperity. 
Simultaneously, essentialist (radical) populists represent a dan-
ger for the political community and the society, but also a sobe-
ring warning to everyone who perceive the attained liberal de-
mocratic values as a natural condition and unchangeable fact. 
Instrumentalist (mainstream) populism could be prima-
rily defined as a manner of political communication of non-radi-
cal political actors, the actors who use populism to win as much 
support as possible at the elections. They can use a style which 
contains some elements characteristic of radical populism, yet 
the actors using it preserve their pluralist perception of the po-
litical system, without calling into question the crucial instituti-
ons of liberal democracy, or antagonising the society by divi-
ding it into “us” and “them” – political elites and “dangerous 
(unwanted) others”. However, it is possible that, even though 
they formally do not call into question the crucial institutions, 
they devalue their importance and influence through their acti-
on. Similarly, by utilising for their own benefit the danger of 
“unwanted or dangerous others”, they could also create anta-
gonism in the society. 
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The demagogy they use does not make them radical po-
pulists, yet the success they have with their demagogy might 
encourage them to cross the imaginary line between instru-
mentalist and essentialist populism. The crucial role in this can 
be played by the media, especially tabloids, but also tabloidisa-
tion of the so-called “serious media”. Successful mainstream po-
pulists amply use media in their self-promotion and reduce the-
ir politics to marketing techniques (Canovan, 1999). Thus 
quasi-politics suppresses real politics which becomes unintere-
sting when confronted with sensationalism. The cooperation of 
mainstream populists and tabloids/tabloidised media via marke-
ting intermediaries becomes a firm foundation for the domi-
nance at the political scene. Thereby, even though pluralism 
and institutions are not called into question, they practically re-
side in the deep shade of the populist manner of communicati-
on. Compromise is despised in political communication, while 
“the people’s will” interpreted in the populist key represents a 
real threat in transforming instrumentalist into essentialist po-
pulism. 
In modern Western democracy, the term populism is not 
used only for the politics which confronts common people with 
the establishment, but also for the politics implemented by 
“the insiders”, politicians in power practicing a kind of catch-all 
politics, using inclusive language to address the people as a 
whole (mainstream, instrumentalist populists). That kind of 
politics was practiced by Tony Blair, who used his success in the 
elections to reform the Labour party, distancing it from its so-
cialist workers’ image (not differentiating the people on the ba-
sis of this) presenting his Government as a service which wor-
ked in everyone’s interest (Canovan, 2004: 243). When it comes 
to Serbia, the very same thing can be said for the Serbian Pro-
gressive Party (SNS) and its leader Aleksandar Vučić. This is a 
political organisation without firm ideology, which appeals to 
all and includes in the ruling coalition everyone they can, regar-
dless of their programme or ideology, and all this is done “in 
the people’s interest”. 
Both radical (essentialist) and mainstream (instrumentalist) 
populists often try to present themselves as actors outside the 
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political arena – non-politicians, i.e. as those who want to make 
politics different by demonstrating that they are not like politi-
cians, yet they are forced to engage in politics to achieve the com-
mon good that established politicians do not care about. 
The role of the populist leader in the operation of popu-
list parties and movements, either essentialist or instrumenta-
list, is highly prominent (Canovan, 1999; Panizza, 2005; Alber-
tazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Šalaj, 2012). The populist leader is 
prone to messianic behaviour and he/she builds campaigns and 
overall image on the role of “people’s saviour” (Arditi, 2005), di-
rect communication with the people, his/her organic link to the 
people and aversion to political elite, even though that he/she 
frequently belonged to that very same elite up to the “moment 
of enlightenment”, or even after it. A major role in this is played 
by the media with their support of the populist leader in the 
constructive criticism, but also the demagogy that they tran-
sform into political profit. Simultaneously, populist can be obje-
ctively interesting to the media, as they make the media more 
attractive with their rhetoric. This symbiosis proves to be bene-
ficial for both the leader and the media. 
Value Neutral Approach to Populism 
Different types of populism have inspired authors to di-
fferent approaches in studying this phenomenon, while diffe-
rent approaches led to ascribing different characteristics to po-
pulism: from being a “different face of democracy” and 
“shadow of democracy” (Canovan, 1999), to “mirror of demo-
cracy” (Panizza, 2005) and “spectre of democracy” (Albertazzi & 
McDonnell, 2008). Populism may manifest in countries of deve-
loped democracy and economy, countries in transition, econo-
mically underdeveloped countries and developing countries (Ar-
diti, 2005). What they all have in common is that populism is 
related to democracy and its weaknesses. Social and political 
context, especially in the times of crises, give impetus to popu-
lism and it is thus often perceived as a symptom of a crisis of 
democracy. So, populism is a consequence rather than cause 
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of a crisis of democracy – the consequence which could gene-
rate further crisis, or be a warning and motive for its defusing 
and solving. In other words, the occurrence of populism can 
deepen the crisis or help in its resolving, which largely depends 
on political actors in different countries. Important indicators 
of such crisis include a high number of the poor and unem-
ployed, as well as increasing inequalities (Pikkety, 2014). Populi-
sm can occur as a reaction to some severe social crisis, or to the 
dominant feeling that the main political actors or social forces 
are unable to resolve such crisis (Taggart, 2002).
Democracy on the other hand, is not a given, unchangeable 
condition, but a process of constant adjustment to social changes 
(Meny & Surel, 2012: 17). In principle, populist actors can pave the 
path to reconciliation of economic inequalities and inclusion of a gre-
ater number of citizens into democratic processes, can lead to pro-
moted tolerance in the society, yet practice shows that things usually 
move in an entirely different direction. Expansion of the strong lea-
ders’ politics, of “people’s saviours” who “directly” communicate “the 
people’s will” and engage the people emotionally, while making the 
majority principle absolute, create risk of having the politics which is 
superficially democratic, but essentially authoritarian. 
Substantially important ingredient that makes populism 
relevant, and especially when populism is dominant, is the occu-
rrence of a “charismatic” leader and the mass media that su-
pport him/her. In unconsolidated (illiberal) democracies, the 
ground is even more fertile for the occurrence of populism, 
providing that there is no tradition of democratic political cul-
ture, while state and social institutions are underdeveloped, 
the rule of law is but a designated aim, while authoritarian poli-
tical frame of mind is susceptible to the emergence of a messia-
nic leader who, with the support of the media, reconceptualises 
democratic political postulates, or prevents them from beco-
ming established. Populists as major political actors are prone 
to avoiding or abolishing the limitations established in the de-
mocratic process, the limitations which safeguard general inte-
rest and fundamental rights and freedoms. 
In everyday life, populism has become synonymous with 
demagogy, easily promised swiftness of change for the better, 
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unrealistic promises, flirting with wide popular masses, indecent 
flattery to electorate, offering easy solutions for complex pro-
blems... In everyday speech, populists are those ready to smear ot-
hers, incite low sentiments and stir up emotions in order to win 
easy political points and obtain support. They are designated as 
tricksters, demagogues, opportunists. It is not uncommon for po-
pulism to be similarly interpreted in academic community, among 
those who, by virtue of their occupation, should be more cautious 
in using and interpreting concepts and terms. 
Populists themselves, either supporters, or immediate 
actors, perceive populism in an entirely different way than tho-
se criticising it or using the term in its predominant everyday 
meaning. Invoking its original meaning from the times of its ini-
tial occurrence, they perceive it as the rule in the name of the 
people, i.e. the essence of democracy (Dahrendorf, 2003:156). 
Populism can be of leftist, rightist, or centrist origin, or rat-
her inspiration, providing that it is often thoroughly changed once 
it has created a symbiosis with an ideology. It therefore might be 
better to concentrate on the fact whether a concrete manifestati-
on of populism has a progressive or reactionary outcome; whether 
it contributes to social changes for the better or for the worse, or 
it actually prevents any changes from happening. 
Whether populism is a defect of democracy, pathological 
form of democracy similar to right-wing radicalism (Betz, 1994), 
autoimmune disease (Jan Verner Miler, 2017), or it can in fact 
be put into a different perspective, as a corrector of anomalies, 
or at least an initiator of confrontation with the flaws of liberal 
democracies – this largely depends on the very definition of po-
pulism, on the perspective from which populism is perceived 
and the consequences that it produces. 
More and more prevalent opinion is that populism is not a 
foreign body in the system of democracy, but that it has become 
rather mainstream in the politics of Western democracy – “popu-
list Zeitgeist” (Mudde, 2004: 542). This has been amply supported 
by the results of the elections in the European Parliament in 2014, 
when the majorities voted for the National Front, and the parties 
which opted for the independence of the UK, as well as for the Da-
nish Popular Party in their respective countries (European 
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Parliament, 2014). Regardless of whether we talk of populism as a 
disturbing phenomenon, or popular Zeitgeist, it retains its elusive 
nature. The phenomenon of populism is not easily studied, espe-
cially empirically. Thus the studies of populism employ different 
research paradigms, rooted in different theories. 
Use of the Term ‘Populism’ 
Unselective and frequent use of the term ‘populism’ led to the 
constant re-examination of the use of this term. It is not uncommonly 
heard that the “populism theory” is in fact a quasi-theory which ren-
ders relative the meaning of some established phenomena, concepts 
and ideologies. Is this in fact a theory or simply a conceptual decepti-
on (Ziegler, 2018), or possibly both, depending on who deals with po-
pulism? On the one hand, a deception which attempts to ascribe to 
newer manifestations of the old phenomena more neutral, or less 
abrasive meaning than the one that these or similar phenomena 
had in the past, which as a rule turned into bad practice, while on the 
other, a deception which lends negative connotations to justified 
social and political initiatives. 
So, inappropriate use of the term of populism in the public dis-
course may serve to make some dangerous phenomena seem ba-
nal, but also to downgrade some justified demands. On the one 
hand we have an attempt to depersonalise some dangerous extreme 
rightist movements and their demands through the use of the term, 
while on the other, some serious social initiatives such as those con-
cerning better healthcare or investments in education are designated 
as being populist. Vesting the characteristics of “scientific objectivi-
sm” to the inadequate use of the term of populism, additionally con-
tributes to the general confusion in relation to populism. 
Historically speaking, populism has been used for 1. Stren-
gthening of the democratic aspect of liberal democracy – in-
volvement of a larger number of people in decision making proce-
ss, but also for 2. Weakening of the liberal, when the demands 
for strengthening of the democratic have disturbed the balance of 
these two values, and 3. Formulating and utilising unrealistic pro-
mises for the purpose of political profit. 
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The motives which led to mobilisation of the people also 
define the very nature of the populism, together with the 
manners of utilisation and achieving results in the process. 
When political parties are chauvinist, racist, anti-minority, 
and parties which see enemies all around them – then their de-
signation as populist is in fact camouflaging their dark essence. 
When, for example, anti-liberal and essentially anti-democratic 
parties are ascribed the attribute of populism, this actually ma-
kes them more acceptable in the public discourse. Such parties 
erode democracy, or embryo of democracy where democracy is 
still not fully developed. Upon coming to power, they create or 
strengthen electoral autocracy, abolish control and balance of 
power, monopolise media and public institutions. 
For the right-wing radicalism, the term of populism is 
an anaesthetic substance – the agent of their socialisation 
and the danger of banalisation is all the greater as the radicali-
sm of the right-wing ideas is more pronounced3. On the other 
hand, identification of populism with left-wing traditionalist 
parties primarily represents dilution of justified social demands. 
The essential difference between radical right-wing 
actors and mainstream populists is that the former are an-
ti-systemic, while latter are anti-establishmentarian actors 
(this includes both left-wing and right-wing radicalism). The fact 
that someone is a radical rightist does not mean that he/she 
does not practice populism, yet his/her dealings cannot be re-
duced to populism, or be designated as such, because this ca-
mouflages the substance of right-wing radicalism, while populi-
sm is reduced to a single manifestation of the phenomenon. It 
is thus necessary to emphasise the symbiotic nature of populi-
sm and make distinction between these terms and phenomena. 
This is also true for radical leftist actors and the use of the term 
of populism in this context. 
3  In 2017, Germany saw more than 23,000 hate crimes, around 900 asylum 
houses were attacked, 1,313 physical assaults committed, 18 murders at-
tempted. The so-called “populist” parties, such as the AfD, create proper 
atmosphere for this hatred. Tamas Dezso Ziegler, “The Populist Hoax – Get-
ting the Far Right and Post- Fascism Wrong”, Social Europe, 2 February 2018.
Populism
39
Marginalisation of the Left and Breakthrough  
of the Radical Right under the Auspices  
of Populist Relativisation 
The Italian election of 2018 confirmed further strengthe-
ning of populism and marginalisation of the Left, as well as that 
the rise of populism and nationalism is not limited to the “mar-
gins of Europe”, as it has frequently been stated (Rae, 2018). 
However, there are considerable differences between ri-
ght-wing radical political parties and movements and those pro-
filed as left-wing. 
Regardless of this fact, the parties and movements such 
as Syriza, Podemos and to an extent British Labour Party are 
lumped together on the basis of their populism with the parties 
such as Alternative for Germany (AFD) or National Front in Fran-
ce. These examples confirm that populism may be and is used 
for relativisation of radical rightist ideas. Also, none of the afo-
rementioned left-wing options is exceedingly radical in their 
ideas, manifestation and action, so they can by no means be de-
signated as extreme. 
The problem does not lie in the very definition of populi-
sm, but in wide definitions intended to relativise right-wing 
extremism. In other words, a definition is not problematic if it 
excludes the possibility of such relativisation. However, if no 
clear distinction exists, then this serves to perpetuate the falla-
cy that no essential difference exists between leftist and ri-
ghtist extremism. This position has gained momentum in the 
last couple of years, developed from the theory of “totalitarian 
twins” of fascism and communism (posited by German historian 
Ernst Nolte) into the idea that the acceptable politics is pri-
marily focused on excluding the extreme options from the 
left-wing and the right-wing sides of the political spectrum. 
Deviation of “The Third Way” from the Left 
The idea of removing both leftist and rightist extremes 
was promoted by the Blairists, their initial thesis being that the 
old Left and Right did not exist anymore and that the 
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Progressivists should occupy and widen the political centre. It is 
important to note that this idea won many a supporter in the 
age of the prosperous post-materialist capitalism, and that one 
of the main messages concerned the importance of widening 
the middle class on the basis of post-materialist values, thus 
providing social and political foundation for the rising political 
centre. However, “bursting of the financial bubble” in 2008 and 
the major financial crisis that ensued, called into question such 
strategy. Namely, on the wave of the idea of widening the Cen-
tre, mainstream European social democrats became accompli-
ces to the protagonists of financial capitalism, which induced a 
drastic fall of these parties’ ratings all over Europe (Rae, 2018). 
In both the West and East of Europe (countries such as Hungary 
and Poland), social democrats openly embraced the ideology of 
the “third way” and economic programmes which fully empathi-
sed with the dominance of financial capital, which seriously de-
graded their credibility in the eyes of the voters. Their defeats 
cleared the way for the rise of populism. 
***
Experience shows that populism can be stimulating for 
the process of destroying the democratic substance encrusted 
with formal democracy, yet its identification with malignant so-
cial phenomena adds confusion in studying the populism of the-
se very phenomena, since it serves to relativise its contents and 
significance. Those who used to be called extremists, Nazis, or 
fascists are now designated populists in the public discourse 
(Bar-On, 2019), i.e. they are made equal to those political groups 
who utilise populist narratives to add attraction to certain social 
demands and leftist ideas.4 To give the same name to those 
who demand healthcare for all and want pensions to be adju-
sted in line with the inflation, and those who relativise the 
4  In Serbia, the process is reversed: benign phenomena are ascribed malig-
nant characteristics. By using too strong a terminology, inadequate charac-
teristics are ascribed to people and things. This is particularly true when it 
comes to the use of the term fascism by the ruling parties and the media 
under their influence, but also by some opposition parties. 
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universality of human rights, is unacceptable, both scientifically 
and socially. The demands for a better access to universities 
cannot be given the same name as the outcry for the abolish-
ment of migrants’ rights. So, the term populism should not be 
used as a synonym for aggressive and radical rightist move-
ments, let alone for the political movements and groups which 
fight for elementary justice and social protection (Ziegler, 2018). 
However, what brings together these ideologically oppo-
sed political options is their negative attitude towards political 
elites, weaknesses of representative democracy and their sy-
cophancy to the people who should “take the matter into their 
own hands”. What does make the difference, however, is their 
attitude towards “dangerous others”, differently perceived and 
interacted with by these two political options. 
Many an anti-democratic party uses democratic mimicry 
to camouflage itself. These parties are actually thoroughly an-
ti-democratic, which is best revealed once they come to power. 
They do not believe in democracy and its fundamental values, 
such as pluralism, or equality, where every human being is asse-
ssed in line with his/her merit, rather than some inherent biolo-
gical characteristics. “Most of these parties are based on the 
same anti-enlightenment attitude which served as the core of 
historical Fascism” (Ziegler, 2018). 
Populists do not wish to appeal to all, but only to those 
that they designated as the people. On the contrary, populists 
need dangerous (unwanted) others in order to establish them-
selves as people’s representatives, protecting them against tho-
se dangerous others. These may include national (ethnic) mino-
rities, political opponents discredited as enemies, or external 
dangerous others – certain states, neighbours, global forces, in-
ternational companies, nongovernmental organisations… Po-
pulist have their finger steadily on the pulse of those that they 
designated as the people and they tell them what they want to 
hear, offering them the very things that they would like to 
have, or achieve. 

Populism – A Global Phenomenon 
The weaknesses of representative democracy: spa-
ce for the rise of populism – Structural and exter-
nal causes of the expansion of populism in Europe 
– Authoritarian populism – Populism in Western 
and Eastern Europe – Pro-European anti-populist 
resistance 

Apart from the systemic preconditions for the appearan-
ce and strengthening of populism – primarily those related to 
the weaknesses of representative democracy – significant fa-
ctors in it strengthening also include some global phenomena 
such as the increase in inequality and terrorism, or the great 
migration wave. Searching for solutions to these challenges, 
populists all around the world have found favourable atmosp-
here to develop and carry out their own political agenda.    
In addition to the traditionally “favourable” atmosphere 
in Latin American countries, populism has been finding strong-
holds in the USA, the United Kingdom, Greece, Russia, Turkey, 
and Europe-wide… Authoritarians are growing stronger, and 
the range of their rule is only limited by the amount of strength 
possessed by the institutions, democratic practices, and politi-
cal cultures in the countries where they rule. 
What connects them? What do all of them have in com-
mon? What are the characteristics they all share? 
The Weaknesses of Representative Democracy: 
Migrants, Alienated Elites – Space for the  
Rise of Populism
People’s struggle for sovereignty against alienated elites 
and the weaknesses of representative democracy is the common 
thread that links different populists. Distrust of and even doubts 
about democratic institutions frequently appear in times of econo-
mic crises such as the one in Greece, or in times of “dangers to cul-
tural identity” and security, which have spread on the wave of mi-
xed migration via Turkey and Greece farther across Europe. Of 
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course, the losers of globalisation, that is, victims of the global la-
bour share and development of technology, nearly complete the 
picture of those who are potentially dissatisfied and thus prone to 
supporting populist responses to life challenges.      
In many countries, institutions and established political par-
ties have not managed to cope with such challenges by means of 
standard democratic practices, so populist parties, movements, 
and individuals entered the empty political and social space, offe-
ring simple solutions for facing these challenges. The narratives of 
populists, as well as extremists, were reduced to the established 
parties having missed the opportunity they had, institutions being 
in the service of corrupt and estranged politicians instead of the 
people, and new social forces (movements) appearing which wo-
uld, on behalf of the people, for the benefit of the people, and in 
direct communication with the people, solve the problems that 
the established parties could not or did not wish to solve.    
The empty space in Greece was filled by the left-wing popu-
list Syriza and the far-right Golden Dawn, which criticizing the 
system managed to upstage the established PASOK and New De-
mocracy precisely because citizens equated the latter two with 
the system. The trigger for this was financial crisis, the decline of 
the standard of living,5 as well as the migration wave, which brou-
ght up the questions of security and threatened identity. The lea-
der of Greek’s Syriza, Tsipras, is one of the populists who promised 
to overcome institutional obstacles once his politics for the people 
5  “Enterprises, trade unions and professional groups sought political favour 
to advance their interests, each at the expense of others. New Democracy 
and PASOK, the two parties that exercised power alternately from 1974 
until 2011 favoured the groups that supported them by offering protection 
to groups that felt threatened by the market and by increasing employ-
ment in the public sector. The logical outcome was a generalized opposi-
tion to structural reforms. ... The accumulation of debt did not preoccupy 
politicians, since they could secure credits from the European Central Bank. 
This politico-economic model was obviously irrational. It was dominated by 
state-dependent oligopolistic enterprises, trade unions, protectionism at 
all levels and subsidized enterprise. This model crumbled with the world 
recession of 2008. The Greek economy as well as society suffered a rude 
shock. Unemployment rose to more than 25%, and accumulated debt had 
to be repaid.” Dimitris Dimitrakos, “An Anti-liberal Challenge – Populism in 
21st Century Greece,” in Proceedings: Abusing the People: Global Challenges 
of Authoritarian Populism, Libertarian Club – Libek, Belgrade, 2017, p. 72).
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was achieved (2017), but the same kind of populism had also been 
promoted by Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the established 
PASOK (1989), who said that “institutions should not stand in the 
way of the people’s sovereign power” (Dimitrakos, 2017: 71). Just 
like this early populism, the modern one also does not entirely call 
into question the political or social system, and it is therefore not 
revolutionary although the very fact that it calls for “bypassing” 
the system and institutions gives it a measure of destructiveness. 
Such an approach is not anti-democratic – on the contrary, it pur-
ports to present itself as popular and democratic, although it is 
deeply anti-liberal, anti-pluralistic, and inimical towards open so-
ciety. The limitless rule of the majority over the “defeated” minori-
ty is a banalized and deeply wrong interpretation of democracy, 
whose roots can also be traced back to the undemocratic political 
culture and tradition of the recent political history of many coun-
tries, including Greece.        
Nevertheless, in the elections of 7 July 2019 Syriza lost 
the majority support of citizens. This could not be called a defe-
at, although the party won over 30% of the vote and New De-
mocracy nearly 40%, because it practically did not fulfil any of 
the promises made in the previous elections and, additionally, it 
resolved the dispute over North Macedonia’s name in a way 
that was not so popular in Greece. Hence Syriza lost the electi-
on formally though not in essence, bearing in mind the relation 
between promises made and fulfilled. On the other hand, the 
radical right-wing Golden Dawn did not cross the 3% electoral 
threshold, which could be brought into direct relationship with 
the fact that migrant crisis in Greece was not in the forefront of 
the campaigns.    
 The example of Greece confirmed some earlier experien-
ces of populists being unsurpassable at making promises, but it 
also confirmed that fulfilling promises is a huge problem. The-
refore, the example of Greece also showed that populists rise 
and fall precisely on easily given unfounded promises.  
The peak of populism in the United Kingdom can be 
seen in the Brexit referendum results. Regardless of the strong 
campaign of public opinion makers, the political and economic 
elite, and the university (or is it due to this campaign?), the 
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citizens of the UK voted “leave” in Brexit. The role of immi-
grants in the campaign was important. It is generally believed 
by the supporters of Brexit that immigrants from the EU brou-
ght benefits for the rich and educated middle classes, whereas 
their presence has been perceived as a realistic threat to manu-
al labourers and rural manpower. 
Additionally, the same syndrome was developed in the UK 
as in the wealthier republics of Yugoslavia, which on the eve of the 
breakup of SFRY considered that they were financing unproducti-
veness and laziness of the citizens of those less developed republi-
cs. The opinion was widespread in the UK that vast amounts of 
money were being sent to Brussels to be spent without a clear pur-
pose by the irresponsible elites, and that that EU administration was 
parasitizing on the UK tax payers. What is more, the EU administra-
tion was also imposing a whole lot of unnecessary regulations to 
curtail the freedom of small businesses or business in general. In 
accordance with the evolution of populism in other developed de-
mocracies, the citizens here also viewed the political and economic 
elites, as well as journalists, as a special political class (or caste) 
which was completely alienated from ordinary people and absor-
bed in nothing but their own interests.          
In Italy, Beppe Grillo came into power promising to take 
power from the self-sufficient geriatric “political caste” and 
fight for a more modern and tolerant Italy. When the Five Star 
Movement became strong enough, it soon assumed anti-syste-
mic narratives, in accordance with the matrix of populism. Gri-
llo’s attacks on certain politicians’ corruption and affairs gradu-
ally turned into a radical rejection of the key aspects of the 
political system, including the parliament itself. Dissatisfaction 
with the political establishment is one of the key initiators of 
populism-related engagement, and one so strong that it launc-
hed a proliferation of conspiracy theories and open lies about 
political opponents, thus turning from an anti-establishment 
into an anti-systemic discourse.  
In Eastern Europe, populists have more and more 
frequently been defeating traditional parties in the elections or 
have otherwise become strong enough to be inevitable coaliti-
on partners, or the main opposition at the very least. Of the 15 
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Eastern European countries, populist parties in 2018 were in 
power in seven, part of the ruling coalition in two, and main 
opposition in three. Populist parties in 2000 had 20% or more 
votes in only two Eastern European countries, and this result 
was by 2018 achieved in ten Eastern European countries (Siera-
kowski, 2018). The onslaught of populism would look even 
more dramatic if various forms and contents within the establi-
shed parties were also taken into consideration. 
There is more and more evidence to sustain that we are 
in an era of populism. The question is to what extent this will 
affect the basis of liberal democracy and the “democratic world 
order.” Democracy is stable when all main political actors stick 
to the basic rules of the game of democracy. Some of these ru-
les are formal, and some are customary, tacit, implied. The pre-
sident or prime minister shall not obstruct justice during inve-
stigations of government members. The freedom of the press 
shall not be restrained, journalists shall not be persecuted or 
blackmailed. When the election is lost, power shall peacefully 
be given over… Certain limitations to party interests have to 
exist so that the rule of law would not be turned into a one-par-
ty state. There are more and more countries in which this, 
thanks to the populists, does not any longer go without saying. 
And this is the key factor for the phenomenon of populism per-
sistently being one of the main themes of political science.     
   
Structural and External Causes of the  
Expansion of Populism in Europe
The strengthening of populism in Europe is on the one 
hand related to the strengthening of resistance to economic 
globalisation, whereas on the other hand the rapid strengthe-
ning of populism corresponds to the migrant crisis, which reac-
hed its peak in 2015 and 2016. Both these causes (occasions) 
for the strengthening of populism also opened the questions of 
the place and role of national states within the EU.    
Or is this perhaps a mere coincidence? Are the stated 
causes overrated when compared to the structural 
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weaknesses of representative democracy? If not, it certainly is 
a challenge for social sciences to perform research to determi-
ne the extent to which the migrant crisis influenced the expan-
sion of populism. Associations to populism are varied and nu-
merous: the strengthening of Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and 
Justice Party in Poland confirmed in October 2015, followed by 
Brexit in the UK in June 2016. The rise of popularity and in-
fluence of the far-left has also been noted in the Netherlands, 
France, Germany, Austria, and then the Eastern Europe, particu-
larly Hungary. “The defence of Europe against immigrants” is 
becoming a significant political topic.   
Populists came into power in Italy at the beginning of 
2018, and in March that same year Putin showed his power in 
the Russian elections. In April 2018 Viktor Orbán led the popu-
list campaign against “dangerous others,” the enemies of the 
Hungarian state: migrants and the external enemy from the 
world of finances, embodied in George Soros – and he won a 
convincing majority. Erdoğan grew factually and institutionally 
stronger before and after the referendum on power concentra-
tion, attacking both internal and external enemies… The shar-
pening of rhetoric and politics by the strongmen rulers within 
and among the Balkan countries is more or less connected to 
populism, and the strengthening of populism in turn also rela-
ted to the great migration wave, although this is still not the 
dominant political theme in the Balkans.  
  Fear manipulation and manipulating threats dominate 
over the international political scene, which is in the growing 
number of European countries used by the right-wing populists, 
whereas left-wing populists deal with the redistribution of 
economic power, thus upstaging the faltering social democrats 
from whom voters wish to hear less and less. 
Populism is precisely the phenomenon which is with 
more or less justification being related to these seemingly in-
comparable states and regimes. On the other hand, the questi-
on is raised of whether populism, in itself controversial, can be 
the least common denominator of research into the political 
events and phenomena in such different states.  
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Populist movements and narratives search for and find 
their strongholds not only in the great migration crisis but also 
in traditional sources: nationalism, anti-elitism, anti-liberali-
sm, nativism, and increasingly in anti-globalism. It is precisely 
anti-globalism that has been recruiting a great number of popu-
lism makers and supporters, thus dominantly marking the phe-
nomenon of populism for the 21st century. 
Populism manifests through manipulations of the media, 
the production of pseudo-events, politicisation of court verdi-
cts, proclamation of political opponents as enemies, production 
and formation of “dangerous others.” 
Populism does not only appear as an “alternative” to the 
established parties – it is at the same time infiltrating them as 
well as society on the whole. The narrative of populism widens 
the gap between the political class and society, but it does not 
provide rational answers to the crisis of representative de-
mocracy. Populism grows in the atmosphere of political and so-
cial divisions and favours the destruction of “the people’s 
enemy” over compromise. It is formed on and developed from 
citizens’ loss of confidence in the established parties as well as 
institutions of representative democracy, but it also disappears 
due to failed expectations. It finally turns out that easily gi-
ven promises are not fulfilled, and therefore populists lose 
their trust. This is how the circle of distrust, easily given and 
unfulfilled promises, and failed expectations is closed.  
Apart from the examples of populist breakthrough, there 
are also examples of successful resistance to populism: from 
Macron in France, through the formation of the great coalition 
in Germany, which united CDU/CSU and the moderate-right and 
moderate-left SDP, “everything-but-the-populists” in the Net-
herlands, to the moderate left in coalition with the radical tho-
ugh pro-European left in Portugal (Botopoulos, 2018).
Austria presents a completely different example of facing po-
pulism: the co-opting of right-wing populists into the ruling coalition. 
Although it can instigate processes for the removal of the defects of 
representative democracy, the example of Austria shows that populi-
sm is in its essence most usually irrational and of anti-pluralistic orien-
tation, as well as dangerous to democratic values – and therefore 
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cannot be suppressed by any similar populist methods or means. It is 
exactly the opposite – it is necessary to search for the ways to remo-
ve the defects of democracy and allow for a more direct and active 
participation of citizens in the formulation and fulfilment of political 
goals through adequate rational narratives, better communication, 
more frequent contacts and closer connections with citizens.
Authoritarian Populism
Reducing populism to leaders’ personal  
characteristics and ways of communication
Apart from the listed structural causes, it is with more and more 
frequency that leaders’ personal characteristics and ways of political 
communication are being stated as what populists have in common: 
xenophobic language, attacks on “the elites,” and despise and disgust 
for international institutions of all kinds. What links Donald Trump, Vik-
tor Orbán, Andrej Babiš, Jarosław Kaczyński, and Marine Le Pen, accor-
ding to Anne Applebaum, is one simple personal characteristic: hypocri-
sy. These politicians are not people’s tribunes, they are hackers. They 
are not enemies of the Western system: they are frauds who strive to 
profit from xenophobia, anti-elitism, anti-globalism, nationalism.6
6  “How else to interpret the news that Trump’s Bedminster, N.J., golf club, 
the one his aides refer to as the ‘Summer White House,’ has employed ille-
gal immigrants … a similar story appeared in Prague. Babis, the Czech 
prime minister, is another politician who likes to talk up his opposition to 
migration. Yet the factories controlled by his holding company, Agrofert, 
employ a wide range of underpaid foreigners: Vietnamese, Mongolian, 
Ukrainian. A journalist who recently visited one of the factories found Viet-
namese families living in company-owned accommodation. Again, these 
aren’t accidents or small slip-ups: These are long-standing policies going 
back many years. Hypocrisy is also the signature character trait of Orban, 
the Hungarian leader who has cleverly styled himself as the enemy of ‘im-
migration’ and the European Union. Follow the money, and the story is 
different: Even as Orban’s anti-immigration rhetoric reached hysterical 
levels, his government was running a ‘Golden Visa’ program that allowed 
more than 19,000 people, including some well-connected Syrians, to buy 
residency in Hungary. Naturally, people close to the prime minister appear 
to have benefited; unsurprisingly, many people close to the prime minister 
have also personally benefited from E.U. funding programs. … Hypocrisy is 
not limited to those “populists” in power. Le Pen’s anti-European party long 
sustained itself using money from the European Parliament. Hypocrisy does 
not only concern immigration, either. Kaczynski, the Polish ‘populist’ leader, 
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So, hypocrisy, or rather the way of acting and communi-
cating, does help explain why all of these leaders, as soon as 
they get anywhere near power, instinctively seek to undermine 
the press, to remove judicial independence and to control pro-
secutors and police. It also explains why they are such “notorio-
us liars.” Their private agendas are very different from the ones 
they declare in public, and they don’t want any of us to find out 
(Applebaum, 2019).
In order to survive as competition for the authoritarian po-
pulists, mainstream politicians should understand the causes of ci-
tizens’ (popular) dissatisfaction and renew the founding principles 
of democracy. “Until recently, liberal democracy reigned triump-
hant. For all its shortcomings, most citizens seemed deeply com-
mitted to their form of government. The economy was growing. 
Radical parties were insignificant. Political scientists thought that 
democracy in places like France or the United States had long ago 
been set in stone, and would change little in the years to come. 
Politically speaking, it seemed, the future would not be much di-
fferent from the past.” (Mounk, 2018a).
However, citizens are disappointed with parties, govern-
ments, and politics in general; they have become anxious, an-
gry, bitter even. They have also become essentially unhappy 
with representative democracy and all of its specific weaknes-
ses. Authoritarian populists, on the wave of this dissatisfaction, 
are in expansion globally. Neither they nor their voters see any 
problems in it. On the contrary, authoritarians consider themse-
lves to be the real response to all the weaknesses of represen-
tative democracy, whereas their voters vote for them for 
has railed against supposed networks of former communists in Poland, 
claiming they’ve been making money out of former state property. Yet he 
has recently been accused of serving as the de facto controller of a compa-
ny that did a deal to procure land from the state in the 1990s; the company 
has big plans to build skyscrapers on the land and employs a former secret 
police informer as its nominal chairman. Hypocrisy isn’t even limited to 
“populists” on the right: Hugo Chávez’s crusade on behalf of Venezuela’s 
poor quickly turned into a kleptocratic money grab that left the people 
around him extremely wealthy.” Anne Applebaum, “It’s not xenophobia 
that links the ‘new populists.’ It’s hypocrisy”  https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2019/02/11/its-not-xenophobia-that-links-new-popu-
lists-its-hypocrisy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.619ce7231012
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different reasons, but with common dissatisfaction as to how 
democracy works and why the political elites are alienated.    
The example of Donald Trump is often cited as the most 
striking manifestation of democracy’s crisis at the global level. He 
is a typical example of the populist who appeals to the people. 
However, he defines the people in typically populist terms: the 
people are those who support his politics. Thus, on 7 May 2016 
Trump declared that “the only important thing is the unification 
of the people – because the other people don’t mean anything,” 
clearly implying that among the USA citizens there are those who 
do not belong to the people. He referred to the media as the ene-
mies of the people, thus ticking one of the obligatory boxes for a 
clear profiling of populism. So, the other people either do not 
matter, or else they matter as the people’s enemies, which is mar-
ked as the central characteristic of authoritarian populism.  
In Russia and Turkey, elected strongmen successfully re-
move the limitations to their own rule institutionally or outside 
institutions. In Poland, Hungary, and Serbia, populist leaders are 
using almost the same mould to destroy the free media, under-
mine independent institutions, and muzzle the opposition.
The populists who are in symbiosis with radical ideas are 
on the rise, just like those who actually form the radical right in 
Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
even Sweden, and hide their extremism behind patriotic slo-
gans. “Hiding” was in the public sphere aided by the public opi-
nion makers, who reduced their extremism to populism. 
As has already been stated, right-wing extremists are not 
the same as populists, and designating them as such leads 
towards a dilution of their extremist nature. They use populist 
narratives and populist ways of public communication, but their 
activities are more detrimental to political culture and the foun-
ding institutions of representative democracy than the populi-
sm of more moderate political groups of any ideological bac-
kground. In Greece and Spain, the victories of the populists, or 
rather the defeats of the established parties, have challenged 
the very foundations of the multi-party system, but these cases 
still did not entail extremism of the kind that would undermine 
the foundations of European values.  
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In some other countries, the extreme right-wing options, 
designated as populists with attenuation, directly shake those very 
fundamental values. In Austria, the far-right candidate came close 
to becoming president. In France, the extreme right-wing politi-
cians united everyone in support of the opponent of their candida-
te in the presidential elections. The political atmosphere throug-
hout Europe is changing rapidly, right-wing extremism is becoming 
more and more visible, the Left has lost its traditional voters due 
to its flirtations with large capital and their more or less open su-
pport for financial fundamentalism.   
And this is where a clear line should be drawn between 
right-wing populism and right-wing extremism: along questio-
ning (that is, not questioning) the European values of democra-
cy and liberalism.  
The extreme right has even on a cultural level been impo-
sing topics and bringing into question the basic European va-
lues: Jörg Haider undermined the value foundations of liberal 
democracy with a re-evaluation of Austria’s Nazi past, claiming 
that “our soldiers were not criminals, at most they were vi-
ctims.” Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, 
has said that Islam is “a dangerous totalitarian ideology.” While 
other extremists who have been called populists have sought 
to outlaw minarets or burkinis, Wilders has gone so far as to de-
mand a ban on the Qur’an (Mounk, 2018a).
Italy – A Complete Triumph of Populism 
A real political earthquake in the generally shaky Italy 
was caused by the populists of the Five Star Movement and the 
League. They made Italy into the first Western European coun-
try to be entirely in the hands of populists (Cotta, 2018).
The populist Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), which sur-
faced during the 2013 parliamentary elections, was created 
from the great rallies organized by comedian Beppe Grillo aga-
inst “the caste” – his derisory name for what he considered the 
ruling class of the country’s professional politicians and journa-
lists. With 32% of the vote, the Five Star Movement became the 
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strongest political group in Italy. The success of the populists 
was made complete by the runner-up League, which had gone 
through a successful transformation from the regional Nort-
hern League into the National League, and Forza Italia, another 
populist group which had since 1994 been dominant in ri-
ght-wing coalitions. This populist trio completes the picture of 
the general expansion of populism in Europe and indicates the 
dominance of the politically versatile and party-wise unstable 
Italy. Between 1994 and 2008 Forza Italia led the government 
three times, but the populists had never before had so many 
votes as in 2013. That year the populist narrative of Forza Italia 
was not so attractive, partly because of the populist competiti-
on, and partly because their campaign lacked focus and leader 
Berlusconi’s appearance was limited. That was how the thus far 
greatest populists were replaced by even greater ones.   
The two greatest populist groups, which make up more 
than 50% of the vote, are characterized by pronounced critici-
sm of current national and European policies, that is, of the 
elites at home and the administration in Brussels. Their critical 
attitudes towards the governing coalition and the EU were the 
crucial points of their campaign, together with the promise of a 
referendum on the Euro. From the structural point of view, key 
reasons for the success of the populists include a mix of con-
textual and political factors: apart from their negative stance 
towards the EU, the citizens do not perceive that enough has 
been done economically to alleviate the consequences of the 
deep recession after the Great Economic Crisis, which has given 
rise to fear of unemployment and the decline of the standards 
of living. The Five Star and League leaders based their electoral 
platforms on very salient and popular issues: the former on mo-
ralisation of political life and criticism of the political elite that 
gives shape to the political life, the latter on the migration 
question and the EU challenges (Cotta, 2018). 
There are, therefore, elements of both right-wing and 
left-wing as well as centrist populism. They are, of course, much 
more heightened in the campaign than when the real opportu-
nity is obtained to rule the state and its political processes. In 
other words, it can be expected – as in the cases of other 
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populist movements – that the sharpened campaign rhetoric is 
attenuated once the opportunity to govern the country is obta-
ined. To this effect, it is expected that threats to Brussels sho-
uld be reduced to looking for compromise solutions and not to 
refusing cooperation, as was announced during the campaign.   
The general tendency of the decline of support for the 
left-wing parties was also seen in Italy when the ruling Demo-
cratic Party lost the elections. In this case too, just like throug-
hout Europe, it became clear that the established left was 
losing its social basis: Milan suburbs, for example, voted on a 
mass scale for the nationalist populist League, whereas the po-
orest areas of Rome and Turin voted for the Five Star Move-
ment. In all three cities, the Democratic Party, which belongs to 
the established left, received the most votes in the richest ur-
ban zones (Melloni, 2018).   
In the industrially developed North, the voters supported 
the League, which put an emphasis on the reduction of tax ra-
tes and opposed the arrival of immigrants, whereas the econo-
mically less developed regions in the South, with a high rate of 
youth unemployment (somewhere even up to 60%), voted 
overwhelmingly for the Five Star Movement, whose campaign 
centred on the struggle against the corrupt elite and the advo-
cacy for a guaranteed basic income (Reichlin, 2018).
The ideological turn towards neoliberalism in the once in-
dividually strongest Communist Party destroyed its social roots, 
thus pushing away its traditional voters. Opting for the “Third 
Way” and striving to expand their electoral base, social-demo-
cratic parties in Italy as elsewhere lost what base they used to 
have (“in what looked like a solid two-bloc political system,” Ni-
cola Melloni). The democrats spoke of financial markets and 
responsible economic policy – and never of exploitation and 
inequality, which their former and potential voters wanted to 
hear. And while they pointed to the significance of pro-market 
ideology, the inequality and poverty that eroded the middle cla-
sses became the topics of the populists.  
Furthermore, Branko Milanović has pointed that both the 
working and the middle class are the real losers of globalisati-
on. Elections are now also fought on the extremes, not from 
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the centre (in England, the USA), through populist platforms. 
The protest vote in Italy could not find any significant leftist re-
presentation. The Free and Equal Party, formed from the De-
mocratic Party, did not win more than 3% of the vote. It transpi-
red that there was not one credible leftist party that could gain 
the trust of the working class. The Free and Equal Party grasped 
the full extent of the loss of support for the Democratic Party, 
but it did not realize that merely facing the past mistakes would 
not suffice and that the voters wished more than an ameliorated 
and more presentable version of the establishment.   
Confirming the nature of populism as a thin-centred ideology 
which forms a symbiotic relationship with the established ideologies, 
the Five Star Movement had classical electoral components of the 
radical left in its programme, which helped them win the elections in 
the poorest regions of the country and among the youngest voters. 
They also obtained support and the vote of 50% of the unemployed 
(Nicola Melloni, 2018), thus capitalizing on the voters’ frustration 
with the political class (the people versus oligarchy, “the corrupt po-
litical caste”) and trying to relax the economic insecurity of the vo-
ters pleading for a universal basic income. In other words, the populi-
sts offered all the things that the established left did not, thus taking 
over their electorate. Still, their programme or narrative did not conta-
in any essentially important answers to the economic questions such as 
the relationship between the workers and capital, inequality, or capitali-
sm itself.7 This seems to be the case outside Italy too. The left would 
have to ask some crucial questions and offer a realistic alternative to 
the functioning of neo-liberal economy, that is, the economy of mar-
ket fundamentalism.  
The EU would have to carry out institutional reforms to 
strengthen the processes of integration, its value system, and 
the democratic political culture, so as to have further influence 
on its member states and candidates, particularly as regards re-
straining populist tendencies and curbing the liberal elements 
of representative democracy and, finally, pluralism itself. 
7  “Rather, they are a populist but centrist political force – opportunistic 
enough to ride any battle that can bring consensus, but without any ambi-
tion to change, or even reform, the system. This is exactly what is missing 
in Italy,” Nicola Melloni, Nothing s Left”, Social Europe, 14 March 2018.
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The Temptation of  
Populism in Germany
Considering the fact that populism is not in itself ideo-
logy but needs a symbiotic relationship with certain complete 
ideologies, numerous established political parties of different 
ideological and programme orientation use populism as a me-
ans of communication in order to obtain the majority support: 
the Republicans in the USA, the Conservatives and Labourists in 
the UK, and the new Republicans in France. This phenomenon is 
also manifested in Germany’s ruling CDU-CSU, especially after 
the worse results it had in the 2017 parliamentary elections and 
the success of the radically right Alternative for Germany (AfD), 
which caused turbulence (especially within the CSU).   
Except in the former communist states of East Germany, 
the AfD achieved the best results in the CSU stronghold in Ba-
varia, so the right-wing defence against the AfD became one of 
the CSU’s priorities. With this in view, the long-serving leader of 
CSU Horst Seehofer gave the party a new populist makeover. As 
the newly appointed Minister of Interior in the great new go-
verning coalition of Chancellor Angela Merkel, he gave a symbo-
lic hint at the populist turn including the word motherland (Hei-
mat) into the name of his Ministry and damaging relations with 
the CDU. In addition, Seehofer is famous for his firm connecti-
ons and relationships with other authoritarian populists such as 
Orbán and Putin.  
In public discourse, Seehofer has sharpened the ri-
ght-wing populist rhetoric (in an interview for the Bild tabloid 
he stated provocatively that “Islam does not belong to Ger-
many”) so as to win, or rather take over the AfD’s voters of an-
ti-migration orientation. In March 2017, while Merkel was pre-
paring for her first meeting with the US president Donald 
Trump, Seehofer went to Moscow, demonstrating his sympathy 
for the Russian president Vladimir Putin. He has been consisten-
tly opposing any sanctions against Russia ever since, on any gro-
unds. Seehofer has also spoken benevolently of the ruling po-
pulists in Poland and publicly expressed sympathy for the 
Hungarian populist Viktor Orbán (Sierakowski, 2018).
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Under his leadership, the CSU shifted attention from 
economic towards cultural and identitary themes. This, howe-
ver, is not a tendency exclusive to Bavaria or Germany – it is also 
present all around both Eastern and Western Europe: in Hun-
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Italy… At the same time, Chancellor Merkel, who has announ-
ced her intention to step down, advocates anti-populist attitu-
de. She has pointed out that nationalism and populism in Europe 
are on the rise, she pursues pro-immigrant policies and instead of 
nationalism, she supports the strengthening of the European Uni-
on and bilateral cooperation within it. Those who support diame-
trically opposite policies refer to identity threats.8
What Is Specific about 
Germany when It Comes to Populism
Notwithstanding the rising popularity of the AfD (Alter-
native für Deutschland) and the stable rating of the Linke Party, 
which some people consider left-wing populists, it can be clai-
med that Germany has been struck by the wave of populism 
less than other European countries. Some authors believe that 
there are structural reasons for this: 1. the historical experience 
which makes the Germans more cautious – the experience of 
the right-wing and left-wing totalitarianism, the heritage of the 
Third Reich and Real socialism in eastern part of the country; 2. 
economic strength – unemployment rate is lower than it has 
ever been, the growth was at stable 10% from 2013 to 2017, 
and the social system is functional (Bröning, 2017). 
There are, however, certain conditions which are favoura-
ble for the rise of populism: distrust in the government (71% of 
the voters in Germany do not have trust in it), in mainstream 
media (70% do not trust them), and 80% of Germans have little 
8    Those who “worry” about German identity refer to the data such as those 
published in Die Welt, which state that in Berlin and Duisburg only 8.2% of 
first-grade elementary school students speak perfect German, 16.4% of 
them do not speak German at all, and 51.1% come from the families in 
which German is not the mother tongue. 
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article188404953/Erstklaessler-
in-Duisburg-und-Berlin-haben-Defizite-bei-Sprache-und-Motorik.html
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or no trust in politicians, while 60% do not see them as capable 
of solving problems (Bröning, 2017). In “trustworthy professi-
ons” lists, politicians come last, and attacks on them and their 
belongings have tripled, according to the Global Trust Report, 
since 2016. The gap between the politicians and citizens is also 
visible in respect of the stance towards some of the crucial poli-
tical questions, such as immigration: unlike the establishment, 
the majority of citizens would like to keep immigrants out, and 
as many as 70% believe that “Islam does not belong to the Ger-
mans” (Ibid).
To sum up – in addition to structural reasons such as the de-
vastating historical experiences and taboos formed on these past 
experiences, as well as economic expansion, there are grounds for 
the development of populism in Germany and the question is when 
this structurally suppressed potential will come to the fore. One 
option to release this potential is by relativizing the dark past, the 
other is through the weakening of economic power.   
Aachen Treaty – Opposing Nationalism and Populism
It is in this context that the treaty signed by Angela Mer-
kel and Emmanuel Macron on 22 January 2019 should be obser-
ved.  It is a new agreement of cooperation between France and 
Germany, which renews the decades-long friendship between 
the two countries. The treaty was also presented as a sort of 
message and support to the European Union, weakened by the 
growth of nationalism and populism: “Populism and nationalism 
are on the rise in all our countries,” the German Chancellor said 
to the French, German, and European officials gathered in Aac-
hen Town Hall. Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron signed 
this new treaty in the town of Aachen in Western Germany, 56 
years after Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the 
historical Élysée Treaty of reconciliation in 1963, which set the 
tone for a close friendship between the two countries after the 
conflicts which ended with the Second World War.    
“It has been 74 years, a whole human life, since the end of 
the Second World War, and what seems in itself obvious is again 
brought into question. This is why we should, above all, renew our 
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dedication to our own responsibility within the European Union, 
the responsibility shared by Germany and France,” Angela Merkel 
said on signing the Aachen Treaty. 
French President Emmanuel Macron spoke in a similar vein, 
pointing to the “growing anger” within the EU states and the pre-
ssures from the outside. He condemned the “lies” spread by Fran-
ce’s extreme right, regarding the treaty signed by Germany and 
France. “Those who mock or spread lies cause damage to our 
history and our people,” French President said in a message 
addressed to those who spread false information on this treaty 
in France, such as the one about France conceding, according to 
the Treaty, the position of the UN Security Council permanent 
member to Germany.  
German Chancellor confirmed the wish shared by Germany 
and France to form a European army: “The new treaty, which envi-
sages a closer cooperation when it comes to defence, should be a con-
tribution to the formation of European army.” One of the Treaty’s 
clauses details common defence plan in case of an attack, similarly 
to the model envisaged by NATO. The clause provides for the use 
of common resources in case of a terrorist attack, or cooperation 
in big military programmes, such as those related to tanks or war 
planes (Agencija Beta/Beta Agency, 2019). 
The aim of the Aachen Treaty is to promote cooperation 
across the 450-kilometer-long border, as well as to improve co-
ordination between the two countries as regards tackling inter-
national problems such as climate change and terrorism. The 
Treaty envisages that economic, international, and defence po-
licies of the two countries should be aligned and a joint parlia-
ment formed of 100 French and German members.   
The Aachen Treaty is a sort of pro-European anti-populist 
manifesto which should serve as a bastion to fend off the ri-
ght-wing radicalism and populism in the two most influential EU 
countries. 
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Populism in Scandinavia
Denmark is yet another example of the rising tide of populism 
in Europe. Some twenty years ago the nationalist National Party of 
Denmark was a small and almost uninfluential party, whereas today it 
is the second strongest. Additionally, the policies and stances that 
twenty years ago were considered as extremist today form part of 
the narratives and policies of the majority of political parties, inclu-
ding those classically liberal, which have come to be promoters of an-
ti-Islamic policies. So, it is not only that the radical right anaesthetica-
lly termed itself populist in the public sphere and thus made itself 
more socially acceptable – such treatment, among other things, also 
enabled its growing support among the citizens.  
According to some evaluations, the causes for these chan-
ges were external: the influence of 11 September and the impo-
sed theme of Islamic terrorism, the inflow of Syrian refugees, but 
also internal nationalist responses to these challenges from witho-
ut. Meanwhile, “the new right” has appeared, which keeps deepening 
the questions of identity and culture, not risking in this way to be 
left on the margins but on the contrary – getting closer to the par-
liament as it spreads sharpened rhetoric, manipulates fear, causes di-
visions, and apocalyptically announces a civil war against Islamists 
(Brygger, 2017). Brygger warns about how easily willing mainstre-
am politicians are to accept nationally extremist positions once 
these become part of the political mainstream and in case they 
have a practical use value in everyday political life: “As soon as na-
tionalism becomes mainstream, people seem to forget how politi-
cal extreme such a position is. … the authoritarian nationalist mo-
vement is the fastest growing and most dangerous political 
movement globally … this movement has different forms in diffe-
rent countries, but there are some common characteristics to the-
se ideas. The first and foremost is the idea that the country should 
somehow be the citizens’ first priority. Trump’s ‘America First’ co-
mes to mind as a perfect example.” (Brygger, 18, 16).
The rise of extremism in Scandinavia, where it was least 
expected, is a warning indicator of the general radicalisation of 
Europe and the shifting focus of policies from the socio-econo-
mic sphere towards the questions of identity. 
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The Economic Base of Populism – 
The Example of Sweden
The success of right-wing and xenophobic parties in Swe-
den is usually explained with the “us against them” populist 
platform, which is based on creating a perceived conflict 
between the people and the elite. In those right-wing populist 
movements that have demonstrated the greatest growth there 
is clear criticism of openness, globalisation, and liberal demo-
cracy, which is a typically populist narrative. Additionally, one 
of the most common explanations for the increased support for 
right-wing populism is immigration. A lot of politicians and lea-
ders in Sweden have profited from pointing towards the “the 
generous migration policy” of the governing coalition.   
There are, however, also those who point to the other 
causes of the strengthening of populism. The Stockholm-based 
think-tank Futurion indicates that the rising populism can be 
explained by people’s concern about what is going on in the la-
bour market. Politicians and numerous experts have underesti-
mated the importance of economy and employment as well as 
overestimated the immigration question. This is the reason why 
the established parties’ reaction to the strengthening of populi-
sm is often wrong (Melin, Carl- Enarsson, Ann-Therése, 2018).
Futurion’s report (The true causes of populism – automa-
tion and other changes in the labour market) points to the fact 
that the election results in Sweden and elsewhere do not show 
any correlation between immigration and populist support. It is 
precisely on the contrary: support for the populist parties and 
candidates is frequently the strongest in the areas where immi-
gration is on the smallest scale. It is not even related to any si-
gnificant changes of attitudes regarding this issue. According 
to the SOM Institute, the stance of the Swedish towards immi-
gration has become somewhat more negative over the last ye-
ars, but the long-term tendency is opposite. It is exactly this es-
sential though not so visible tendency that is emphasises: when 
the democrats in Sweden double their support in 15 years, this 
cannot be explained away with the scale of immigration, which 
differed considerably over the years of the party’s growth. The 
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point is not in racist values either. It cannot be claimed that the 
Swedish have become intolerant or that racist orientation in 
Sweden is on the increase; the long-term tendency is in fact the 
opposite (Melin, Carl and Enarsson, Ann-Therése, 2018). 
The report instead shows that changes in the labour mar-
ket and economic tendencies matter. For instance, it refers to 
the study by economist Sirus Dehdari from the University of 
Stockholm, which points to a strong correlation between ex-
cess unemployment and support for the right-wing populist 
democrats in Sweden. When people – and particularly those 
with less developed skills – become superfluous, the chances 
are greater that they will vote for this option. Yet another study 
by Carl Benedikt Frey from the University of Oxford confirms 
that support for the Republicans in the USA had the biggest 
growth rate between 2012 and 2016, in the areas where many 
work positions were threatened by automation. Changes in the 
labour market will not affect all groups in the same way. Routi-
ne tasks are more prone to automation, and a lot of low-quali-
fied men, who often perform jobs with a relatively high status 
and income, are more vulnerable than others. However, traditi-
onal labourers are not the only ones who are affected since di-
gitalisation and artificial intelligence can also bear impact on 
many employees. Historically speaking, the Swedish people be-
lieved that new technologies resulted in the creation of new 
work positions. Futurion’s study in collaboration with the SOM 
Institute reveals that the picture is today changed. The majority 
of the people now have a negative opinion on the correlation 
between new technologies and work positions.         
It is not only automation but economic tendencies too 
that have been causing concern in the labour market. In the last 
ten years, global economy has been heavily hit by the financial 
crisis that befell the United States in the autumn of 2008. The 
CES IFO research institute in Germany proved that there is a 
strong correlation between financial crisis and support for 
the right-wing extremists and authoritarian movements (Me-
lin, Carl and Enarsson, Ann-Therése, 2018). The growing popu-
list tendency that we have witnessed in the last decade brings 
back to mind what happened during the Great Depression in 
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the 1930s, when the extremists took power in Germany, Italy, 
and Spain, with catastrophic consequences, and the allergic rea-
ctions to this process throughout Europe are therefore under-
standable. 
In citizens’ fear of losing their jobs the populists see a to-
pic to increase their ratings and not a problem to be systemica-
lly solved by reducing fears and anxiety as well as the personal 
costs of technological changes. Requalification and additional 
training for new jobs are the most important instruments, whi-
ch also effectively insure against unemployment. But instru-
mentalising fear can be more profitable in political terms. In 
many countries, even the established parties have been on par 
with the populist in this respect. Sometimes they are also on 
par when it comes to anti-immigration rhetoric and xenophobia. 
This, however, is one battle that the populists will always win. If 
non-populist politicians focused on economy and work positi-
ons instead, they would stand better chances of success, and ci-
tizens would in turn have better chances to improve the quality 
of living. Populist parties rarely have any solution to that.
Spain
In the snap parliamentary elections in Spain, in April 
2019, the ruling socialists won, but without sufficient majority 
to form the new government even in coalition with the leftist 
Podemos. These elections were also marked by Vox Party ente-
ring the parliament, the right-wing populist party which fights 
against separatism, improvements in women’s rights, immigrati-
on, tolerance, and openness of society. “Twenty-four nationalist 
members of parliament will be proud of being Spanish, and 
they will not keep quiet when the lawmakers breach the consti-
tution, mock our flag, or try to destroy national unity,” the Vox 
leader Santiago Abascal said.   
Under the pressure of growing unemployment and natio-
nalism, socialists also focused on the struggle against Catalan 
and Basque separatism in their campaign. They received the 
greatest individual support, but they needed at least 12 votes 
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of the opposition to form the government: “The future won, 
and the past lost. The single condition I have for forming coaliti-
on is respect for the Spanish constitution and aspiration towar-
ds social justice, living together, and political purification,” Spa-
nish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said. The socialists achieved 
better results than they had announced, which came as a sort 
of prize for raising minimum income and providing a better pro-
tection and promotion of women.   
Still, even after these elections, Spain remains a deeply divi-
ded country. Political stability is nowhere in sight, and national 
themes are in focus. Catalonia’s striving for independence has sha-
ken entire Spain, which in these elections responded with a new 
and stronger form of nationalism. Reform plan was pushed in the 
background. Support for the conservative People’s Party, Spain’s 
leading until May 2018, was considerably reduced. The party obtai-
ned its worst result ever, with 66 parliamentary seats (in the pre-
vious convocation, it had 137 members of parliament).    
These elections confirmed that traditional two-party system 
was becoming a thing of the past in Spain. In the last 40 years or so, 
the socialists (PSOE) and people’s party (PP) were alternately go-
verning the country, and their domination started to crumble in 
2015. Since then, these were the third parliamentary elections whi-
ch confirmed that none of the parties can individually obtain the 
sufficient number of votes to form the government. 
High unemployment rate and corruption were triggers for 
citizens’ dissatisfaction and search for alternative politicians and 
parties, and that was how new political actors appeared, such as 
the leftist Podemos, the centrist Citizens, or the right-wing Vox. 
But since democracy was introduced 40 years ago, Spain has at 
the national level never had a coalition government. 
So, European tendencies have also caught on in Spain: 
even in the places where the leftists received majority support, 
nationalist themes were dominant, and the support was not 
sufficient for the formation of a stable government. The Eu-
ropean trend of making an ever greater political fragmentation 
and complex coalitions continued. Another trend that conti-
nues is that of the rise of the right-wing populism, which is in 
close connection with the heavy defeat of the conservatives 
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due to corruption scandals. Taking the heaviness of their defeat 
into consideration, the success of Vox is not so great, even tho-
ugh entering the parliament with 10% of votes is an exquisite 
result. Their success is also not so great because the campaign’s 
key topics were such that the results could have been better: 
corruption, immigration, and Catalan independence.       
Podemos was punished for its internal divisions, scandals, 
and not so firm positions on crucial questions, especially that of 
Catalan independence – the epilogue was that it lost nearly one 
third of its support as compared to 2016. All in all, social and politi-
cal circumstances have been and still are favourable for the deve-
lopment of populism, and it can therefore be said that the prota-
gonists of right-wing and left-wing populism in the given 
circumstances could have done better.    
Populism in Eastern European Countries 
In the post-communist East, populists have for years con-
tinually been defeating traditional parties in the elections, or 
else are strong enough to be coalition partners or the main 
opposition. As was already noted in the introductory part, in 
2018, populist parties governed seven out of 15 Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, they belonged to the governing coalition in 
two more, and formed the main opposition in three countries 
(Siearkowski, 2018). Eiermann, Mounk, and Gultchin also point 
out that in 2000 populist parties won 20% of the vote or more 
in merely two Eastern European countries, whereas today they 
manage to do so in ten countries. What are the main reasons 
for this? How do they differ from the developed liberal demo-
cracies of the West? It has nearly become a commonplace in any 
research of Eastern European political parties and systems, as 
well as in any research of the phenomenon of populism, to pla-
ce emphasis on structural differences from the liberal democra-
cies of the developed Western countries, such as illiberal politi-
cal tradition and political culture, underdeveloped and loosely 
founded institutions and parties, and the specific social base 
that originates from such a framework.  
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1.  Undeveloped liberal tradition and political culture: 
Liberalism in Eastern Europe is an “import from the 
West with high duty rates,” and civil society is not only 
weaker – it is oriented differently and focused, in 
terms of values and programme, more on humanita-
rian activities or entertainment than on political que-
stions (Siearakowski, 2018a). Phenomena such as 
Trump or Brexit can be socially and politically absor-
bed with more easiness in the USA or the UK, where 
the cultures of political and social liberalism are dee-
ply rooted, than autocrats can be restrained in Hun-
gary or Poland. Shaping citizens as subjects instead of 
free people over a course of years and the strong do-
mination of ideology in a one-party system created 
the social atmosphere and behaviour patterns which 
are slow to change and prone to “chameleon” populi-
sm.     
2.  Lack of the balance and control of the government 
as the founding principles of liberal democracy. One 
of the main social and political factors which has made 
populism different and much stronger in Eastern than 
Western Europe is a systemic lack of the tradition of 
balancing and controlling the government, on which 
the developed liberal democracy of the West rests. 
Thus, for example, the influence of the executive aut-
horities on the judiciary originates from the former 
Real socialist government, which was based on the 
unity of government principle. Such political and so-
cial grounds are more favourable for the formation of 
the authoritarian populism of Kaczyński or Orbán than 
liberal democracies, in which there is a traditional divi-
sion of the government, the judiciary is naturally esta-
blished and accepted as a special authority – a contro-
ller and not transmission of the executive authority.  
3.  Loosely founded and underdeveloped institutions. 
Eastern European societies are more prone to attacks 
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on liberal institutions such as the freedom of speech 
or the press, or the independence of courts, precisely 
because of the fact that these institutions are not so-
lidly rooted. This is so because in Real socialism they 
had a different ideological, social, and political role: to 
defend and preserve, within the one-party system, the 
order which was to lead towards a classless society, 
“the society made to fit every man.” 
4.  In the public sphere and the narratives of key politi-
cal actors, the party system is organized as the “pa-
triot-enemy” dichotomy, not in accordance with the 
ideological and programme division lines. The left in 
Eastern Europe is either very weak or completely ab-
sent from the political mainstream due to the former 
sins of the communist elite, from which it primarily 
originated. The main line of political division does not 
separate the left and right wings, which differ in their 
ideologies and programmes, but instead “patriots and 
enemies,” political actors “for the people and against 
the people.” Eastern European countries are much 
more prone to the “friend-enemy” dichotomy, spoken 
and written about by German jurist and political theo-
rist Carl Schmitt. Each side sees itself as the only true 
representative of the nation and treats its opponents 
as those who should be removed from political life – 
not merely defeated in the election. 
Some authors do consider that populism could determi-
ne the essential cultural and political borders of the European 
Union. But if the politics of Poland or Hungary have proved to 
be more similar to Russian than French or Austrian politics, 
does that mean that the EU borders were drawn too far away? 
Should their place be next to Russia and not Western Europe? 
Does this mean that the EU borders cannot possibly be mainta-
ined for a long-term period (Sierakowski, 2018a)? Or will the li-
beral democracy institutions simply influence a change in the 
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societies and political cultures of these countries after several 
cycles of government changes (Sartori) and thus place the que-
stion of cultural and civilizational borders in Europe within a 
historical instead of topically political context?  
The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Hungary 
Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), led by Viktor Orbán, 
again won a convincing majority in the 2018 parliamentary ele-
ctions. Previous victories, in 2010 and 2014, enabled Orbán to 
radically change the Hungarian constitution. He managed to 
systemically weaken the mechanisms of democratic control 
and balance of power, thus building what is today referred to 
as illiberal democracy. Orbán’s latest victory in the elections 
firmly consolidated his position of the populist policy leader in 
the right-wing spectrum of Europe. Orbán and Fidesz won 133 
out of 199 parliament seats in the elections with a high turno-
ut (68.13%), with the rise in voters’ support of more than 3.6%. 
Two-third majority allowed him to additionally marginalize the 
opposition and open the space for a further institutionalisation 
of his supremacy.   
The success of Fidesz in the elections was based on its ri-
ght-wing populist messages – its Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant, 
and xenophobic rhetoric. This is a great challenge for Hunga-
rian society as well as for the group of the European people’s 
parties to which Fidesz belongs (Butler, 2018).  
Victory in the 2018 elections makes it possible for Orbán 
to reach the continuity of 12 years in power by the next regu-
lar elections in 2022, which is a long period in politics, and whi-
ch also signals the threatening possibility of autocratic populi-
sm further strengthening. But usurping institutions and levers 
of power control can cause a counter-effect: a movement for-
med outside the institutions to liberate the enslaved society 
and state. This was demonstrated by civil protests in December 
2018. Usurping institutions and refusing to control the authori-
ties can be successful only to the extent to which citizens are 
ready to obediently accept it.     
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In February 2019, the citizens who protested in Buda-
pest formed a “living wall” around the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, symbolically defending academic freedom. The de-
mands of those who protested were actually not focused on 
academic freedom only, but on all those freedoms that make a 
democracy liberal. What also testifies to the relationship 
between the democratic and liberal in Orbán’s Hungary is the 
fact that Hungary is the first EU country to be categorized in 
Freedom House report as partly free.   
Populism in Poland
Like many other authoritarian populist parties and orga-
nisations, Polish Law and Justice tends to limit the rule of law in 
the name of the people, that is, to remove limitations to its own 
rule to the greatest extent possible. It also tends to question 
the standards and values of the EU and some aspects of globa-
lisation, as well as to place security above freedom in value hie-
rarchy. Some liberally oriented authors also see the manifesta-
tion of populism in Poland at the economic level, through the 
so-called “re-Polonisation,” that is, the re-nationalisation of 
some companies – “instead of ending privatisation, the govern-
ment is strengthening state-owned companies” (Tatal, 2017). 
Tatal points especially to the economic costs of populi-
sm, which are in Poland generally hidden or dispersed, and in 
particular to the fact that long-term economic growth and sta-
bility are sacrificed for short-term political gains, and that this 
is the main characteristic of economic populism. The governing 
Law and Justice reaches for short-term economic effects for 
political support, and they do not have any serious response to 
the real challenges such as the low growth rate of private inve-
stments, insufficient productivity rise, low employment rate, or 
demographic problems (Tatal, 2017: 78).      
Tendency towards authoritarian populism is manifested 
through attempts to control the media, electoral legislation 
which strengthens the governing groups, or political influence 
on the judiciary. Strong resistance on behalf of the citizens, 
expressed through protests for the defence of the 
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independence of courts, and two vetoes from the President of 
Poland which followed the citizens’ will showed the strength 
of civil resistance to the authoritarian intentions of the govern-
ment, however strong and stable it is. The example of Poland 
shows that the strongest bastion against the strengthening of 
authoritarian populism is the strengthening of the rule of law 
and individual freedoms, and in order for this to happen, a de-
veloped civil consciousness is needed, as well as readiness to 
use non-institutional forms of fighting in defence of freedom.  

Populism and global Democracy
External and internal “enemies” of democracy, Po-
pulist view of the democratic-liberal misbalance – 
How populism spreads through the global liberal 
order – Liberal vs. Democratic - Different views of 
the liberal-democratic misbalance – What can be 
learned from populists – Can populism encourage 
strengthening of democracy, and what is the role 
of movements in it? – Widened gap between the 
political elites and citizens – Support for market 
fundamentalism – Widening of the gap between ci-
tizens and elites – Economic populism – The idea of 
Europe and the European Union in search of balan-
ce – The idea of Europe – A bastion against “Popu-
list International” – European Parliament elections: 
Europe of the people vs. Europe of the citizens – 
The idea of Europe in Serbia

The expansion of populism throughout the world has rai-
sed the question of its influence on the global position of demo-
cracy and challenged some of its basic postulates. Using the po-
pulist mould, some theorists classify the enemies of democracy 
into external and internal. External enemies include global po-
wers such as Russia or China, or global phenomena such as the 
migration wave or unjust redistribution of profit in economic 
globalism. The internal enemies of democracy can be pro-demo-
cratic or pro-liberal, depending on whether it is the liberal com-
ponents that outbalance the democratic ones, or vice versa.  
 
External and Internal “Enemies” of Democracy 
The narrative of external and internal enemies is not 
always or exclusively populist; it is also a characteristic of main-
stream political parties, analysts, and theorists. Even in the ma-
instream democratic discourse, the presence of this narrative is 
pronounced. Fukuyama, for example, speaks of the external 
threat in the first two decades of the 21st century, from autho-
ritarian states such as Russia and China, which are represented 
as great undemocratic entities that in different ways bring the 
global order into question and “try to meddle – particularly the 
Russians – in the internal politics of democratic countries” 
(Fukujama, 2017).  
On the other hand, there are internal challenges such as 
populist nationalism or authoritarianism, where democratically 
chosen leaders undermine the liberal element of representative 
democracy, endangering the rule of law, the independence of 
the court system, and independent media, and treating political 
opponents as national enemies. Whether this has something to 
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do with inequality and the fact that globalisation has led to an 
enormous increase in the wealth of states – the wealth not dis-
tributed properly – is debated in both scientific and media circ-
les, but also directly relatable, often for good reasons, to citi-
zens themselves. For example, half of the US citizens is actually 
less wealthy than 20 years ago, due to the de-industrialisation 
and salaries that have not managed to keep pace with the costs 
of living (Fukujama, 2017), as well as other similar socio-econo-
mic problems. It is here that the basis for the support given to 
populist leaders, parties, and movements can be found. They 
blame the system as a whole and social elites because they 
have created such a situation, and they profit politically from 
this wave of disappointment.   
Still, notwithstanding the strong pressure of the losers of 
globalisation, Fukuyama considers that populism will not jeo-
pardize global democracy in the long run because global demo-
cracy is a global and rational need. However, claims that somet-
hing will not happen because it is not rational were confuted so 
many times throughout history, and especially recent political 
history, so they cannot in fact be taken as a serious political ar-
gument.         
Populist View of 
the Democratic-Liberal Misbalance
In the conflict and search for a balance between the de-
mocratic and the liberal within representative democracy, po-
pulism represents, among other things, a product of striving 
to make the democratic primary in relation to the liberal. In 
this process, aspiring to strengthen democratic legitimacy, po-
pulism disturbs the rule of law and even civil liberties as the 
most important components of liberal democracy.  
As public opinion research shows, evaluating the functio-
ning of democracy, citizens quote indecisiveness and inefficien-
cy in respect of reaching major political decisions as one of its 
greatest weaknesses; this is the reason why countries such as 
Russia, China, or Turkey seem like examples which show that 
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exhausting procedures of adjustment can be evaded by means 
of more authoritarian systems in which leaders have greater li-
cence and more efficient mechanisms of governing. When com-
pared to the powerful leaders such as Putin, Orbán, or Erdoğan, 
democratic governments appear slow and indecisive, and parlia-
ments appear as inhibitors of efficient ruling. And this is where 
a great potential for populists is contained, as well as a serious 
challenge to representative democracy, which rests on stable 
institutions and adjustment of different interests.
The European Union is at the moment facing the issues 
of functionality and efficiency. It has established a respectable 
set of membership criteria, but their application, or rather the 
evaluation of the fulfilment of these criteria, is brought into 
question. It seems that sometimes, regardless of any criteria, 
geostrategic interests are brought to the fore; sometimes it is 
security interests – stability is often above the qualitative libe-
ral-democratic criteria. Additionally, the European Union has 
never made any rules for the countries integrated into the EU, 
which have in turn taken to bad practices such as corruption or 
openly authoritarian governments: the level of corruption is 
high in Romania and Bulgaria, and there are some undemocratic 
practices in Hungary and Poland. The European Union, in fact, 
has no way to discipline its member states which side-track off 
the beaten path of liberal democracy. 
 
Spread of Populism through 
the Global Liberal Order
Immigrants and the elites are under the attack of populi-
sts all around the world. Populists call for the protection of 
home country by erecting physical and mental walls and em-
ploying market protectionism. Free media is also under attack, 
accused of producing false news and being enemies of the 
truth. The judiciary and parliamentary system are under attack, 
too, for being responsible for controlling the executive authori-
ties, enacting and protecting valid laws… Is it any different in 
Serbia? The difference from the countries with developed 
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democracy is in that Serbia does not even allow that the rule of 
law and independent institutions to control the executive aut-
horities be built. The media are under an even greater pressure 
precisely because there are no mechanisms they could use to 
protect their own freedom if the rule of law does not function 
and there are no independent judiciary and free prosecution. 
Populism has various appearances and specific modalities 
in different political and cultural surroundings, which is why 
confusion arises as regards its real content. Dealing with popu-
lism from the perspective of global liberal order, Fukuyama and 
Muggah reduced it to three essential qualities: 
1. Popular but unsustainable policies  
2.  Designating one group of the population as the single 
“legitimate” representative of the nation 
3.  Highly personalized style of leadership and direct com-
munication with the people. 
The belief is becoming widespread that populism poses a 
serious threat to liberal democracy and international liberal order, 
upon which peace and prosperity have rested for the last two ge-
nerations. Democracies rely on power division arrangements, on 
the courts, legislative authorities, and free and independent me-
dia to control the executive authorities. Since these institutions 
disturb the free reign of populists, they are frequently subjected 
to unscrupulous attacks, especially from the variety of forms of ri-
ght-wing populism, which is spreading across the United States, 
the Western and Eastern Europe. “There are also worrying signs 
that populists are banding together, as in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland and Serbia, with worrying implications for the integri-
ty of institutions ranging from the UN to the EU and NATO.” 
(Fukuyama and Muggah, 2018)    
Several global factors have allowed for the spread of po-
pulism, according to Fukuyama and Muggah: 
Economic factors associated with the decline of the mi-
ddle class and concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
so-called economic elite. Next are the intrinsic political wea-
knesses of democracies themselves, whose shortcomings are 
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routinely exploited by charismatic leaders. There are also cultu-
ral factors, related to the resentment about newcomers, immi-
grants. In the cultural discourse of populism, the protection of 
cultural identity, way of life, and Western civilisation pushes cla-
ss differences into the background.
In the opinion of these authors, the future of the global 
liberal order will to a great extent depend on the strength and 
direction of populism in the USA, the country that has been the 
architect and guardian of the world order for more than 70 ye-
ars: if Trump wins the 2020 elections, the USA will become in-
creasingly polarized and liberal institutions will likely continue 
to weaken. The USA will continue their retreat from the global 
order. The switch from the unipolar to a multipolar world will 
become quicker. Will liberal democracy survive such a transfer 
of global power? (Fukuyama and Muggah, 2018)      
It is dubitable whether such a global liberal order, defi-
ned as it is by these two authors, can survive at all, and the que-
stion is even more important of whether it should survive as it 
is, or perhaps a substantial change is necessary? Can populism, 
with all the weaknesses justly attributed to it, have a positive 
impact on the strengthening of the democratic elements of li-
beral democracy, without destroying its essentially liberal foun-
dations? Answers to these questions will to a large extent also 
provide answers to the questions of global directions which po-
pulism takes, as well as the questions of the future physio-
gnomy of liberal democracy.    
Liberal vs. Democratic
How liberalism undermines the foundations of liberal de-
mocracy and how can it be stopped?
Populists are ready to deny basic democratic procedures 
and customs, and this does not reflect negatively on their ratin-
gs. On the contrary. When a mainstream politician makes a 
gaffe, his popularity diminishes, and when a populist turns a 
gaffe into political programme, his popularity grows. But much 
more dangerous is the actual denying of basic democratic 
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principles and procedures. Undermining the basic rules of the 
game threatens to undermine democracy itself. Under the in-
fluence of populists, the representatives of old established par-
ties have also become more willing to undermine the basic ru-
les of the game, and this is the point at which the threat to 
liberal democracy increases dramatically.  
Public opinion research shows that citizens’ trust in de-
mocracy is on the wane and that they are considerably less 
committed to democracy than they once were. For example, 
while more than two-thirds of older Americans say that it is im-
portant to them to live in a democracy, less than a third of yo-
unger Americans do. The younger generations are also more 
open to authoritarian alternatives. Two decades ago, for exam-
ple, 25% of Britons said that they liked the idea of “a stron-
gman ruler who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections”; today, 50% of them do. These attitudes are increa-
singly reflected in practical politics: from the UK to the US, and 
from Germany to Hungary, respect for democratic rules and 
norms has precipitously declined. “Democracy is no longer the 
only game in town” (Mounk, 2018a).
But the attraction of political extremes to the youth has 
grown over time. In countries like Germany, the UK and the US, 
for example, the number of young people who locate themse-
lves on the radical left or the radical right has roughly doubled 
over the course of the past two decades; in Sweden, it has in-
creased by more than threefold. Polling data for populist par-
ties also confirm these findings. In many countries around the 
world, the general tendency is to vote for anti-system parties 
(Mounk, 2018a).
One possible explanation for this is that young people 
have no experience or reasoned opinion on what it would in 
fact mean to live in an undemocratic political system. People 
born in the 1930s and 1940s experienced, directly or indirectly, 
the threat of Nazism and fascism as children, or were raised by 
people who had actively fought it. They spent their formative 
years during the Cold War, when fears of Soviet expansionism 
were part of the everyday public life. It could be said they grew 
up right in the middle of a cold propaganda war. This is why 
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they perceive any alternative to democracy as a threat to pea-
ce. Unlike them, millennials have no such experience. The que-
stion of whether it is important to live in a democracy is for 
them far more abstract (Mounk, 2018a). 
Education as the pillar of the defence 
of liberal and democratic values
For these reasons, the questions that has been haunting 
democratic societies ever since Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cice-
ro, then Erasmus, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, are today as re-
levant as ever: how should young people be educated in the 
spirit of political virtue, how should they be raised to grow into 
free and exemplary citizens of their community, and how to te-
ach them to care about the community? The questions are cru-
cial to the political culture of all countries, especially those in 
transition, as well as those developed democracies which are 
focused on growing or nurturing liberal and democratic values.
Civic education has shaped contemporary democratic co-
untries: the USA, the UK, Germany, or Scandinavian countries. Is 
this essential tool for shaping democratic political culture all 
but extinct (Mounk, 2018a), or is it merely neglected in the so-
cieties of prosperity, the societies that have nearly forgotten 
that democracy is both the process of building and the comple-
ted structure?
The answer seems to lie in the neglect which is a con-
sequence of being lulled in the benefits of wealthier and more or-
dered societies. This neglect could cause immense long-term con-
sequences to democracy in individual countries as well as globally. 
Civic education should also contain both (self-)criticism 
and great achievements of liberal democracy, and aspire towar-
ds making students decisive in correcting social injustices so as 
to be able to defend liberal democracy. In his book The People 
vs. Democracy, Mounk claims that we shall be able to contain 
the growth of populism only if allow for the political system to 
overcome the actual shortcomings that caused it. Common pe-
ople have for a long time considered that politicians do not li-
sten to them when reaching decisions, the rich and powerful 
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have a worrying degree of influence on public policies, conne-
ctions between the lobbyists and lawmakers dominates the le-
gislative sphere, the role of private money in financing campai-
gns is improperly significant, and the connection between 
politics and money in general improperly close (Mounk, 2018b).
All that has shattered citizens’ trust in politicians and pu-
blic policies and opened a wide space for the activities of popu-
lists, who use it to the fullest. At the same time, the standard of 
citizens’ lives has been stagnating for decades in many coun-
tries of the developed West. Frustration about the lack of ma-
terial progress, as compared to the privileged caste, has ope-
ned additional ways for the populists. 
In line with everything above, defence against populism 
would on the one hand entail a limitation of the elites’ influen-
ce through the influence of money on politics, and a greater im-
pact of the common man on politics on the other. The narrative 
of the populists, however, is similar: more democracy for the 
people, less influence for the estranged elites. What would be 
the first step towards balancing democratic and liberal values is 
a far more equal distribution of the fruits of globalisation and 
free trade. Instead of nationalist patriotism, building inclusive 
patriotism should be offered with a view to protecting the vul-
nerable minority from discrimination. The moral grounds of the 
political community and just society need to be rebuilt from the 
scratch.   
People vs. Elites, or: Populists vs. Democrats
More Liberalism or More Democracy
Different Views of the Liberal-Democratic Misbalance
Are voters really that much indoctrinated, uninformed, or 
irrational to make such wrong choices, as they appear to be 
from the election results in Italy, the Brexit vote in the UK, or 
Donald Trump’s presidency in the USA? If so, the liberal demo-
crats’ obvious next step is to further deny them making impor-
tant decisions, as Jan-Werner Müller cynically concludes. Critici-
zing Mounk’s approach of defending the liberal from 
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democratic values as an instrument of populism, Müller takes 
the side of “common citizens” in the face of “the worried eli-
tes.” Are the “common citizens” really so irrational and ill-infor-
med that they make such horrible choices, Müller wonders. This 
is precisely what Mounk claims in The People vs. Democracy, ac-
cording to Müller who points out that Mounk’s diagnoses are 
deeply wrong because they focus on individual citizens instead 
of the structural causes that pose a direct threat to democracy: 
“If one really believes voters are incompetent or illiberal, the 
obvious next step is to take even more decision-making power 
away from them. But, rather than retreating to technocracy, we 
should tackle the specific structural problems that have aided 
the triumph of populist politicians” (Müller, 2018b).
One of the questions disputed by the theorists is the one 
of informedness or the availability of the information necessary 
for reaching electoral decisions. Müller points to the fact that 
there is a lot of evidence that citizens are not as well-informed 
as the theory of democracy would have them. However, he also 
adds that elections are not civic education tests or exams in MA 
studies, and that voters do not need detailed knowledge of 
every single political issue – this is a thing that politicians, jour-
nalists, and other experts should deal with. This is correct, but 
the point is in the fact that there are states in which citizens do 
not possess elementary level of informedness, while regimes 
prevent the flow of information and serve naked propaganda. 
Citizens in such political communities do not need detailed 
knowledge of every political issue, but they do need to be infor-
med at least at the basic level so as to be able to take part in 
the elections.   
Müller rightfully warns that it is imperative in the 
struggle against the damaging consequences of populism to 
face the structural problems that enabled the populists to be-
come exposed in the first place. He also states that not everyt-
hing that populists say about mainstream politics is wrong. The-
se warnings, however, would have to be articulated and 
presented in a different way. In many countries, the media and 
party system are visibly deteriorating, and they require a 
substantial reconstruction because instead of influencing the 
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removal of systemic shortcomings, they often contribute to 
their maintenance. 
And this is where we once again come to the issue of ci-
vic education, which should be crucial in helping citizens and 
the future generations to manage disagreements and recognize 
other citizens as legitimate opponents in democratic confronta-
tions. Cultural and political differences will not be a subject of 
conflict if people learn to live with them, nurturing mutual res-
pect. Populists will not be able to use them as a political tool 
for the production of “dangerous others” if new generations 
are brought up with adequate civic education.   
Civic education is also important in understanding the si-
gnificance of democratic and liberal values and the balance 
between them, for the functioning of the political community. 
Misbalance between liberal and democratic values has 
been discussed at length, and diagnoses and suggested thera-
pies vary depending on the point of view. Some authors such as 
Robert Dahl or Jan-Werner Müller mostly warned about the de-
ficiencies of democratic values, whereas other authors warned 
about the deficiencies of liberal values. 
The latter believe that liberal democracy is today seriously 
endangered even in the most developed countries of the West. 
Trump, Brexit, and the strengthening of populists throughout Eu-
rope are a warning signal against “illiberal democracy,” which is 
characterized by the politics which lacks respect for the rule of law 
or the minority rights, and as such represents a kind of relativized 
democracy that could turn into electoral autocracy.  
Warnings against illiberal democracy are actually indications 
of systemic postulations for the strengthening of populism. On 
the other hand, emphasizing the liberal at the expense of the de-
mocratic is also a systemic disorder which causes the counter-rea-
ction of populism. In this kind of disorder, rulers are isolated from 
democratic responsibility – they impose limitations on a series of 
policies which should in fact serve to strengthen the democratic 
component of liberal democracy: the bureaucratic bodies, autono-
mous regulators, and other supplements to the real democracy.    
In his book The People vs. Democracy, political theorist 
Mounk refers to this systemic disorder as “undemocratic 
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liberalism,” which is the antipode to “illiberal democracy.” He 
states that our political regimes have for long not been functio-
ning as liberal democracies, and that they resemble undemocra-
tic liberalism more and more (Mounk, 2018). 
The European Union is often presented as an example of the-
se trends. Establishing a unique market and monetary unification in 
the absence of political integration called for transferring politics to 
technocratic bodies such as the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the EU Court of Justice. Decision making is increa-
singly performed outside the public eye, which was one of the argu-
ments of Brexit supporters and is easily comprehensible even outside 
the UK. It can be remarked that creating policies is still largely in the 
hands of regulatory bodies and global economy, which administrate 
these policies through international arrangements such as the World 
Trade Organisation of the IMF – through activities which many citi-
zens consider to be against the interest of the workers or national in-
terests (Rodrik, 2018). All these circumstances feed the narratives of 
the populists and are favourable for the development of populism. 
On the one hand, limitations are needed as regards the 
achievement of political power in order to prevent the majority 
(or those in power) from violating the rights of the minority (or 
those not in power). On the other hand, the balance between 
the democratic and the liberal requires a public policy responsi-
ble to the preferences of the electoral majority.     
Liberal democracy is inherently fragile because a reconci-
liation between two principles is not a natural state – it is rather 
a process of constant adjustment. When the elites are strong 
enough, they are not interested in sustaining the mood of the 
majority, and when the masses are moved towards requests for 
a redistribution of power, minority rights usually go neglected. 
Liberal democracy, therefore, has a tendency to disrupt the ba-
lance towards “illiberal democracy” or “undemocratic liberali-
sm.” It is up to political actors to maintain the balance through 
rational adjustment of interests. It is harder to maintain this ba-
lance in the countries with rooted and varied political rifts (eth-
nic, religious, cultural, ideological) and undeveloped political 
culture than in homogeneous political communities with deve-
loped political culture.    
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What Can Be Learned from Populists
Instead of complaining about the populists’ lack of 
scruple, the established political parties could learn a lesson or 
two from the struggle for the trust of citizens. Above all, com-
munication, style, and narrative should be adjusted to the “com-
mon man,” and what is of substantial importance, programmes 
and the vision of development should be related to citizens’ 
prosperity – through more direct communication; sometimes 
the narrative should go beyond the naked data and be enriched 
with emotions; instead of statistical data on the better state of 
economy, ways in which economic measures are reflected on in-
dividual citizens should be pointed out; tax policy should be di-
rected towards a more just redistribution; the gap perceived by 
the citizens as the gap between the estranged elites and their 
own interests should be overcome with simple messages, etc. 
Trustworthy people – efficient organisation – an attracti-
ve political offer. These are the necessary ingredients for the 
success of the established parties. The formula was abbreviated 
by populists, who left out the organisation part and emphasi-
zed the attractiveness of the political offer to the citizens. Cer-
tainly, having an efficient organisation can only be of help. 
So, the lost trust needs to be regained, and the trust of new 
supporters acquired through more direct communication. It is ob-
vious that reliance on the so-called party machineries does not 
have the role it used to have, but this does not mean that the mac-
hinery should be entirely rejected or neglected. Traditional voting 
is nearly extinct: that for family-oriented parties or based on class 
divisions. Those who did not grasp this fact are now faced with 
electoral defeats (Woods, 2018). But those who did understand it 
can have a comparative advantage over those who only dispose of 
populist instruments and mechanisms. 
After a decade of economic weakness, voters are scepti-
cal of the established politicians who offer promises of the 
growth and improvement of the living standard. Workers actu-
ally earn less than they did ten years ago. In the United States, 
56% of households have reduced household incomes. At the 
same time, further threats of automation have made 
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employment even less certain and reduced negotiation oppor-
tunities for the workers. 
Contrary to popular belief, a recent research study has 
confirmed that technology is not the main cause for the redu-
ction of labour income. The conditions of the workers have in-
stead deteriorated because of their loss of negotiation power, 
trade union density, the reduction of welfare state, and the 
growth of the financial share in economy. Yet another impor-
tant factor is tax policy. According to Financial Times, effective 
tax rates “paid by the world’s 10 biggest public companies by 
market capitalisation in each of nine sectors” have fallen by ne-
arly one-third since 2000, from 34% to 24%. And since 2008, 
personal income-tax rates across all countries have increased by 
6%, on average (Woods, 2018). 
When the majority become poor, it necessarily reflects 
on the vote. Populists can use this in a much better way than 
the established parties and politicians. It is especially the case 
when it comes to communication with citizens (“the people”). 
The Brasilian example is often quoted as a drastic example of 
the brutal dominance, however inappropriate, of the populist 
narrative, style, and manner of communication over the usual 
“sterile” offer of the established politicians: whereas the for-
mer promise a gun to each Brasilian to defend themselves aga-
inst the insupportable criminal, the latter speak about fiscal sta-
bility and economic growth. It is similar in developed 
democracies. However, some have learned their lessons, like 
Obama, who sent volunteers all over the country to listen to 
the voters’ problems, or Macron, who followed in Obama’s 
steps. They showed that there are things to be learned from 
populists and adapted to the established political mould. In the 
process, they used simple and easily understandable messages 
that brought politics closer to the citizens.      
Discussions of economic growth only function when peo-
ple can personally feel the benefits of this growth. If they want 
to be competitive in the political market, politicians would have 
to offer more direct answers to what the people expect or feel. 
In the British Brexit referendum, the government of the then 
Prime Minister David Cameron claimed that leaving the 
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European Union would result in reduced GDP, lost trade, and di-
sorders in the financial sector (Woods, 2018). Such arguments 
did not suffice to prevent the majority vote for Brexit. Suppor-
ters of leaving the EU, on the other hand, promised border con-
trol and focused on emotions, primarily that of fear and allaying 
the fears of “the people.” The elites that supported staying in 
the EU did not manage to reach the voters in the right commu-
nicative way, and this reflected on the results. It transpired that 
it was almost equally important to have arguments and possess 
operative abilities to transform the arguments into comprehen-
sible and acceptable communication with citizens.  
In difficult times and situations of crisis, people look for 
solutions to existential problems, but they also search for the 
political offer of hope that in the future life will be better. De-
pending on the political culture, citizens opt for the worthy or 
those with a vision. In the wake of World War II in Yugoslavia, 
the “worthy” revolutionaries systemically provided themselves 
with the privileges to last a lifetime, whereas the British voted 
for the opponent of the man who defeated Hitler, Winston 
Churchill. The communists in Yugoslavia offered a community 
that led towards a just classless society, at the same time crea-
ting a political system which made it impossible for the promise 
to come true. In the UK, the promises were more realistic, and 
the political system denied any privileges to the worthy. On the 
contrary! It encouraged a competition of ideas and program-
mes. The man who defeated the World War II winner, Clement 
Attlee, promised a new social contract. His government went 
on to provide free universal healthcare, unemployment insuran-
ce, pensions, decent housing, and secure jobs within the natio-
nalized industry. On the other hand, the communists in Yugosla-
via introduced the ideological and political monopoly by 
instating a one-party system.    
Populism exists in different political systems, and its rea-
ch and extent are limited by nothing but the social and political 
context.  
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Can Populism Encourage Strengthening of  
Democracy, and What Is the Role of Movements in It? 
Starting from a neutral evaluation of populism, that is, 
from the hypothesis that populism, apart from being dangerous 
to democracy, can also encourage a greater participation of citi-
zens and corrections in a political system made rigid with burea-
ucracy, we shall refer to some manifestations of populism such 
as the movements that have spread across Europe.  
More and more voters in democratic states believe that 
traditional political parties are largely turned towards their own 
interests and the strengthening of their own power. Traditional 
(established) parties formed their cartels to such an extent that 
they have become repellent to the voters: they use state reso-
urces and abuse state and public institutions to remain in po-
wer. This is even more pronounced in Serbia due to the absence 
of the rule of law and the undeveloped critical public opinion 
and press freedom.    
In search of a real alternative, the voters are looking for 
something new and different. Young voters especially show less 
and less interest in party activism, unless the party in question 
is the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, which has enough mo-
ney to pay them. Those who see more than money in politics 
consider that parties are overly bureaucratic and boring. 
Jan-Werner Müller believes that “[n]ot surprisingly, then, the 
most innovative political experiments in Europe in recent years 
have emerged from street protests and mass assemblies that 
eschewed hierarchical forms of organisation.” (Müller, 2018a)
Formed spontaneously from street protests, they achie-
ved success in the elections, but somewhere along the way they 
lost some of their principles: although they continued promo-
ting horizontal forms of organisation and participatory demo-
cracy, their charismatic leaders had more power than ever con-
centrated in their hands. Created in protests and 
demonstrations, these movements later turned into something 
different from what they initially proclaimed to be. This refers 
to the Spanish leftist Podemos, formed after the 2011 mass 
protests, as well as to the Italian Five Star Movement, but also 
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to some other movements. In Serbia, such movements include 
Enough Is Enough or the Movement of Free Citizens.  
Podemos Secretary-General Pablo Iglesias, for instance, 
has been criticized by the activists in the movement for his 
“hyper-leadership” and “online Leninism.” An example of extre-
me repulsion to political parties was given by the Five Star Mo-
vement “guru” Grillo, who holds no official position in the M5S 
and spreads his influence through the blog that has been key to 
the movement’s success. He defined the M5S as a “non-associa-
tion” and has revoked M5S members’ right to use the symbol, 
for which he owns the copyright, for supposedly breaking the 
“rules” – or what is officially called the “non-statute” – of his 
“anti-party.” He also asked that those running for public office 
under the M5S banner must sign a contract promising to pay fi-
nes if they violate the anti-party principles. (Müller, 2018a) 
Of course, political movements are not necessarily populist in 
nature. As the Green and feminist movements have shown, a move-
ment can contest traditional forms of politics without claiming to re-
present “the real people” or the “silent majority.” But today’s political 
movements also tend to be less pluralistic than the large parties that 
dominated post-war European politics. This makes sense, given that 
“movement” implies not just dynamism, but also a presumption that 
all members are in complete agreement about the path forward. The 
problem is that when everyone already appears to agree on where 
they should be going, there seems to be no need for extensive demo-
cratic deliberation. Therefore, the movements that have emerged in 
Europe in recent years – on both the left and the right – have focused 
more on strengthening their respective individual leaders than empo-
wering their rank-and-file members, even when they emphasize parti-
cipatory democracy (Ibid). 
Emmanuel Macron’s “Republic on the Move,” which won 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in Spring 2017, 
had built its strength on the strengthening of its leader, which 
made sense regarding the presidential elections, but it exten-
ded to parliamentary elections too. Sebastian Kurz became 
Chancellor of Austria when he was 31, having reshaped the con-
servative People’s Party (ÖVP) as the movement called “Seba-
stian Kurz List—the New People’s Party.” 
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Both leaders used their “sense of dynamism and purpo-
se,” which is usually a key feature of movement politics. Kurz, 
for his part, bent the entire ÖVP to his will. In addition to giving 
it a new name, he reorganized its internal structures and chan-
ged its official colour from black to turquoise. Still, the party’s 
conservative platform hardly changed at all, suggesting that 
Kurz’s moves are aimed at marketing and asserting his personal 
authority more than anything else. (Müller, 2018a)
It can be said that Kurz’s populist measures and methods 
have revitalized the party, and that these same methods have 
dulled the blade of populism by subsequent inclusion of radical 
right-wing populists in the government. Time will tell whether 
in this way Kurz managed to dull the blade of populism or sim-
ply slid into populism himself in order to obtain power, and 
what the price he will have to pay to remain in power is. Macron 
was the leader of the movement which opposed radical ri-
ght-wing populism, but he had something of a populist in him-
self, as he pointed out the weaknesses of the alienated elites 
and expressed sympathy for populist leadership. However, Ma-
cron does not bring into question the representative democra-
cy system or pluralism, and neither does Kurz, which sets them 
apart from real populists.  
The importance of the movements such as “Podemos,” 
“Republic on the Move,” and “Momentum” (a young movement 
that helped Jeremy Corbyn reshape the platform of the British 
Labour Party) is in the fact that in times of representative de-
mocracy crisis they offered an alternative to the citizens, espe-
cially to those frustrated with the prevalent political systems, 
usually dominated by the established political parties, all virtu-
ally the same in their attitudes towards key political views on 
society and the political community.   
But it would be naïve to think that movements themselves 
can make politics in Europe “more democratic.” They could opera-
te even less democratically than traditional parties, owing to their 
“strong plebiscitary forms of leadership” (Müller, 2018a).
The importance and meaning of the movements can pri-
marily be located in initiating changes within the democratic 
systems and parties, which would in turn lead to a larger-scale 
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inclusion of a greater number of citizens into political processes 
– not in their replacing the role and significance of the parties. 
This might change in the future, but the change is still not hap-
pening at today’s level of social development.   
Widened Gap between the Political Elites and Citizens
Why have the moderate democrats remained oversha-
dowed by populist autocrats who successfully exploited inequa-
lity, economic unscrupulousness, and decrease in standards?
A possible answer could be: because they did not have 
any solution to the ever-wider gap between the elites and com-
mon citizens; instead, they worked on widening this gap by the-
ir lack of any understanding of the moment and circumstances 
in which they found themselves. 
The question remains open of whether, if they had had 
better, clearer, and less calculating solutions, they would have 
impeded the strengthening of right-wing populism? Essentially, 
the key solution that was and still is missing concerns greater 
inequality: greater inequality breeds the need for further redis-
tribution, and this entails higher taxes for the rich and encoura-
ging consumption by those with lower incomes. Political par-
ties, especially leftist, could not give proper shapes to these 
processes, so they failed to receive support from those who 
would benefit from such an arrangement – and that is the majo-
rity of citizens. Instead of offering solutions comprehensible to 
the citizens, the practice created wider and deeper gap 
between the voters and political class. 
The practice, on the contrary, also produced something 
quite different: the political elites moved in the opposite dire-
ction, damaging not only their own but also the reputation of 
representative democracy itself in the eyes of the citizens. Inco-
me tax progressivity was reduced, reliance on regressive con-
sumption taxes increased, and the taxation of capital follows 
the global trends, which involve decreasing thereof. Instead of 
increasing investments in the infrastructure, the governments 
have introduced austerity measures which are particularly 
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pernicious to workers with low qualifications. Big banks and 
corporations get paid, but households do not. For example, in 
the United States the minimum wage has not been adequately 
adjusted, so the actual standard is constantly declining despite 
the rise of the GDP (Rodrik, 2018b). 
Citizens wanted further discussion and more work on how 
to stop the decline in standards, whereas the political parties im-
posed the issues of identity (gender, racial, ethnic, sexual) and li-
beral values. Instead of jobs and wages, they dealt with the topics 
of liberal values that for the voters were abstract. It transpired 
that competing with populists about such topics, the established 
and clearly profiled moderate parties stood no chances.          
Support for Market Fundamentalism and Widening  
of the Gap between Citizens and Elites
One of the key reasons for the growth of populism is the 
fact that democrats of different colours, including centrist and 
left-wing parties, have become too close to the big capital, fi-
nancial caste, and great corporations. Big banks have become 
especially influential not only through financing but also throu-
gh their control of key positions in politics.  
Once the Keynesian consensus with the post-war gold re-
serves had been abandoned, and progressive taxation suppres-
sed, that is, when the European welfare state “had gone out of 
fashion,” the vacuum was filled with market fundamentalism 
(neoliberalism), which was in politics most successfully advoca-
ted for by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
Instead of developing a trustworthy alternative, modera-
te democrats on the Centre and Left accepted the new rules of 
the game. It is precisely the “third way” leaders (Clinton, Schrö-
der, Blair) that are reproached for being uncritical promoters of 
globalisation instead of searching for alternatives to market 
fundamentalism. French socialists were criticised for having be-
come supporters of releasing control over international move-
ments of the capital. On the other hand, approaching the cen-
tre from the right was reduced to promises of encouraging 
expenditure on social programmes and education, which was 
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rarely realized. That was how the populist relativization of ideo-
logies developed, which went so far that there was talk of the 
end of ideologies, the inevitable merging of the Left and Right 
which annuls any meaning that ideology might have.  
“The alienated elites” reduced the significance of redis-
tribution, appealing to meritocracy (where efforts and results 
are rewarded), whereas on the other hand trust in the govern-
ment’s capability to solve the inequality problem was at a very 
low level. The general impression was that the alienated elites 
were more interested in saving banks from the financial crisis 
than in the politics of fighting poverty. The argument was that 
the survival of banks and the existing financial order was more 
important to fighting poverty than any political projects of re-
distribution, or politics of fighting poverty. But fewer and fewer 
are those who accept this argument, and there are more of tho-
se who expect an alternative political and economic offer to be 
established, an offer that would strive towards a more just so-
ciety in the fiscal, social, and environmental sense (Boujou et 
al., 2019).          
Economic Populism 
However, this is where the space for populism opens. 
Injustice, inequality, exploitation, poverty… These topics are of 
greatest interest for the majority of the population in nearly all 
countries, regardless of their level of development. Populists 
usually offer solutions in the name and for the benefit of “the 
people,” opposing the elites and the limitations imposed by li-
beral democracy. Populists would prefer to remove the limitati-
ons of the executive authority once they obtain this authority. 
Considering the fact that they represent “the people” with capi-
tal P, they believe that any limitations to their exercising of po-
wer in fact undermines the will of the people. Such limitations 
can only serve “the enemies of the people” – the minorities and 
foreigners (for right-wing populists), or the financial elites (for 
the leftist populists). 
This is a dangerous approach to politics because it is dee-
ply anti-democratic and anti-liberal. Also, because it banalizes 
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and absolutizes the majority principle and allows for a complete 
marginalisation of the minorities. Periodical elections under the 
authoritarian populist government and undemocratic circum-
stances become the means to legitimize usurping politics. It is 
the kind of politics that disrupts state and public institutions, 
the executive and judiciary authorities, the media and the enti-
re public space in general: they form their own NGOs, their me-
dia, their critics, their opposition…
Limitations explained by populism extend to the eco-
nomy, too, where exercising absolute control is “in the interest 
of the people.” But, while populism in the political sphere is ne-
arly always pernicious, economic populism can sometimes be ju-
stified (Rodrik, 2018a). This thesis deserves some debate. First, 
politically speaking, populism is not necessarily always pernicio-
us because it can initiate democratic processes, which has alre-
ady been explained. The claim that economic populism can so-
metimes be justified leaves a lot of space for debate. 
Sometimes? Is “sometimes” enough to mark economic populism 
as positive? 
Economic politics: short-term interests often undermine 
the search for policies that have far more long-term desirability. 
Monetary politics: politicians with the power to print money so as 
to increase production and employment in a short time, say, befo-
re the elections. But this makes economic stabilisation more diffi-
cult because companies and households adjust to the inflation 
expectations. Such monetary politics has harmful long-term effe-
cts because it does not yield desirable results. The solution is an in-
dependent central bank, isolated from politics, which relies exclu-
sively on its mandate in sustaining monetary stability. 
The costs of macroeconomic populism are well-known in 
Latin America. Populist parties periodically produced painful 
economic crises, which hit the poor most severely.  
Another example is the official treatment of foreign inve-
stors. Once a foreign company makes an investment, it essen-
tially gets embroiled in domestic troubles. The promises made 
with a view to attracting the company are easily forgotten and 
substituted by policies which suppress them in favour of the 
state budget or national companies. On the other hand, foreign 
Zoran Lutovac  |  Populism, Stabilitocracy and Multiculturalism 
98
investors can also be privileged at the cost of the public inte-
rest, as is the case with Serbia, where they come for subventi-
ons and the privileged position; once the effect of these privile-
ges wanes, they retreat. For a regulated state it is more 
important to have a stable political and legal system with clear 
rules and procedures and an independent legislative system to 
protect anyone who wishes to do business in accordance with 
the given rules, in fair conditions of equality.            
Economic Populism against Liberal Technocracy
The global tendency to give a disproportionate privilege 
to the capital at the expense of work has caused reactions in 
certain states (Iceland). International rules and international co-
urts protect international investors. Banks and other financial 
institutions have been particularly successful in obtaining privi-
leges and a special status. 
This kind of “liberal technocracy” is also present in the 
European Union, where economic rules and regulations are de-
signed in such a way as to remove any possibility of democratic 
consideration at the national level. Even practically speaking, in 
every EU member state this political gap – the so-called demo-
cratic deficit of the EU – has led to the strengthening of popu-
list Eurosceptic political parties. 
This is why the demands are being put forward more and 
more loudly for the return of the higher degree of autonomy as 
regards economy in the member states. On the other hand, we 
should constantly remain cautious in respect of the effects of 
economic populism, or any populism, as it endangers political 
pluralism and undermines the norms of liberal democracy. 
Danica Popović has pointed to short-term positive effects 
of economic populism which are later inevitably turned into 
extremely negative measures – negative to the extent that se-
rious reforms are required because economy is brought into a 
condition far worse than before the implementation of econo-
mic populism (Popović, 2017: 26-34).
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Pro-European Anti-populist Resistance 
The Idea of Europe and the  
European Union in Search of Balance
The balance between the democratic and the liberal is im-
portant at the European, supranational level, as much as it is im-
portant for the democracy in each individual member state. On 
the one hand, there are demands to preserve the values upon whi-
ch the EU rests, while on the other there are calls for more demo-
cracy within the EU. The best example of the attempts to make 
the EU better are the initiatives launched before the European 
parliamentary elections, from 23 to 26 May 2019: the initiative to 
preserve the idea of Europe and the initiative to improve the fun-
ctioning of the EU as a political community. 
As an alternative to these initiatives, there are national 
values and the delegation of competences from the national to 
the supranational level. The informal “Populist International” is 
formed; its members are ideologically diverse – as populism it-
self is – but they do have a common trait: they all support aut-
horitarian tendencies and bring into question the values and in-
stitutions of liberal democracy. This is what makes Orbán from 
the EU closer to Putin from Russia than, for example, to Ma-
cron. The CSU attitudes to Russia differ considerably from the 
attitudes of the German government and the European Union. 
The Czech or Italian populists present a similar case. They all 
have fine mutual relationships and similar attitudes on many 
questions: above all, migrants, bureaucracy in Brussels, and the 
strengthening of individual states instead of the EU.
Before the first direct elections for the European Parlia-
ment in 1979, national parliaments had delegated their repre-
sentatives. This is exactly what Eurosceptics and the opponents 
of the strengthening of the supranational character of the EU 
would do if given the opportunity. 
Voting is still done on different days under different ele-
ction laws. Candidates are selected by national parties of diffe-
rent political groups in Europe. The very fact that there is no 
authentic pan-European party system makes these elections es-
sentially national. Transnational lists of candidates still do not 
Zoran Lutovac  |  Populism, Stabilitocracy and Multiculturalism 
100
exist. The established parties, naturally wishing to protect their 
own interests in the European Parliament, resist the attempts 
to define quota for pan-European parliament members. A spe-
cial problem for the strengthening of the reputation of the 
pan-European idea is posed by the fact that European Parlia-
ment elections are in individual states treated as second-order 
elections.9
Although they look like and are in practice often treated 
as the elections of lesser significance in the states of the EU, 
the attention they cause still gives them importance, primarily 
among the pro-European politicians, in the media, and in acade-
mic circles. The attention is directed towards a reconsideration 
of the attitude towards the idea of Europe and towards the Eu-
ropean supranational community. Hence the alarming warnin-
gs from intellectuals, the academic community, and pro-Europe-
an politicians about the vulnerability not only of the Union but 
of the very idea of Europe. The warnings are in the first place 
directed to those who would at least like to preserve the 
existent level of integrity, but also to those who would like to 
raise the integrity to a higher level and confront the strengthe-
ning of the Eurosceptic group inside the EU Parliament, which 
would in turn like to refurbish the common European house in 
its own custom – strengthening national specificities at the ex-
pense of the community.     
The Idea of Europe – A Bastion against 
 “Populist International” 
New Wave – A Letter to the European Public
In intellectual circles, the reaction to pan-populism was 
organised and vociferous. European intellectuals dramatically 
warned that The Idea of Europe is in danger. They warned 
9  Slovakia in 2014 is given as a drastic example of the lack of interest in 
these elections. In the Czech Republic merely a fifth of the voters took part, 
and as contrasting examples there are Luxembourg and Belgium, where 
elections are mandatory, and where the turnout was about 90%.
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against criticism without offering viable alternative, and even 
against desertion: “It has been abandoned by the two great 
allies who in the previous century twice saved it from suicide; 
one across the Channel and the other across the Atlantic. The 
continent is vulnerable to the increasingly brazen meddling by 
the occupant of the Kremlin. Europe as an idea is falling apart 
before our eyes.”10
The intellectuals cautioned against the resurrected natio-
nalism – instead of supranational community, what is offered is 
the Europe of national states and values: “Enough of ‘building 
Europe’!” is the cry. Let’s reconnect instead with our “national 
soul”! Let’s rediscover our “lost identity”! This is the agenda 
shared by the populist forces washing over the continent. Ne-
ver mind that abstractions such as “soul” and “identity” often 
exist only in the imagination of demagogues (Kundera et al. 
2019).
In such atmosphere, European parliamentary elections 
were held. The intellectuals dramatized the state of the affairs 
to the fullest, invoking “a new spirit of resistance” to prevent 
the catastrophic outcome of those elections: “They will give a 
victory to the wreckers. For those who still believe in the legacy 
of Erasmus, Dante, Goethe and Comenius there will be only 
ignominious defeat. A politics of disdain for intelligence and 
culture will have triumphed. There will be explosions of xenop-
hobia and antisemitism. Disaster will have befallen us.” (Ibid.).
The signatories of the call said that they “refuse to resign 
themselves to this looming catastrophe”:
“We count ourselves among the European patriots (a gro-
up more numerous than is commonly thought, but that is often 
too quiet and too resigned), who understand what is at stake 
10  Signatories, among others, included: Milan Kundera, Salman Rushdie, 
Elfriede Jelinek, Orhan Pamuk, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Vassilis Alexakis, Vassi-
lis Alexakis, Svetlana Alexievich, Anne Applebaum, Jens Christian Grøndahl, 
David Grossman, Ágnes Heller, Ismaïl Kadaré, György Konrád, António 
Lobo Antunes, Claudio Magris, Ian McEwan, Adam Michnik, Herta Müller, 
Ludmila Oulitskaïa, Rob Riemen, Fernando Savater, Roberto Saviano, Eu-
genio Scalfari, Simon Schama, Peter Schneider, Abdulah Sidran, Leïla Slima-
ni, Colm Tóibín, Mario Vargas Llosa, Adam Zagajewski.  
Libération, 25.01.2019. The Guardian, 25.01.2019. 
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here. Three-quarters of a century after the defeat of fascism 
and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall there is a new 
battle for civilisation.
Our faith is in the great idea that we inherited, which we 
believe to have been the one force powerful enough to lift Eu-
rope’s peoples above themselves and their warring past. We be-
lieve it remains the one force today virtuous enough to ward 
off the new signs of totalitarianism that drag in their wake the 
old miseries of the dark ages. What is at stake forbids us from 
giving up.
Hence this invitation to join in a new surge. 
Hence this appeal to action on the eve of an election that 
we refuse to abandon to the gravediggers of the European idea. 
Hence this exhortation to carry once more the torch of a 
Europe that, despite its mistakes, its lapses, and its occasional 
acts of cowardice, remains a beacon for every free man and wo-
man on the planet. 
Our generation got it wrong. Like Garibaldi’s followers in 
the 19th century, who repeated, like a mantra, “Italia se farà da 
sè” (Italy will make herself by herself), we believed that the con-
tinent would come together on its own, without our needing to 
fight for it, or to work for it. This, we told ourselves, was “the 
direction of history”. 
We must make a clean break with that old conviction. We 
don’t have a choice. We must now fight for the idea of Europe 
or see it perish beneath the waves of populism.
The EU’s core values are under attack as never before. It 
must defend them
In response to the nationalist and identitary onslaught, we 
must rediscover the spirit of activism or accept that resentment and 
hatred will surround and submerge us. Urgently, we need to sound 
the alarm against these arsonists of soul and spirit who, from Paris to 
Rome, with stops along the way in Barcelona, Budapest, Dresden, 
Vienna and Warsaw, want to make a bonfire of our freedoms. 
In this strange defeat of “Europe” that looms on the hori-
zon; this new crisis of the European conscience that promises to 
tear down everything that made our societies great, honoura-
ble, and prosperous, there is a challenge greater than any since 
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the 1930s: a challenge to liberal democracy and its values.” 
(Kundera et al. 2019).
It is here that it becomes visible that the call is in fact 
much more than a plea for the citizens of Europe to come to 
their senses – this is a demand for preservation of the values 
that Europe is founded on, together with the global political or-
der of liberal democracy. It is the call for conscience and cons-
ciousness, sense and political responsibility, to preserve the 
procedures and institutions that the free world is based on.
Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe
The lack of democracy and excessive independence of 
administrative and bureaucratic “elite” alienated from those 
they should represent are among the most frequent reproaches 
addressed to Brussels. On the International Human Rights Day, 
10 December 2018, political and academic elites published the 
Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe (120 European 
politicians and academicians). Immediately after its publication, 
the Manifesto gathered more than 110,000 signatures. It, inter 
alia, predicted the European Assembly and the policy for real 
fiscal, social and environmental justice in Europe (Manifesto for 
the Democratisation of Europe, 2018).
Primarily, the proposals are based on precisely targeted 
taxes, providing that a large portion of the proposed expenses 
is aimed at public spending; e.g. funding the research of new 
technologies at universities and division of the migration ex-
penses among the state parties. Furthermore, the new common 
taxes are aimed at reducing inequalities within the countries. 
There are wealthy Greeks who do not pay sufficient amount of 
taxes, as well as poor Germans who pay too much. 
The Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe enables the 
willing states to sign the agreement on the establishment of the new 
European Assembly which would consist of 20% elected pan-Europe-
an Manifest members, and 80% members elected on the national le-
vel. The European Assembly would undertake the task of democrati-
cally controlling and steering economic policies implemented by the 
ministers of finance of the constitutive countries. 
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The new taxes would be targeted at the profit made by 
big companies, or the wealth of the richest citizens of Europe. 
It would be secured thus that those who profited the most 
from the development of Europe would contribute proportio-
nately to the financing of European public good, such as the de-
velopment of ecologically healthy environment, or the solution 
of the problems such as reception and integration of migrants. 
It is quite hard to predict transnational majorities that 
might be created in the Assembly. There is, for example, not-
hing to indicate whether the social fractions of the main Eu-
ropean Christian-democratic parties would or would not side 
with the leftist parties who could guarantee more social justice 
in our European societies. Both of these currently identify po-
pulist forces as the greatest danger. 
The key message is that Europe cannot ignore the issues 
of real democratic legitimacy and fiscal justice. The keepers of 
the “federalist flame” and fighters for democratisation of the 
EU and constitution of a democratic community within the Eu-
ropean Parliament still see an important base for “More Euro-
pe”, regardless of the fact that they have long been a clear mi-
nority. Hence the calls, manifestos, warnings… Eurosceptics, 
however, have entirely different ideas – relying more on the ve-
rified national values, than on the uncertain projections for the 
bright future. 
So, more social justice and more democratic legitimacy is 
needed to achieve “More Europe” – is the main message of the 
initiators of the Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe. 
European Parliament Elections
Europe of the People vs. Europe of the Citizens 
Nationalists vs. Globalists 
The elections for the European Parliament failed to meet 
the expectations of the radical Right and populists, and the fe-
ars of the liberals and the Left did not become reality: the re-
sults of the former were not bad, but they were far from the 
promised triumph, while the fears of the latter are still keenly 
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felt after these elections. The results in Italy, France and Great 
Britain, as well as good mutual communication and joint messa-
ges sent by the leaders of the radical Right concerning peaceful 
revolution and national (nationalist) vision of Europe confirm the 
dominance of the populist Zeitgeist of the radical rightist va-
riety. They speak of the Europe of the people which must repla-
ce the Europe of neoliberal elites. They speak of dangerous ot-
hers: immigrants and Islam, but also elites in Brussels, as those 
who represent a threat for the peoples of their respective co-
untries. 
They speak the language that people understand, but in-
stead of classes, they speak of nations, instead of public poli-
cies they impose identity related topics, instead of inequality 
they speak of immigrants. Instead of speaking of social justice, 
they impose the topics concerning “dangerous others”. 
While the proponents of The Third Way in early 2000s 
expanded margins towards the centre and there were talks that 
the radical political polarities would diminish and gradually disa-
ppear, today’s talks are entirely different: the centre is fully 
marginalised and the main fight is between radically rightist 
and radically leftist. At the centre of attention are identity 
issues, which are given primacy over the issues of social justice. 
Steve Bannon, ex-Chief Strategist of Donald Trump’s ad-
ministration, together with Mischaël Modrikamen, the leader of 
the Belgian People’s Party, founded in 2017 in Brussels “The 
Movement”. That NGO has the task of supporting nationalists in 
Europe and connect them into a network. Months before the 
election for the European Parliament in 2019, Steve Bannon 
was touring Europe. 
“After the election, each new day in Brussels will be a new 
Stalingrad. Nationalists will act together. Their networking will fa-
cilitate what I call “command by negation”: you may not be able to 
realise your own will – as you don’t have majority – but you can 
block things.” (Serrao, 2019).
Bannon talks of two politics for Europe: on the one hand 
there is Macron with his alliance “Renaissance” the goal of whi-
ch is realisation of the programme Globalist: United States of 
Europe. According to the plan, Germany should become a kind 
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of North Carolina, while France would be South Carolina. Simply 
said: nations as administration units of a single central bureau-
cracy. Macron wants to centralise foreign policy and create EU 
army. The other politics advocates the old Westphalia system in 
which national states represent interests of their citizens. They 
comprise a single Union which inclines towards a stronger eco-
nomic and weaker political integration, especially when it co-
mes to foreign and immigration policy. And there is no EU army. 
Ones propose national sovereignty, while others advocate the 
creation of a supranational community in which nation states 
lose their sovereignty… “As far as I know, 70% of all legislation 
currently in effect in Germany, are adopted in Brussels” (Serrao, 
2019).
On the other hand, there are calls within the Left for the 
creation of their own vision of Europe – pan-European democra-
tic revolution (Ypi, 2019) – not only as a response to the networ-
ked and synchronised radical Right, but also as an integrated 
concept of creating a different Europe, the Europe of more fir-
mly and functionally interconnected states and peoples. 
The hard negotiation on who would become the new EU 
officials after the European elections actually supported the 
claims of the populists that the citizens of the EU only vote, but 
they do not elect. The alienated elites choose from within their 
ranks, say populists, but also some well-intentioned democrats 
who would like to change the nature and functioning of the EU. 
Populists in fact speak of alienated elites which negotiate 
among each other on the division of functions, and the voters 
cannot do anything about that. They remind that Macron perhaps 
does not want Weber who is the lead candidate, yet he is willing 
to accept a proposal by Angela Merkel. So, the nomination and 
subsequent election of Ursula von der Leyen for the President of 
the European Commission showed where the real power in the EU 
actually lay – both actually and institutionally. Attempts of demo-
cratizing the EU after this seem to be increasingly needed. The will 
of the European Parliament was ignored, as the main candidates 
of the both leading groups were not taken into account, and the 
candidate was elected that had the support of Angela Merkel and 
additional support of Macron (Rásonyi, 2019).
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In the poll by “Deutschland Trend” ordered each month 
by the ARD public service from the German “Infratest Dinag” in-
stitute, the citizens were asked whether Ursula von der Leyen is 
the right woman for the position of the President of the Eu-
ropean Commission. As much as 56% of the participants respo-
nded “No”, while only 33% believed that the German minister 
was a good choice for the function (Infratest dimag, 2019). Yet 
she was elected all the same, which once again confirmed that 
the real, fundamental power is outside the European Parlia-
ment and outside the reach of the voters’ will, which actualises 
the demands for more democracy in the EU.
The Idea of Europe in Serbia
The idea of Europe is in peril in Serbia. When listening 
the announcements and statements of state officials after their 
meetings with EU representatives, one might think that there is 
no danger. However, in Serbia, high state officials do not speak 
directly and openly against Europe, with the exception of some 
minor coalition partners. They talk against Europe via their con-
trolled media and “their” analysts. What is even more detrimen-
tal for the idea of Europe in Serbia is that the politics is deeply 
anti-European in values, while in a wider sense this politics is 
anti-civilisational. 
Not only that there is no promotion of the European va-
lues and the idea of Europe, but there is even an indirect and 
very strong promotion of anti-European values while the idea 
of Europe is derided. European integrations may be implemen-
ted without European values, just as European values can exist 
without European integrations. It would be the best if they wo-
uld go hand in hand, but it unfortunately is not so. 
Democratic political culture does not exist, nor is it worked 
on its establishment. On the contrary, what is promoted is the po-
litical culture of exclusivity instead of tolerance and integrativity. 
Opposition is treated as an enemy, rather than a legitimate repre-
sentative of those with different political attitudes. Citizens are 
treated as subjects instead as the holders of sovereignty who elect 
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and control all political representatives. Instead of the politics of 
good neighbouring relations, the relationships with neighbours 
are used in increasing national tension.  
The way in which politics is implemented is deeply an-
ti-European and anti-civilisational, just like the very values of 
such politics. Liberal-democratic system does not exist, nor the 
ethics and practice of responsibility. There is no separation of 
powers, or control of powers and authorities. Executive autho-
rity, i.e. one man controls everything: from institutions right 
down to media. These are not only state institutions, but also 
NGO and social institutions, with the exception of few truly de-
dicated to European values. 
Elections are neither free, nor fair. Quite the reverse, 
they are merely called elections, but they are not that in their 
essence. Voters are blackmailed and threatened, public resour-
ces are abused for the benefit of the dominant ruling party, the 
conditions before and during campaigns are entirely undemo-
cratic, a great majority of the media do not inform the citizens, 
but publish propaganda for the benefit of the ruling party. Ele-
ctoral will is not freely formed, and there are no conditions for 
it to be expressed freely. Electoral administration is not inde-
pendent. The rule of law does not exist. The autocrat controls 
everything in the society and the state. The authorities publicly 
demonstrate their powerlessness before hooligans and crimi-
nals, while simultaneously being contemptuous of their own ci-
tizens. Party membership is more important than the law. 
According to the assessment by the Freedom House, Ser-
bia has been demoted to the category of partly free countries. 
Human rights are sometimes respected, and sometimes not. 
The key criteria is one’s political affiliation and proximity to the 
authorities (Trivić, 2019). These are no European values, but rat-
her anti-European, anti-civilisational, dehumanising practices.  
In the times of authoritarian populism, 2012-2019, Serbia 
found itself in a seemingly absurd situation that we have the 
number of the MPs who declare themselves as pro-European 
which is the greatest ever, while simultaneously the support to 
European integrations among the citizens of Serbia is at its 
lowest. The media controlled by the regime lead a constant 
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anti-Western campaign. This only confirms the thesis of the 
pro-European politics which is rhetorical, rather than practical. 
There are two key reasons for such situation: non-European po-
litics of the regime and support of the Brussels administration 
to such politics.  

Populism in Serbia 
Manifestations of Serbian Populism: Glorification 
of the People, Anti-elitism and Anti-pluralism 

Populism in Recent Political History of Serbia 
– The Roots and Manifestations 
The modern populism in Serbia has grown under the aus-
pices of totalitarianism, based on the “exclusive right of the 
communists to political organisation, ruling ideology of Marxi-
sm-Leninism and domination of state (social) ownership over 
the main means of production and marginalisation of private 
ownership as the basis of economic independence of the citi-
zens from the government” (Popov, 1993: 26). At the peak of 
the Yugoslav crisis, in the second half of the 1980s, populism 
became the dominant political phenomenon. 
Created on the foundations of the “partisan populism” 
and its slogan of Death to the Fascism Freedom to the People, in 
the “soft” totalitarian order of the Second Yugoslavia, populism 
was reduced to “a mere ritual of government in the name of 
the people, without the possibility of politically constituting the 
people.” For the purpose of ideological propaganda, a narrative 
of the working people was being developed and finally even 
constitutionalised, while from time to time, the masses of peo-
ple gathered in the streets and at public squares, to affirm their 
loyalty to the regime and the leader (Popov, 1993: 25). 
The people were politically used to consolidate the 
system of government in the single-party state. Providing that 
there was no party pluralism, the only opponent to the ruling 
elite of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was par-
ty elites within the very LCY which advocated the ideas of stren-
gthening the statehood of the republics, i.e. national identities 
within the federation. This phenomenon dating from the 1960s 
reached its peak with the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. 
The federation weakened both formally and factually, while the 
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cult of the personality of Josip Broz became the pillar of such 
state organisation. It could already be guessed that the life of 
such federation would coincide with the life of the president, 
“the greatest son of all the peoples and nationalities,” while the 
guarantees for his lifelong rule were integrated in the Constitu-
tion. This very constitutional guarantee evidences the scope of 
the personality cult in the totalitarian state. The personality 
cult was the connective tissue of such community, it compensa-
ted for the lack of political pluralism, separation of powers and, 
generally, democratic institutions and procedures. All this defi-
ned the social and political context for the specific type of po-
pulism. 
Serbian nationalism and populism were more overtly ma-
nifested and strengthened on the basis of the 1974 Constituti-
on which stimulated the factual creation of sovereign republics, 
except for Serbia (Popov, 1993: 26). “Serbia divided in three will 
be united again” was the mantra of the awakened Serbian nati-
onalism, which was fuelled by the “injustice” of Serbian position 
within the SFRY and resulted in the populist mobilisation aga-
inst the elites which neglected the interest of their own people. 
Additionally, the populist mobilisation was stimulated by 
the messages against dangerous others, which ignited fear and 
hatred: “The spiritual fathers of nationalism imposed on their 
own people the belief that the governments of national states 
would disappear, that they would be destroyed by some other 
peoples, not merely be abused and exploited by those peoples” 
(Popov, 1993: 27). The slogan of poet Matija Bećković which 
was appropriated and instrumentalised in the public discourse – 
“Serbs are the remnants of the slaughtered people” – is the 
best illustration of the way in which the fear of extermination, 
which had been created during WWII, especially in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, was instilled in the people. 
Heading the populist movement and ideology in the se-
cond half of the 1980s was the leader (Slobodan Milošević) and 
the dominant state-run media favouring him, which completes 
the necessary elements defining populism. Contextual reasons 
for its occurrence included: political and economic crisis of the 
totalitarian state which started to come undone along national 
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borders and a wide discrepancy between the external image of 
the SFRY and what the state essentially was. The one-party poli-
tical system of self-governing socialism and “fraternity and uni-
ty” was giving in before the changed international circumstan-
ces, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Milošević won majority support within the Communist Lea-
gue of Serbia once he “descended to the level of the people,” whi-
ch was reported by the state-run media that had begun to support 
him. His patronage of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija, reflected 
in the slogan “No one may beat you!,” was shaped by the media so 
that it assured all Serbs that they had found a leader who cared 
for the entire Serbian people, rather than guarding his partisan 
privileges like other members of the political elite of his time. 
What ensued was the famous “occurrence of the people,” i.e. or-
ganisation of a series of meetings, where through his direct appe-
aling to the people, he cleared the way towards his complete do-
mination on the political scene of Serbia, the domination which 
relied heavily on his empathic attitude towards the people and 
harsh criticism of the communist elite. 
Being “different” among communists, Milošević questio-
ned the established political dogmas and started addressing 
the people directly, goading them against the estranged politi-
cal elite. At the moment of his emergence, he stood out from 
the standard party officials, and he rather quickly won the 
attention and support of a great number of Serbian citizens. His 
support allowed him to change everything which was expected 
to be changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall: from introducing 
a multiparty system, down to amending restrictive ideology and 
means of political communication. Yet he did not want plurali-
sm, nor some essential changes in the society, but he rather 
abused populism to usurp strong levers of power. 
Serbia adopted a new Constitution which did not pave 
the way for necessary changes, but it rather reflected the 
attempts to secure and define the government tailored to suit 
the leader and his associates. Additionally, he started using a 
more inflammable rhetoric when it came to “dangerous ot-
hers,” i.e. archenemies. He used nationalism as a mean of gai-
ning power, consolidation of his position of authority and, 
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finally, to stay in power. The leader and the media, the key 
actors of the populist structure, attained a victorious symbiosis. 
The symbiosis was aided by the established Communist League 
of Serbia, subsequently renamed into Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS), using its inherited infrastructure and privileged position 
in society. 
The undisputed leader won all the levers of power, and 
he could use them to start building liberal democracy, yet this 
had not been his intention. Instead of multiparty democracy, he 
offered a modified single-party system, with the Socialist Lea-
gue of the Working People of Yugoslavia, which should have 
served as a non-partisan substitute for multiparty pluralism. 
Dissolution of SFRY and Populism – Glorification of 
One’s Own Nation and Instigation of Fear and Hatred 
against “Others” 
“Serbian populism became the dominant phenomenon at 
the peak of the Yugoslav crisis and it gained strength througho-
ut its dissolution, participated in by identical, or similar actors in 
other parts of Yugoslavia, and they all came into power” (Po-
pov, 1993: 50).
The Constitution adopted in Serbia in 1990 was a political 
reflection of the complete lack of understanding of and resi-
stance to changes that had affected international order. Inste-
ad of being the foundation for general changes in society, the 
Constitution was the reflection of the confusion caused by the 
fact that the main actors were still burdened by the dying ideo-
logy of self-governing socialism and infatuated by the ideology 
of the ever-growing nationalism. Simultaneously confronted 
with the democracy – “the guiding idea of the 20th century,” 
they found themselves in identity and legitimacy confusion whi-
ch directly impacted society in general. 
The political heritage was not a framework which would 
facilitate construction of the new political and constitutional 
identity of Serbia. On the contrary, the experience of the socia-
list political community which had not been based on 
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constitutional democracy was a serious obstacle to thorough 
changes. The fact that such political community was described 
as a milder and more liberal variety of Real socialism, was partly 
favourable, yet it also represented a mitigating circumstance. 
What was favourable was the fact that certain elements of the 
democratic liberal world had already reached such community, 
yet this deescalated political and social energy and the readine-
ss for radical political changes. 
Serbia inherited the condition of unfinished statehood 
(Đinđić, 1988), yet it failed to overcome such a condition, and it 
continued functioning as an unfinished state (Dimitrijević, 2003: 
57-71) regardless of the international and internal circumstan-
ces. In other words, the order of “façade” statehood of Yugosla-
via was not transformed into constitutional democracy. The so-
cialist order of Yugoslavia was based on the will, ideology, and 
power of the Communist Party, the state was an agent in the 
hands of this real sovereignty,11 while the constitution, legisla-
tion, and political institutions created a semblance of a well-re-
gulated state. The single-party system, wrapped in the seducti-
ve ideology of brotherhood and unity and self-governing 
socialism, was in fact a political perpetuum mobile to formally se-
cure legitimacy of the Communist League, to guarantee peace 
and stability and defence against external and internal enemies. 
The Party Produces and 
Dispels Fears through Populism 
Not only that the party gave contents to ideology and in-
stitutions, it was also established outside and above the system 
that it had shaped and constituted itself. The League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia had established such social order where 
the supra-constitutional position and role of the party was not 
to be questioned. And just like political participation of the 
11  “It is not that the state obtains more sovereignty, but on the contrary, the 
state in socialism is not sovereign at all. It is but a tool in the hands of the 
true sovereign who has no status of a public-legal person, but rather of meta-
physical-political subject.” Đinđić, op.cit. p 171.
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citizens was simulated through delegate system and the accep-
ted political oxymoron of having elections in the one-party 
system, the autonomy of social activities was imitated by the 
Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia. Similar to 
all other elements of public importance, the Socialist League 
was a construct made by the party, their generous political gift 
to the citizens that allowed them to express pluralism of intere-
sts and creativity. 
It was actually the negation of social autonomy, an insti-
tutional channelling of quasi-pluralism under the auspices of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Party control and su-
pervision of institutions, political and public life, and the party’s 
universal presence support the claims of those who warned 
that Yugoslav socialism was an undemocratic order.12
Populism as a thin-centred ideology acted in symbiosis 
with the established ideology. Instead of the constitutional and 
democratic concept of the rule of law, the Yugoslav socialism 
established rule by law.13 Law was understood and treated in 
practice as an instrument for the realisation of the ideological 
and political construct of building socialism, i.e. paving the way 
towards communism as the social ideal, ideologically and politi-
cally formulated by the communist party. In this sense, determi-
nation of constitution as the supreme legal act is merely decla-
ratory, since the constitution does not guarantee rights, nor 
does it limit authorities and power. Constitution merely repre-
sents yet another transmission of the party’s sovereign power, 
the power which in itself is not limited by the constitution (Đin-
đić, 1988: 42-47).
12  Nenad Dimitrijević, referencing Zoran Đinđić, speaks of “the non-state or-
ganised order.” 
13  Rule by Law was a characteristic of both Eastern and Central European coun-
tries. See: Sajo, A./Losonci, V, “Rule by Law in East Central Europe: Is the 
Emperor’s New Suit a Straightjacket?”, in Greenberg, D, et al (eds.) Constitu-
tionalism and Democracy. Transition in the Contemporary World, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 1993, p.327.
Populism in Serbia
119
Transitional Post-communist Populism 
Serbian 1990 Constitution was adopted by the single-par-
ty Serbian Parliament after the populist “anti-bureaucratic revo-
lution” conducted by Slobodan Milošević within the Communist 
League of Serbia. At the time, Serbia was still a member to the 
SFRY and it thus contributed to delegitimising of the previously 
practically disempowered federal state. Federal republics’ bran-
ches of once powerful and undisputed sovereign of SFRY, em-
bodied in the LCY, were taking over full control in their respe-
ctive republics, renouncing their (quasi)leftist identities and 
embracing the ideology of nationalism with the aim to preserve 
their own legitimacy. 
Accordingly, the constitution was treated as an instru-
ment of power, rather than being the supreme legal act and so-
cial contract. Instead of becoming the foundation for the termi-
nation of the practice of façade constitutionality and 
democracy, the 1990 Constitution was primarily intended to 
allow for the rule of extra-institutionally imposed decision-ma-
king centre to be glossed over. Instead of limiting the power 
and guaranteeing rights and freedoms as the foundations of a 
constitutional democracy to be built through the process of 
transition, the Constitution of 1990 became an integral part of 
the newly established dominance. 
It is probably not too harsh an assessment that the 1990 
Serbian Constitution failed to meet the most elementary con-
stitutional criteria of a legal state, characteristic of the modern 
political community. This primarily refers to the absence of an 
adequate treatment of the fundamental human rights and free-
doms, the essential lack of the control and separation of po-
wers, and inadequate treatment of political parties as pillars of 
the newly established multi-party system and representative 
democracy. In addition to this, a semi-presidential system was 
founded, which obstructed the formal balance of power, tip-
ping the scale towards the excessively powerful president of 
the state, the pillar of autocracy. 
Starting from the predominant position that constituti-
ons are primarily instruments limiting political power and 
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putting its implementation under control (Sartori, 2013: 223), it 
can be said that the Constitution of 1990, in addition to the se-
ries of other integrated solutions not only dealing with the po-
sition and role of the President of the Republic, also reflected 
the contradiction between the desire of the ruler to rule witho-
ut limitations, and his simultaneous wish to secure a constituti-
onal semblance of democracy for this extra-institutional rule. 
One of those controversial solutions was to significantly limit 
the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija, presented as “reinstitu-
tion of the united Serbia.” It would turn out later that what was 
done and the way in which it was done, would persistently re-
main the hot topic of national, as well as international politics 
throughout the 1990s, and to this very day. 
When it comes to political identity, the Constitution 
attempted to address the contradictions between the civic rheto-
ric and nationalistic ideology of the ruler for whom it had been wri-
tten: the state ethnically and democratically founded (preamble), 
only for the principle of civic-democratic sovereignty to be inconsi-
stently derived in its normative section (art. 1&2). The issue of na-
tional minorities’ loyalty was certainly not defined with this 
attempt at constitutional seesaw between national and ethnic, yet 
it is a proper illustration of the ideological and identity confusion. 
Serbia was just one of the countries in the region and wi-
der geopolitical area where ethnic had priority over civic, so 
that the loyalty of national minorities in all those countries was 
primarily oriented towards their own ethnic community, or nati-
on, and only secondarily to the countries in which they lived. 
Furthermore, practical politics was much more important to the 
members of national minorities than what had been written in 
the constitution or legislation (Lutovac, 1998). However, in ad-
dition to everything else that could be said on the subject, it is 
a fact that the chance was also missed to reach the widest po-
ssible consensus on constitutional level, and to establish with 
this constitution a social contract concerning the kind of state 
and society that should be built. This is understandable, provi-
ding that it is in the nature of authoritarian populists to 
“appropriate the people” and build factual, and if possible even 
formal monopoly on communication with the people. 
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The rights and freedoms in this Constitution, though be-
ing addressed very thoroughly, do not represent the real foun-
dation of this supreme legal act. On the contrary, it can be said 
that for this Constitution “the state authority is the source of ri-
ghts and freedoms of man and citizen, rather than their guaran-
tee.”14 Even though it contains most of the generally accepted 
international norms and principles of human rights, this consti-
tution relativizes them through the provisions which indicate 
that the conditions for the realisation of such rights and free-
doms are stipulated by the law, which calls into question direct 
constitutional applicability of the rights and freedoms. Namely, 
such provisions are in contradiction with contemporary standar-
ds of protecting human rights and freedoms, which require 
them to be limited exclusively by the constitution. Furthermore, 
there are no constitutional guarantees that legislator would 
not limit some of these rights and freedoms in prescribing the 
conditions and manners for their realisation. 
Essentially, such an attitude towards human rights and 
fundamental freedoms largely illustrates the nature of the or-
der and society, as well as political identity of the community at 
the beginning of the process of transition. This constitution 
thus preserved the continuity of subjugating citizens to the order 
and human rights to ideology.15 
14  Ustavne pretpostavke za demokratsku Srbiju (Constitutional Preconditions for 
Democracy in Serbia), Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 1997, p.10.
15  “The 1990 Serbian Constitution copied one of the most problematic provisions 
contained in article 203, paragraph 2 of the 1974 SFRY Constitution, on the 
reasons to prohibit the realisation of rights and freedoms. That provision rep-
resents the constitutional basis for the proclamation and simultaneous denial 
of rights and freedoms. It is, namely, “action with the aim of a forcible change in 
constitutionally stipulated order, breach of constitutionally guaranteed free-
doms and rights of a man and citizen, instigation of racial and religious intoler-
ance and hatred”. The Constitution of Serbia quotes this constitutional basis in 
two cases – when it guarantees for the freedom of political, union, and other 
organisation and action (art. 44) and when it guarantees for the freedom of print 
and other means of public information (art. 46, para. 6). Through their diction, 
these constitutional reasons for the prohibition of realisation of the aforemen-
tioned political rights and freedoms became a kind of rubber terms which can 
be interpreted (i.e. abused) in a myriad of different ways by the competent au-
thorities. Ustavne pretpostavke za demokratsku Srbiju (Constitutional Preconditions 
for Democracy in Serbia), p. 11.
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Populism, as a thin-centred ideology in the times of the 
one-party state of SFRY survived on the basis of ideological settings of 
that society, and once the times of nationalism had begun, it swiftly 
readjusted and created symbiosis with it. This transformation of po-
pulism from one ideology into another reaffirms the “chameleonic na-
ture” of populism and its symbiotic, i.e. parasitic character. 
Observed from the perspective of those who champion re-
presentative democracy, or the rule of law, it was quite easy to 
transform the state and society: to cancel one party’s monopoly, 
establish a multi-party system, adopt new constitution as a proper 
social response and the foundation of the new democratic com-
munity based on the rule of law, delimit and bring under control 
the implementation of political power, and functionally regulate 
organisation of the state. This, however, did not happen in the 
1990 Serbia. Instead, the overwhelming, almost undisputed, ideo-
logical tide of democratic ideas was used to cover up for the 
narrower pragmatic political aims, by creating constitutional and 
legal fiction and quasi-democratic institutions. 
On the wave of the ideas of representative democracy 
and nationalism, the political project of attaining a modern de-
mocratic national state was constructed. It turned out, howe-
ver, that this was but a pragmatic shaping of the idea to legiti-
mise the rule of the old ruling class in new circumstances.16 It 
was required to present oneself in a favourable light before in-
ternational community and one’s own citizens. This was achie-
ved with the aid of those intellectuals and citizens who, even 
when they had realised that this was but a democratic façade, 
were ready to support it, believing that this would result in the 
creation of a democratic space where in the future they would 
16  First political parties in Serbia were created by the design of the ruling 
Communist Party. Soon after political pluralism was accepted in principle 
in late 1989 and early 1990, first opposition parties were formed, yet the 
laws regulating the establishment and operation of political parties were 
not adopted until July 1990, so in the interval between this general accep-
tance and legal regulation of political parties, the parties operated thanks 
to the “good will” and tacit agreement of the still dominant communist 
parties in both republics. More on political parties in Serbia and Montene-
gro in: Goati, Vladimir, Partije Srbije i Crne Gore u političkim borbama od 
1990. do 2000. (Parties in Serbia and Montenegro in the Political Struggles 
from 1990 to 2000), Bar, Conteco, 2000.
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fight for real democratic reforms. It would turn out, however, 
that this first stem was more important than one could assume 
and that it left quite serious consequences on further develop-
ment of political and constitutional identity of Serbia. 
It can be said that the era of the rise and rule of Slobo-
dan Milošević was marked by populist overtones in all its defi-
ned segments: opposition between the suffering Serbian people 
and estranged elites which took care only of their own interest, 
mobilising the people by means of the fears of existential threats, 
hostile surroundings and domestic traitors, as well as of an inter-
national conspiracy which introduced the “unjust economic san-
ctions” to the people fighting for justice and survival. 
However, this transitional post-communist populism failed 
to engage the entire people the way the main actors of the regi-
me populism wished to present. The period from the beginning of 
the 1990s is referred to by Nebojša Popov as the era of regime 
and opposition populism (Popov, 1993: 49). However, the circum-
stances of unfinished state and the inexistence of developed insti-
tutions allowed for the absolutist politics to be led with a relative 
majority, which confirms the thesis that in illiberal democracies, 
i.e. illiberal countries in transition, the negative consequences of 
populism combined with conflict-inducing political programmes 
are detrimental to such political communities. 
Populism in the Transitional Momentum 2000-2003
The overthrow of Milošević on 5 October 2000 is referred 
to by some as the Revolution of 5 October since it involved 
mass involvement of citizens (the people) who protected their 
election will and opposed to the usurpation of power. In additi-
on, an essential change of the political order was promised, not 
merely a change of government. Milošević gained legitimacy at 
a formally democratic election, yet this election was not fair or 
free. The power was in the hands of one man, the leader, regar-
dless of the function he occupied and his authorities, or compe-
tences. Political processes took place under his control and the 
supervision of his associates. 
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The changes of 5 October took place on the wave of wide 
and deep people’s (civil) dissatisfaction, in the conditions of a 
grave economic and social situation and the international isola-
tion of Serbia. In terms of political programme and ideology, 
DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) was a movement which 
gathered different actors united with the aim of overthrowing 
the regime and starting essential reforms of the state and so-
ciety. It had certain elements of a populist movement and style, 
yet its goals were reformatory. The actual leader of DOS (Zoran 
Đinđić) did not care much for building his own charisma and ra-
ting, but was instead turned to reformatory changes. Vojislav 
Koštunica, posing as the leader due to his rating potential and 
general acceptability was not inclined either to build his own 
personality cult but from the very start had the tendency of 
confronting “the people’s will” with “unworthy elite” in the 
proper populist style. His vision of the changes was different: 
gradual changes without revanchist attitude towards those 
who used to rule the country, and even abused their power in 
the era of Milošević. 
It can be said that Đinđić’s leadership of Serbia was rat-
her an incident, a result of coincidence, than the reflection of 
the majority expectations in the political public opinion. Đinđić 
was not a populist leader of great popularity. On the contrary, 
he was probably the only leader who had a weaker rating than 
the movement (DOS) and party (Democratic Party) that he led. 
He tried in a short time to change what could be changed, on 
the ruins of the unfinished state and pre-modern society, deva-
stated economy, impoverished and cheated “people.” Not 
paying attention to his rating, unreformed and non-lustrated 
security services, or numerous enemies of the reforms that did 
not want changes, especially those sudden and essential – he 
soon faced resistance within DOS and outside of it, as he beca-
me an open target for demagogic and quasi-patriotic criticism. 
The shots at him were shots at quick reforms that he implemen-
ted in Serbia. 
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Post-Đinđić Period 2004-2012
In line with the newly established separation of political 
powers, quite soon after the assassination of Đinđić the focus 
of political attention shifted from the essential reforms to po-
pulist issues, which could euphemistically be referred to as to 
the adjustment of the politics to the expectations and specific 
characteristics of Serbian people. Pro-European orientation and 
rhetoric remained, but it was no longer dominant. The question 
of the relationship towards Kosovo and Metohija was given 
equal treatment, if not if not even prioritised over European in-
tegrations. Populist rhetoric and communication were present 
among the politicians in power, yet it could not be said that po-
pulism was in power. It is more realistic to say that it was with 
the opposition and that it slowly crept from the realms of deep 
opposition to the open political scene, ever closer to the stru-
ctures in power. 
Populist episodes were present even with Boris Tadić (a 
true democrat of European orientation, who advocated civic va-
lues), primarily in his style and public appearances that he paid 
much attention to, and in his attempts to present himself as a 
pro-European politician who understood his own people and wor-
ked for their benefit, as he went to presidential elections as a can-
didate of the citizens, not his own party. He also revealed his po-
pulist tendencies in “listening to the will of the people,” often 
formulating his daily politics in line with the endless public opinion 
polls which, among other things, indicated that political parties 
were not popular. Apart from his indirect communication with the 
people via public opinion (and direct, at the elections), in practice 
he demonstrated a tendency to ignore not only his own party, but 
also state institutions when he appointed Cvetković as Prime Mini-
ster, a man of undeniable expertise whom he could use to exert 
factual political influence when as the president of the state he 
had no extensive competences but did have the legitimacy of be-
ing elected by the people. However, the style of Tadić’s govern-
ment could by no means be called populism in the narrow, radical 
sense of the term. Tadić’s utilisation of populist techniques and 
methods never jeopardised the essence of representative 
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democracy, or pluralism as its natural habitat. It could thus be said 
that he was a democratic leader who did not call into question the 
fundaments of liberal democracy, nor did he base his politics on 
producing and clashing “dangerous others” in the vein of true po-
pulist leaders. 
The Coalition of Quasi-Rightist  
and Quasi-Leftist Populism 2012-2019
If for the 1990s it can be said that they were characterised 
by the clash between quasi-leftist (post-communist) and quasi-ri-
ghtist (anti-communist) populism, than this period is characterised 
by the coalition of these two populisms. They are both still quasi 
since they invoke some values of the Left and the Right, while in 
practice they are a far cry from either – they could rather be re-
ferred to as to poor copies of the Left and the Right. 
After the political changes of 5 October 2000, an immense 
job started of building state and social institutions and restoring 
confidence in one’s own agency and potentials on all social planes 
(Lutovac, 2014: 395-406). The expectations of the citizens (people) 
were also huge, which proved to be a double-edged sword. It wo-
uld turn out that the velocity and scope of the changes did not live 
up to those expectations, and were below realistic potentials, whi-
ch all contributed to the triumphant return of the main actors 
from the 1990s. However, some things did significantly change: 
pro-Europe politics, for example, became almost universally em-
braced by the relevant political parties; national exclusivity was no 
longer part of the political mainstream, while NGOs did not repre-
sent “unwanted others” anymore. 
It seems, however, that such a change was primarily the 
result of a pragmatic assessment that this could contribute to 
the coalition potential of the involved parties without being an 
obstacle to international recognition, rather than a genuine 
change of political course. 
Populism’s triumphant return to power came with the esta-
blishment of the parliamentary majority of the Serbian Progressi-
ve Party (SNS) and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and the 
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formation of Ivica Dačić’s Government in 2012, in which the First 
Deputy Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, was the de facto leader 
who waited for the first proper opportunity to make his dominati-
on formal at the snap election. The SNS-SPS coalition announced 
the beginning of the reign of the two populisms: quasi-rightist and 
quasi-leftist, as well as the era of the rule of one man, Aleksandar 
Vučić, who embodied everything that authoritarian populism was, 
or was thought to be: from usurpation of all the levers of power, 
destruction of state and social institutions, suppression of plurali-
sm, over the noticeable control of the media, demagogy, political 
style of building the cult of personality, right down to creating the 
image of ruling in the name of the people, legitimised through 
confrontation with the “corrupted elite” of the earlier ruling clique 
and the fight for people’s interests by protecting them from “dan-
gerous others” embodied in the enemies of the people – those 
from the international community and the neighbourhood, as well 
as internal enemies. 
What is characteristic of Serbia is that one party – Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS) which was created from radically rightist 
SRS (Serbian Radical Party) – made a U-turn when it comes to ideo-
logy and programme, and after it had seized power, it started to 
externally act as a movement, simultaneously preserving internally 
the characteristics of a strictly organised leader party. Vučić tur-
ned the SNS into an umbrella party which gathered all those who 
supported him: parties, movements, associations, individuals. He 
governs and controls all his coalition partners as a movement of 
ideologically and programmatically heterogeneous parties. The di-
fference between the SNS and movements in the developed, de-
mocratic European countries is that this party has no undisputed 
programme aims, and it operates in Serbia, a country which lacks 
the rule of law, developed institutions, or media freedom. This ma-
kes the party’s position monopolistic, and leaves no space for an 
equal and fair fight for the support of the voters. Betrayed promi-
ses, political turns, affairs, deceptions of voters do not influence 
SNS and Vučić’s rating negatively. On the contrary, their rating re-
mains steadily high. 
In the countries of developed democracy, the affairs such as 
unlawful demolition in Belgrade’s Savamala district, or illegal 
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construction on the top of Kopaonik Mountain, the unfulfilled pro-
mise that there would be no reduction of pensions, and the like, 
would at the least negatively impact the rating of the actors, and 
maybe even bring down the government. It is not the case in Ser-
bia, primarily due to the lack of free media, independent judiciary 
and state institutions, who would stimulate the citizens through 
their unprejudiced operation to put pressure on the incriminated 
politicians. Instead, one party, or actually one man has usurped all 
the institutions in the country and he decides on everything, inclu-
ding the outcome of all the affairs. The virtual reality presented to 
the voters is in fact the only one which is readily available to them. 
There is no space for critical arguments and actions, which cause 
the citizens who would be able to put a stop to all this to instead 
withdraw into their private spheres. 
In the media sphere, which is under his full control, Vučić has 
demonstrated his populist style, presenting himself as merely a 
man who always thinks how to make things better for the people. 
His PR tactics included direct conversations with “ordinary peo-
ple”, sleeping in army barracks, saving children from snowstorms, 
and disqualifications of his opponents (“the yellow thieves”), or 
“the catastrophic politics of the predecessors.” Abusing his control 
of the large majority of the media, he succeeded in presenting his 
unfulfilled promises and political turns as consistent politics and 
personal triumphs. Criticism has not been left any space in so stri-
ctly controlled media, while the term self-criticism has long been 
erased from the political vocabulary. 
In the economic field: protection of large capital and forei-
gn investors, protection of public enterprises as financial ha-
vens of the party. Austerity measures implemented by the ru-
ling coalition during this period led to the more pronounced 
poverty of the citizens and created additional inequality in the 
society. In the social field, implemented policies are presented 
as socially responsible with the focus on the protection of the 
poorest, however, in reality there is more and more poverty, 
more people are leaving the country, and inequalities in income 
have become the greatest in Europe. 
Undemocratic political culture has become more and more 
pronounced. Political opponents have not been treated as 
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contestants in a competition, but rather as enemies that need 
to be destroyed for the good of the people and the state. 
So, since the late 1980s until today, populism in Serbia 
has changed its manifestations, leaders, dangerous others, poli-
tical style, yet it has kept a common trait: efforts to put repre-
sentative democracy institutions under direct control and su-
bjugate to the will of the leader, i.e. the will of the people as 
interpreted by the popular leader. 
The Clash between Reflexive and Generic Populism 
-Agreement with the People vs. “The Future of Serbia” -
Authoritarian populism practiced since 2012 caused the 
creation of a wide opposition front embodied primarily in the 
Alliance for Serbia, founded on 2 September 2018, and sub-
sequently growing in scale, with all the signatories of the 
Agreement with the People dating from February 2019. The 
Alliance for Serbia was founded as a response of the opposition 
to the oppressive and usurping politics of the ruling clique, as a 
way to reach the citizens and try to offer an alternative. 
Agreement with the People 
Riding on the wave of the citizens’ protests which had 
started in late 2018, the oppositional Alliance for Serbia respo-
nded to the calls of the citizens who had protested each Satur-
day for months, and gathered the remnants of the authentic 
opposition and gave political form to the citizens’ demands. 
Agreement with the People is the document made on that oc-
casion. It sublimated the demands of “the people,” i.e. those 
who spoke in their name at the protests. These demands clearly 
professed distrust, not only of the ruling elites, but also those 
who preceded them and those who should come and change 
the system, rather than changing the people in the bad system. 
The protests actually started in Kruševac, after a physical as-
sault on an Alliance for Serbia leader. This was followed by a pro-
test in the municipal hall of Belgrade’s municipality of Stari Grad, 
and subsequently, the first protest in the open, in Belgrade. After 
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two months, the protests were being held throughout Serbia, in 
more than 50 cities and municipalities, and soon this number grew 
to more than 100. It is possible that the ruling clique had been 
unaware of the scope of the citizens’ dissatisfaction, but the very 
fact that the street protests were attended by the supporters of 
the left and the right, those politically neutral and fervent political 
followers, side by side – evidenced the general dissatisfaction in 
society. The Agreement with the People was intended to politica-
lly articulate this dissatisfaction, and it largely succeeded in this, in 
line with the main demands of the citizens. 
When it comes to the populist elements in the document it-
self, they are present in the very fact that it addressed the people, 
rather than citizens (“Responding to the demand by the people, 
and starting from the condition of the society which is deeply divi-
ded and usurped in its every segment by the regime…”), its attitu-
de towards elites, through its professed intention to change the 
social and political system which does not serve the people, but 
rather the estranged elites (“We are ready to be the people’s ser-
vants, rather than their government. We are ready to serve the 
system, instead of the system serving us.”), through the intention 
to lustrate those who have abused their positions of power, throu-
gh the expressed intention to annul all the acts adopted to the de-
triment of the people and the state, expressed determination to 
have a joint opposition election list, including the people’s repre-
sentatives, once the conditions for the fair and free election have 
been created, and finally, to appoint a transitional government of 
experts which would, in the people’s name, create the conditions 
for normalisation of the political and social life in Serbia.17
“The Future of Serbia” 
Reactions to the protests from the ruling coalition, especia-
lly by the most powerful man in the country, in addition to being 
populist, were mainly clumsy and deeply negative, and they just 
added fuel to the flames of the aroused dissatisfaction: from 
17  Proposal of the Agreement with the People, https://savez-za-srbiju.rs/
predlog-sporazuma-sa-narodom/
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derision, mocking and scorn for the protests, down to diminishing 
the number of the protestors and the arrogant attitude towards 
the demands of the dissatisfied citizens. Within the populist narra-
tive, they were not treated as part of the people, but as a minority 
which jeopardised the people and the national interests. Already 
in the early phase of the protest named Stop Violence, Stop Bloody 
Shirts, the President of Serbia and of the strongest party in the ru-
ling coalition sent the provocative message that even if 5 million 
citizens were to protest in the streets, he would not fulfil their de-
mands. This was so abrasive that 1 of 5 Million became the slogan 
of the ever growing protests. 
The response of the president of Serbia and the strongest ru-
ling party, Aleksandar Vučić, to the ever growing and widespread pro-
tests throughout Serbia, was to launch the campaign “The Future of 
Serbia” on 7 February 2019. He launched this campaign, which was 
populist in style and mobilisation method, in Aleksinac, while the Se-
cretary General of the President, Nikola Selaković, on that occasion 
said that it was the most important for Vučić to talk to the citizens. 
Asked whether this was in fact the introduction of another election 
campaign, Selaković said that “for wise politicians, every day between 
two election cycles is election campaign.” The entire campaign was 
directed to politically buffer the citizens’ protests in the media, to 
show that the majority of the people supported the leader, while the 
protesting minority intentionally or unintentionally sided with the 
enemies of the state and the people. 
However, the difference between the protests and the 
campaign “The Future of Serbia” is essential: tens of thousands of 
people throughout Serbia attended the protests willingly, expre-
ssing thus their dissatisfaction, while the attendance of the Gover-
nment’s campaign was organised, under threat, pressure, or being 
paid per diem. This proves that silver-tongued populism is not eno-
ugh to obtain majority support, but is merely an auxiliary tool in 
the captured state of usurped institutions and media. 
The Leader, Elite, and Plebs 
The text authored by the President of Serbia, Aleksandar 
Vučić, which was published in the Politika daily on 10 July 2019, 
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may serve as a paradigmatic example of the attitude of authori-
tarian leader to public opinion. Even though the President daily 
occupies the entire media space, this text written by Vučić is 
special in its open expression of the authoritarian and populist 
essence of Vučić’s rule. The text entitled “The Elite and the 
Plebs” abounds in the examples of populist rhetoric – he sends 
a message to the people, while the people include those who 
are not against him. Essentially, he addresses his target group, 
“the people” who are not bothered by the numerous contradi-
ctions present in the text. 
With typical populism, he attacks the elite, by calling it 
quasi-elite. The quasi-elite includes those criticising him, i.e. the 
government. It is symptomatic that he published his anti-elitist 
text in the “elitist” Politika daily, rather than in some “people’s” 
newspaper, or tabloid. Why was that so? First, it is of no impor-
tance to whom Vučić gives his statement, or where he publishes 
his texts, since these are bound to be quoted and reproduced 
everywhere, sometimes even for days, if needed. Second, Vučić 
addressed those supporting him, those forced to vote for him, 
those he deceived daily, by threatening them with external and 
internal enemies, those scared for their mere survival, and tho-
se he daily persuaded that he was simultaneously a member of 
the elite and people’s man, that he was both a peacemaker and 
a warrior, in line with the need, that he would do everything for 
the people and that this was the purpose of his being. 
The elites, i.e. quasi-elites, which he perceives with so 
much scorn are essentially quite a varied and heterogeneous 
group, usually divided into political, economic, cultural, and in-
tellectual elites. Populists homogenise these subgroups into a 
single entity with the attributes of corruption, exploitation, im-
morality, selfishness, arrogance, incompetence. “They” are stu-
pid, lazy and sloppy, in Vučić’s words, or actually traitors, scum, 
thieves… 
Not only does Vučić belong to the political caste in po-
wer, but he also determines who may become an exclusive 
member of this caste. Simultaneously, he rhetorically fights for 
the poor and disadvantaged, while in practice being the very 
person generating this poverty and disadvantage. He is 
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pro-Europe, yet everything he does is contrary to European va-
lues. He is a supporter of the EU, yet his media favour Russia, 
and adopt anti-Western position. He paints himself a Robin 
Hood, while the facts indicate that he is actually the one deepe-
ning inequalities in the society, transferring the burden of fiscal 
stability to the poor rather than the rich. 
Income inequality in Serbia is the greatest in Europe, and 
expressed in “gini coefficient,” in the previous three years it 
amounted to 38 (the greater the coefficient, the greater the 
inequality), as it was said at the symposium “Inequality in Ser-
bia,” organised by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art in 
late 2018. The information that 20% of the richest have nine ti-
mes larger income than 20% of the people with the lowest in-
comes proves this thesis. In the opinion of Prof Dr Mihailo Aran-
derenko of the Faculty of Economics, Belgrade University, this 
situation is caused by the weak effects of the tax system and 
social transfers. That the equality within the tax and social pro-
tection systems is poor is also shown by the fact that equality in 
Serbia prior to taxation and social transfers is similar to that in 
the EU, while afterwards, inequality becomes quite pronoun-
ced. In Serbia, 52% of the total tax revenue originates from 
VAT, which is regressive and represents a greater burden for 
the poor than for the rich, while in the EU countries VAT is res-
ponsible for 34% of the total tax revenues. On the other hand, 
direct taxes such as employment, income and property taxes 
are progressive, as they have more impact on the rich than on 
the poor, and they are responsible for 16% of Serbian tax reve-
nues, while in the EU countries they amount to 33%. 
So, the authoritarian president of Serbia advocates the 
rule of the people, while he has usurped all the power and tre-
ats citizens as his subjects. He constantly refers to the citizens 
as to the people, yet the people, as he perceives it, do not inclu-
de all the citizens, but only those who support him. He speaks 
for the people, yet the people are only his supporters. As evi-
denced by all the aforementioned facts, he is a classic authori-
tarian populist. He is authoritarian in his abuse of authority and 
aversion to criticism, he does not allow for his authority to be li-
mited, he stifles freedom, he generates and resorts to all kinds 
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of violence: from verbal and institutional violence, to violence 
against common sense. He has adopted creating illusions as his 
political style, while force, violence, and deception are his main 
political tools. 
He is a populist because he is, inter alia, an anti-elitist, 
and he stifles pluralism, relativizes and ignores institutions, pro-
cedures and laws, he does not want any intermediaries 
between himself and the people, he pompously removes fences 
at the meetings full of attendees brought by force, receives 
them in early morning hours in the Government’s building to 
talk with them about their problems, he sleeps in army barracks 
and dines on bean-soup… 
A representative example of the era of post-truth and 
post-morality: he manipulates emotions when the facts do not 
support his position, or he uses facts in the virtual reality 
existing only in his head and his media. Even when he makes 
errors, he does that for the benefit of the people. He gives pri-
macy to the ethics of good intentions over the ethics of respon-
sibility, even though he often quotes Max Webber. And why wo-
uldn’t he, when no one else gets the chance or has a platform 
to refute any of this. 
Populists do not wish to be liked by everybody, but only by 
those that they themselves have defined as the people. On the 
contrary, populists need those “dangerous others” in order for 
them to be promoted into the people’s defenders, protecting 
them from the “dangerous others.” These are sometimes national 
(ethnic) minorities, sometimes CSOs, and sometimes political 
opponents discredited as enemies. At times these are external 
“dangerous others” – certain states, neighbours, global forces, in-
ternational companies, non-governmental organisations… 
Aleksandar Vučić is the embodiment of an authoritarian 
populist, due to the fact that populism is his ideology, and be-
cause of the way he communicates, politically mobilises and or-
ganises his party, i.e. his style is populist… Therefore, his every 
public appearance is deprived in advance of any originality, it is 
identical to those of dozens of other populists who “protect” 
their peoples from imaginary “conspiracies of the elites.” His 
tone, wording and messages are in accordance with his political 
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character and temperament. His causticity and sarcasm are the 
main characteristics of his polemical tone in fighting imaginary 
enemies. 
Even a superficial semantic analysis of the text he autho-
red for Politika indicates an autocrat who does not pick his 
words, or actually he does pick them in order to deepen the di-
visions. He uses conflicts to maintain power. He pays no attenti-
on to constitutional and legal limitations. He is the one delive-
ring undisputable truths, he prosecutes and announces final 
judgements, and he defends what cannot be defended when 
protecting his loyal associates with his authority. A great num-
ber of affairs, each of them big enough to bring the Govern-
ment down, was concluded with him offering public absolution. 
He sends the message to “his people” that he would be the one 
who will decide when to retire, as he cannot lose the elections. 
This kind of self-confidence originates in the fact that he has 
usurped all the levers of power and almost all media, that he 
defines electoral conditions and counts the votes. 
In the era of Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia did not become a 
stable democratic country, but rather the reflection of the 
attempts to secure and define the rule fit to the leader and his 
associates. The leader used populism in all its manifestations 
and forms: he made the rhetoric against “dangerous others,” 
i.e. arch-enemies, harsher, he used nationalism as a tool of 
winning, consolidating and preserving power. The key actors of 
the populist structure, the leader and the media created their 
mutually beneficial symbiosis, even more closely-knit than in 
the times of Milošević. It can be said that the control over me-
dia is even more pronounced than in the era of Milošević. The 
media became the pillar of the captured state and society. 
The undisputed leader has won all the levers of power, just 
like Milošević before him, and has used them for the strengthe-
ning of his own rule, rather than for the development of liberal de-
mocracy, as it has been presented by the controlled media. 
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Impact of Social and Political Context  
on the Nature of Populism in Serbia 
Between 2012 and 2019, formal institutions in Serbia did 
exist, yet they were deprived of their contents. In practice, the 
holders of power have a favoured, i.e. absolutely dominant po-
sition. Through manipulation of the state resources and institu-
tions, in an improved 1990s model, they have such an advanta-
ge in political confrontations that they render them entirely 
meaningless. The opposition political actors’ position is entirely 
unequal. In that way, the fundamental democratic principle of 
equal participation in competitive elections is uprooted. Electi-
ons are held regularly, yet the opposition is disadvantaged in 
every possible way – due to financial engineering, influence on, 
or total control of the media, inexistence of independent judi-
ciary, muted public opinion, and suppressed civil society. All this 
gave the ruling elite a major advantage, and thus such a system 
(competitive authoritarianism) is a hybrid order which naturally 
tends to suppress the elements of liberal democracy, especially 
where institutions are weak and where critical public opinion is 
underdeveloped, as is the case in Serbia. So, based on the defe-
cts of democracy present in the country, Serbia can be classi-
fied as competitive authoritarianism, or illiberal democracy. In 
other words, this is an underdeveloped political community in 
terms of political practice, political culture, as well as when it 
comes to state and public institutions. 
If we tried to make conclusions pertaining to the outcomes 
of democratisation in Serbia based on the reports by the European 
Commission, we could say that democratisation, as a result of the 
process of European integrations, has only just begun in many a 
field, that there is a verbally expressed political will to take this 
process further, yet that this determination is often pushed aside 
when confronted with the narrow interests of political elites. The 
EC Report for 2018 left the diplomatic formulations and wording 
thus far used and pointed to the large gaps in implementing Eu-
ropean agenda in a more direct and clearer way. 
If we, however, informed ourselves of the outcomes of 
democracy exclusively from the sources of the Government, or 
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the media controlled by the Government, then the image pain-
ted would be of Serbia as an already stabilised democracy whi-
ch endures its “critiques” (those criticising the government) and 
the unjust EU policy of conditioning. All in all, a perspective whi-
ch is entirely populist. 
In reality, this is significantly different; there is no true 
separation of powers; democratic processes are seriously 
flawed, elections are realised in the atmosphere of the prono-
unced favouritism towards the parties in power, pressure is 
exerted on the actors and voters in the field; political corrupti-
on became an everyday occurrence; no conditions exist for fair 
political contest, the opposition is attacked by the private me-
dia receiving state support and privileged positions based on 
their political influence, the state-run media are but a party ser-
vice of the strongest ruling party and bulletin of the most po-
werful man in the state. 
Effective limitations of power do not exist. Parliament 
acts as a service of the executive power. The overwhelming 
majority of the media are under the control or pressure of the 
executive power, and those that are not, are under constant po-
litical and financial pressure. Criticism is treated as an enemy 
activity, and critics often as the enemies of the state. Critical 
opinions could be read only in low circulation dailies and maga-
zines, on one privately owned television, and on social 
networks. The attitude of the executive power and the media 
towards independent state authorities is inadequate. The Om-
budsman who performed his duty professionally was under 
constant political pressure and was exposed to media lynching 
since the political elite perceived him as a potential political 
opponent once his term of office expired in 2017. Citizens’ ini-
tiatives and protests are not taken seriously. The Constitution 
and legislation are subjugated to private interests, and instead 
the rule of law there is the rule of the parties, i.e. the rule of 
the single man and those subjugated to him. 
The key principles and values of the EU are parts of the 
programmatic commitment of a great number of relevant poli-
tical parties in Serbia; they are present in legal and political 
science textbooks, as well as in the supreme legal act, yet in 
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practice, they are not sufficiently represented. The rule of law 
is overshadowed by the ruling party and its leader, who derives 
his legitimacy from personal popularity, transposing it to decisi-
on-making within and outside the scope of his authority. He po-
sitions himself as the supreme social arbiter, a pater familias 
who acts patronisingly towards other institutions and bases his 
politics on the “direct communication with the citizens.” 
On the other hand, the democratic political community 
of the rule of law, i.e. stabilised democracy, is a community in 
which human rights and democratic procedures are respected, 
where each branch of the government is effectively limited so 
that it could not exceed its respective authority. Formal advoca-
cy of these principles and values is required, but is not suffi-
cient. It is necessary to effectively implement in practice the 
democratic principles and promote the proclaimed values. On 
this path of many an obstacle, Serbia is still far away from the 
finish line. 
Populism is not helpful here, as it does not aid mending 
the defects in building liberal democracy. Quite the reverse, in 
the name of democracy, these defects are concealed, modified, 
or even nurtured at the expense of building a democratic so-
ciety which strives to strike the balance of democratic and libe-
ral values. 
***
The causes for the occurrence of populism in liberal de-
mocracies are various: from latent ones originating in the stru-
cture and functioning of the developed democratic societies, to 
concrete (contextual) which occur in the times of political and/
or economic crises. A substantially important ingredient in the 
occurrence of populism as a relevant, and especially dominant 
phenomenon, is the appearance of a “charismatic” leader and 
the mass media that support him/her. In illiberal democracies, 
the ground for the occurrence of populism is even more fertile, 
since there are no traditions of democratic political culture, sta-
te and social institutions are underdeveloped, the rule of law is 
but a defined goal, while authoritarian political consciousness 
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favours the appearance of a messianic leader who, with the su-
pport of the media, reconceptualises the established political 
postulates. 
Social and political context essentially determines the 
margins, nature and scope of populism, and ergo its consequen-
ces. Populists can basically have the same or similar understan-
ding of politics, yet it is filled with different values, which de-
pend on different traditions and experiences, as well as varying 
economic and social contexts. 
Starting from the terminological definition and the pre-
sented concepts of democracy, today’s Serbia could be classi-
fied as an illiberal democracy, characterised by the existence of 
regular elections that are, however, not always free or fair, whi-
le the elected political class is not inclined to respecting consti-
tutional and legal limitations of their rule, but rather ready, in 
order to preserve their particular interests, to breach democra-
tic principles and procedures, as well as freedoms and rights of 
the citizens. In other words, liberal constitutionalism is under-
mined by simplistically interpreted and similarly practiced de-
mocracy. The order which tends to avoid or cancel the limitati-
ons established in the democratic process with the purpose of 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms is also called popu-
list democracy. In such a community model, “people’s will” is the 
measure and excuse for everything; any kind of limitation to 
that will is proclaimed an assault on democracy, and this in fact 
happens quite frequently in the political life of Serbia. The pro-
tection of people’s will in practice is reduced to an aspiration to 
unlimited power and marginalisation of political minorities, as 
well as neutralisation of all those who seek to limit the power 
and authorities. 
Starting from the literature on populism and different 
perspectives on the consequences of populism, i.e. staring from 
the position that populism can, on the one hand, be perceived 
as a threat to the ideal and practice of liberal democracy, while 
on the other, as a corrective to the elitist tendencies of modern 
representative democracies – it is important to also take into 
account the state of development of representative democra-
cy, its institutions, political culture, and political practice. 
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While in the countries with a long tradition of democratic 
political culture, developed state and social institutions, populi-
sm may, in principle, have a warning, corrective role which mi-
ght amend the misbalance between liberal and democratic ele-
ments of representative democracy, in the countries of illiberal, 
unconsolidated democracy, populism cannot have such a role, 
since the institutions, democratic political culture, and establis-
hed democratic practice are still underdeveloped. Quite the re-
verse, in such circumstances populism turns out to be a major 
obstacle to establishing and consolidating the key elements of 
representative liberal democracy. The example of Serbia con-
firms it. 
The gap between democratic ideals and real functioning 
in such societies is too wide and deep to expect populism to 
have any corrective role. If you add to the equation economic 
and political crisis which is not an incident or transitional occu-
rrence in development, but rather a permanent state of affairs, 
then the social and economic context in such political communi-
ties is an additional cause for the appearance of populism and 
all the accompanying elements. In such a context, there is no 
major tension between liberal and democratic elements of the 
political order, since the liberal are still in development, while 
the democratic are interpreted and practiced simplistically, as 
the absolute right of the majority to exercise their will in the 
name of the people, without taking into account the rights and 
attitudes of the political minority. 
The context of undeveloped institutions, undemocratic 
political culture, and constant political and economic crises, cre-
ates an extensive space for the appearance of populist leaders, 
allegedly full of understanding for the needs of the people re-
ady to challenge the corrupted elites and dangerous others. 
With the help of the media who are ready to give them space, 
primarily due to the attractiveness of such leaders, and sub-
sequently due to their political influence that they do not wish 
to oppose due to the financial benefits and privileges they rece-
ive – populists receive strong backing which they use for their 
own, rather than for the general good. 
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In such circumstances, populists supress pluralism and 
critical thinking, restrict media freedom, perceive institutions as 
their own service, rather than general good. In this way, they do 
not contribute to the correction of the defects in the political 
system, but rather conversely, they prevent their amendment. 
All in all, neither the populism of the 1990s nor the populism of 
today have contributed to the democratisation of the political 
community, or modernisation of the society and economy, but 
are in fact a millstone around the society’s neck. The heritage 
and practice of populism not only failed to contribute to the fa-
vourable balance of liberal and democratic values, but also re-
mained below the level and mainstream of Serbian cultural and 
political history “which inclined to the harmony between the 
freedom of citizens and freedom of the state” (Popov, 1993: 
58). By becoming the dominant phenomenon, Serbian populism 
has marginalised the modernisation tendencies which had 
existed earlier in the history of the Serbian people (Popov, 
1993), but it had to pay attention to the fact that a great num-
ber of citizens still supported Europeanisation and modernisati-
on of the society. 
So, populism is a general phenomenon occurring in all so-
cieties and social orders, and thus also in transitional societies. 
Interpreted as a thin-centred ideology, populism was also te-
sted through public polls, analyses and syntheses of the politi-
cal actors and phenomena in Serbia. It turned out that in Serbia 
too, in different eras, an eclectic mix of elements of different 
ideologies had functioned, being often contradictory, yet with 
their main characteristics being constant: glorification of the 
people, antagonism with elites and “others” who jeopardise the 
state and/or the nation. In both illiberal and liberal democra-
cies, populism may be a thin-centred ideology, quasi-ideology, 
or merely a technique, a ruling style without ideological foun-
dation. Social and political context defines the margins and es-
sentially determines the nature and scope of populism, and, ac-
cordingly, also its consequences. 

STABILITOCRACY
Populism in Stabilitocracies: The Case of Serbia 
Term and definition of stabilitocracy – Balkan sta-
bilitocracies – Stabilitocracy and democracy – The 
essence of stabilitocracy: External stability based 
on autocratic populism – Liberal and populist de-
mocracy: Internal tension and the gap between the 
theoretical concept and actual functioning – The 
initial phase of democratic consolidation in Serbia 

Term and Definition of Stabilitocracy 
Defects in democratic elements and deficiencies in liberal 
elements, as well as unstable political, economic and security envi-
ronment – these are all circumstances in which so-called stabilito-
cracies are created. Stabilitocracies may be described as the orders 
formally based on the principles of liberal democracy, yet in practi-
ce their formal shell is filled with undemocratic and illiberal con-
tents, and they receive external and internal support for it. The in-
ternal support is not entirely legal and legitimate, since the 
support received by the regimes in stabilitocracies is based on pri-
vileges and usurpations in the political, media, and economic sphe-
res. Such usurpation directly influences: 
1. Usurpation of state and social institutions 
2. Rejection of meritorious principles 
3. Breaching the rules of the election process 
4. Media control 
Stabilitocrats are authoritarians supported by internatio-
nal community because they have power and authority concen-
trated in their hands. They “simplify” international communica-
tion by avoiding international procedures in their own country. 
The term Stabilitocracy is derived from the Latin word stabi-
lis meaning firm and Greek word kratia – to rule. Stability is usually 
associated with the systems which maintain or achieve the state of 
balance after the cessation of the influence of the causes which 
previously disturbed such balance. Here we primarily refer to sta-
bility in (foreign) political context. When the term of stabilitocracy 
is analysed in terms of the words composing it, then such a com-
pound word should indicate the rule of stability. However, the 
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essential meaning of the term stabilitocracy in the public discour-
se has to do with the fact that the stability on which it relies is ba-
sed on autocratic and illiberal foundations, on restricting pluralism 
and subjugation of institutions. 
So, stability before liberal democracy is the foundation 
on which stabilitocracy is based. Internal and external dangers 
are weapons in the hands of autocrats who receive the support 
of the “allies” and “friends” from abroad. What such allies and 
friends believe to be bad for themselves – they deem necessary 
for stabilitocracies, as they put stability before democratic and 
liberal principles. 
Stability is nurtured as a supreme value among domestic 
autocrats, as well as their supporters in the international com-
munity. Steadiness, certainty and predictability are above the 
fundamental values nurtured in the countries of developed de-
mocracy. And while autocrats are ready to act in the thus defi-
ned framework – they are acceptable. However, once they fail 
to meet such expectations, they become an impediment and 
lose their support, or at least the autocracy they practice in the-
ir own countries is no longer tolerated. Slobodan Milošević was 
a “guarantee of peace and stability,” while one of his party’s 
slogans was “With us, there is no uncertainty,” and it all lasted 
until the point where he “endangered regional stability,” i.e. fai-
led to fulfil the role intended for him. A similar situation was 
with Nikola Gruevski in Macedonia. 
So, stabilitocracy is designed to preserve peace, even at 
the expense of liberal democracy’s fundamental values. On the 
other hand, everything that disturbs or may disturb geostrate-
gic interests of the powerful actors is perceived as unstable. 
Europeanisation versus Stabilitocracy 
Balkan stabilitocracies incline towards autocracy, which 
undermines the fundaments of an orderly society and state. By 
accepting European values in principle rather than in practice, 
they essentially do not guarantee stability in the long run, but 
rather conversely, they prevent it. It is therefore more 
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appropriate to call them labilocracies. In the long run, the 
so-called stabilitocracies obstruct real, sustainable stability ba-
sed on the values, liberal principles, and democratic institutions 
and procedures. 
Even though the main purpose of supporting stabilitocra-
cies is maintaining peace and stability in the region, this aim is not 
achieved as authoritarian systems are created, which are founded 
on quasi-democratic and anti-liberal bases. Pragmatism of this 
kind is not beneficial in the end, nor is it sustainable, so it can be 
said that stabilitocracy is the wrong means in achieving an alleged-
ly good aim. Regional relations have not become better due to 
this type of support to Balkan authoritarians. On the contrary, 
they became worse, since authoritarian endeavours of the rulers 
are tolerated, including nationalism and intolerance for neighbo-
urs, using harsh rhetoric in maintaining a stable rule… 
Europeanisation instead of stabilitocracy is the formula 
for building stable societies based on democratic and liberal 
principles, which are the holders of sustainable peace and stabi-
lity in the true sense. Such states which build common markets 
and mutual cultural and political connections may attain sustai-
nable peace and stability, unlike stabilitocracies. 
Europeanisation (Radaelli and Exadaktlyos 2012; Ladrech 
2010; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002) would imply 
the process of adopting the fundamental values, institutional, 
legal and administrative framework and strategic political goals 
proclaimed by the EU. Apart from Europeanisation of the candi-
date countries, within the EU there is a process of internal Eu-
ropeanisation of the members thereof, the process of integrati-
on by means of political culture, common values and 
development of democratic institutions, a gradual process of 
“reorienting the direction and shape of politics” towards the 
European Union as a political community (Ladrech 1994: 69). 
In short: the values being institutionalised and institutions 
becoming values of the first order, separation of powers which im-
plies independent judiciary, functional parliament and responsible 
executive government, and in recent times, civil society instituti-
ons – these are all values per se, since they contribute to the fun-
ctioning of the rule of law and civil rights and freedoms. 
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Autocrats, on the other hand, reach for the measures 
that are not common in the countries of developed democracy, 
such as an endless series of snap elections simultaneously invo-
king democracy, i.e. “checking people’s will.” Actually, snap ele-
ctions are used as a tool of constant mobilisation and utilisation 
of public resources and the usurped institutions for continuati-
on of “legitimacy” (2012 Parliament would expire in 2016, yet 
by means of snap elections in 2014 and 2016, Vučić secured 
himself and his allies until 2018, i.e. 2020). In this way, the ru-
ling clique utilised public resources once in two years to solidify 
their support. In the stabilitocracy that is Serbia, elections are 
not scheduled when the law prescribes, but serve the ruling 
clique to prolong their power in the conditions of utter inequa-
lity. Snap elections are not used to affirm the principle of the 
substitutability of government, but quite the reverse. From cyc-
le to cycle, elections are held in irregular conditions, with the 
idea of not offering a chance to the opposition to consolidate. 
What is happening is actually the very thing that Serbian Consti-
tution intends to prevent from happening: the usurpation of 
power. Namely, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia envi-
sages in its article 5, paragraph 4, that: “political parties may 
not exercise power directly or submit it to their control,” and 
this is the very thing that is present in all the phases and se-
gments of the rule. 
Stabilitocrats perceive and treat their opponents as ene-
mies, so they are essentially anti-pluralists. They perceive the 
institutions of representative democracy as obstacles in their 
direct communication with the people, as they see themselves 
as exclusive people’s representatives, and they produce exter-
nal “dangerous others” when needed. So, one may say that sta-
bilitocrats and stabilitocracy are a kind of populists and populi-
sm supported from within, as well as externally, with the 
purpose of stabilising autocracy, rather than liberal democracy. 
In stabilitocracy, it is impossible to have a relevant social 
dialogue concerning important political and social topics, be-
cause critical thinking is labelled as a treason, opposition as 
enemies, journalists are treated as a government’s service, or 
they are labelled foreign hirelings. In the political system, 
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opposition is perceived as a foreign body… Façade institutional 
structure and servile political culture are a haven for autocracy. 
The inexistence of independent judiciary, i.e. strong political in-
fluence on the judiciary, multiply all institutional and extra-insti-
tutional advantages enjoyed by the ruling clique. A relevant so-
cial dialogue would assume for all this to be changed entirely 
and at once. This change would have to be the basis for initia-
ting the conversation concerning a thorough social transforma-
tion. However, this is not a priority of either Brussels or Washin-
gton, as is evidenced in practice. They prioritise maintenance of 
peace and stability, and management of the processes in We-
stern Balkans with as little effort as possible. Stabilitocracy ena-
bles them to have just that: to shorten the procedures by con-
centrating power in the hands of cooperative autocrats. 
However, the consequences are, in the long run, detri-
mental to the societies of stabilitocracies, in terms of the deve-
lopment of democratic institutions, procedures and political 
culture, as well as when it comes to economic development and 
social stratification. If stabilitocracies are acceptable for inter-
national political actors, for the capital these are economically 
unstable communities since the business conditions are not gu-
aranteed by sustainable stability of institutions and the political 
system, but by the strength and stability of the autocrat who 
guarantees such stability. In such communities, the economic 
flow is managed by clientelism, rather than by the market and 
competition. The corruption is systemic, being largely suppor-
ted instead of being opposed by the state. Consequences to 
the society of such a state are detrimental. 
Support to international stability by autocratic regimes 
makes such countries politically closer to the EU, yet in terms of 
their values and the quality of their democracy they get progre-
ssively more distant. One of the consequences of such a relati-
onship towards stabilitocracies is that their citizens get increa-
singly more alienated from the politics, as they tend to vote for 
their own, tangible benefits, or out of fear, completely negle-
cting public good and even their own ideological or program-
matic affinities. By supporting this practice, the countries of the 
developed West generate animosity towards themselves even 
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in those that had affinity towards them, so in the end, it turns 
out that the support to stabilitocracy is a political investment in 
instability and uncertainty. 
So, the term of stabilitocracy, which has been introduced 
in the political glossary of the region in recent years, designates 
sacrificing human rights and functional democracy for real, or 
imagined national or regional stability, being a kind of a tacit, or 
sometimes actually quite vocal support to autocrats. Essential 
in all this is the question of the nature of stability in autocratic 
societies. 
When talking about stabilitocracy in Serbia, one should 
understand that this refers to the autocratic rule of Aleksandar 
Vučić, who exerts control over all the levers of power in the sta-
te and society, while playing the role of a reformer, statesman, 
and protector of public interest in his multimedia reality realm. 
In communication with the developed countries of the West, 
Vučić presents himself as someone who delivers on his promi-
ses and resolutely leads Serbia towards the EU, he behaves pre-
dictably and guarantees stability. Simultaneously, he commends 
himself to Russia as a warrant of their influence in the Balkan, 
and in China as an important economic intermediary at the ga-
tes of Europe. 
A special problem are stabilitocracies – countries such as 
Serbia, that still lack consolidated democracy and internal criti-
cal mass of those who could consolidate it. Instead, they rest on 
undemocratic, authoritarian, populist mechanisms of power, 
which formally have majority support of the citizens and exter-
nal support of the EU, which favours the stability of the country 
and the region more than the establishment of consolidated li-
beral democracy. 
When a system relies on a powerful individual, then it has 
the identical duration as the person in power, which is confir-
med by the SFRY and many other examples. 
In some of the candidate countries, including Serbia, de-
mocratically elected leaders used their mandates to accumulate 
and enlarge their power outside the scope of legislation and 
constitution. This also happens with leaders in developed de-
mocratic countries. The difference is that institutions in such 
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countries, political culture and democratic practice restrain 
such ambitions of the leaders, while there are no such obstacles 
in stabilitocracies. 
In the countries of stabilitocracy autocrats do not pay 
much attention to the rule of law, they do not accept limitati-
ons of power and they use electoral legitimacy to unlawfully 
expand their power and influence. At the same time, the electi-
ons in which they gained their formal legitimacy are but a sha-
dow of what they need to be in liberal democracies. They con-
trol and suppress media freedom, prevent their political 
opponents from expressing their opinions both in the parlia-
ment (obstruction by the minority is the latest invention of the 
ruling majority which prevents the opposition from speaking by 
proposing meaningless amendments to their own draft legisla-
tions) and outside of it, they disqualify their opponents by la-
belling them “traitors,” “enemies,” “thieves,” which undermines 
the essence of democracy and the role of opposition within it. 
Institutions are subjugated to the interests of the ruling clique, 
rather than to public interests. Authoritarianism is presented as 
a natural condition legitimised in the unfair and unjust electi-
ons, where their opponents did not even have the chance to 
present themselves accordingly to the voters. 
In order for this kind of situation to be maintained on the 
national political scene, a full media control is necessary, and it 
is attained accordingly, with the exception of a negligible num-
ber of low-circulation and poor accessibility media outlets, as 
such politics requires propaganda rather than media freedom. 
Populism and Defects of Democracy 
The populism of the 1990s was the populism of the lea-
der of the SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia), an ex-communist, Slo-
bodan Milošević, who on the wave of nationalism and his clas-
hes with the Right, as well as through his intermittent 
cooperation with radically rightist SRS (Serbian Radical Party), 
dominated the political scene of the time (Popov, 1993). Re-
styled, with actors who had occupied important positions 
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throughout the 1990s, populism triumphantly returned with 
the establishment of the SNS-SPS (Serbian Progressive Party – 
Socialist Party of Serbia) parliamentary majority and formation 
of Dačić’s Government (SPS) in 2012. This time around, the so-
cialists were the weaker partner, though the Prime Minister was 
the former PR of Slobodan Milošević. In that government, the 
First Deputy Prime Minister was Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of 
the SNS and a former member of the Serbian Radical Party, who 
was the de facto leader and used the first opportunity to for-
malise his dominance at a snap election. 
The SNS-SPS coalition heralded the beginning of the rule 
of the two populisms, quasi-rightist and quasi-leftist, which la-
sts to this very day (2019). This is also the era of the rule of one 
man, Aleksandar Vučić, an autocrat who embodies everything 
that populism is, or is thought to be: from the demagogical rhe-
toric, his political style of building the personality cult, right 
down to the government in the name of the people, which is le-
gitimised through confronting the “corrupted elite” of the for-
mer regime and struggle for people’s interests by protecting 
them from the “dangerous others” embodied in the internatio-
nal community, neighbours, and internal enemies. 
In 2012-2019 Serbia, democratic institutions formally did 
exist, however, in practice, the holders of power had a privile-
ged position. By usurping public resources, they secure themse-
lves advantage in political confrontations, putting others in a 
disadvantageous position, thus negating the democratic princi-
ple of equal participation in the election race. Elections are held 
regularly, yet the opposition is disadvantaged due to their re-
stricted access to financial resources, the dominant influence of 
the regime on the media and inexistence of independent judi-
ciary. All this provides the ruling elite with a huge advantage, 
making this system a kind of a hybrid which naturally tends to 
suppress the liberal elements of democracy, especially where 
institutions are weak and critical public opinion is underdevelo-
ped, as is the case in Serbia. Therefore, based on the democra-
tic defects that it manifests, Serbia could be classified as a co-
untry of competitive authoritarianism, or illiberal, populist 
democracy (Lutovac 2016: 219-239). 
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In the political practice, there is no real separation of po-
wers, opposition is constantly assaulted by privately-owned me-
dia which receive state support and occupy a privileged position 
based on the political influence, while state-run media act as a 
partisan service of the strongest party in power and a bulletin 
of the most powerful man in the country. The rule of law is 
overshadowed by the ruling party and its leader, who derives 
his legitimacy from personal popularity, transposing it to decisi-
on-making within and outside the scope of his authority. He po-
sitions himself as the supreme social arbiter, a pater familias 
who acts patronisingly towards other institutions and bases his 
politics on the “direct communication with the citizens.” Autho-
ritarian populism in full bloom. 
On the other hand, the democratic political community 
of the rule of law, i.e. stabilised democracy, is a community in 
which human rights and democratic procedures are respected, 
where each branch of the government is effectively limited so 
that it could not exceed its respective authority. Formal advoca-
cy of these principles and values is required, but is not suffi-
cient. It is necessary to effectively implement in practice the 
democratic principles and promote the proclaimed values. On 
this path of many an obstacle, Serbia is still far away from the 
finish line (Lutovac 2016: 235-236), and populism is not helpful 
here, as it does not aid mending the defects in building liberal 
democracy. Quite the reverse, in the name of democracy, these 
defects are concealed, modified, or even nurtured at the ex-
pense of building a democratic society which strives to strike 
the balance of democratic and liberal values. 
Manipulation of emotions, fears, apprehension and tensi-
on on the one hand, and national pride, sport success, historical 
achievements on the other, are used as a political fuel, powered 
by the media. Bread and circuses. A well-tested propaganda 
mould applied in its crudest form. The coalition of the quasi-ri-
ght and quasi-left populism has changed the nature of patrioti-
sm: nationalism has been restyled, proclaimed self-sufficiency 
has gave way to Europeanism, the ranking of dangerous others 
has also changed, yet the model of political behaviour remained 
the same. 
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In the atmosphere of this emotional manipulation, the 
principle and importance of majority is made absolute by the 
overwhelming parliamentary majority, neglecting the role and 
importance of minority and more, much hostility against diver-
se thinking and criticism is demonstrated. Dangerous others are 
ranked in line with the current needs – these are sometimes 
Americans, sometimes Croats, Albanians, or Bosniaks. Instead 
of being perceived as competition on the political scene, the 
political elites of the former regime are treated as dangerous 
others, in addition to all those ready to criticise and resist the 
politics of the single man who controls not only the coalition in 
power, but also almost all state and independent institutions 
and crucial state media and tabloids. Therefore, it can be said 
that the politics of anti-pluralism has been an important chara-
cteristic of the populism in Serbia since 2012.
Stabilitocracy and Democracy 
Every year on 15 September, the International Day of De-
mocracy is marked. In 2007, the General Assembly of the UN in-
vited all the members, governmental and non-governmental or-
ganisations to mark that day as the day of struggle for 
achieving democratic ideals. The rights of participation in politi-
cal and social life go hand in hand with civil freedoms – freedom 
of speech and argument, together with the freedom of forming 
political groups, or associations, and freedom to join them. An 
important element in achieving democratic ideals is the process 
of stabilising the institutions which secure the rule of law and 
political processes that enable fair political fight, preservation 
and widening the domain of freedom and human rights. 
In the majority of states, however, the Democracy Day 
celebrations are more of an ideal than achievement. This is cer-
tainly true of Serbia. In today’s Serbia, the term democracy de-
notes an institutional system of government in which individu-
als close to the autocrat, by means of irregular voting, gain 
formal legitimacy and factual power to decide on everything. 
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Serbia is among the countries which are yet to be tran-
sformed from the autocratic system, where the regime is not 
responsible nor liable to effective control, to a system with the 
rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, of a deve-
loped civil society and independent institutions. Thus, the mar-
king of the Democracy Day is highly important, since it reminds 
us where we are and where we are heading to: underdeveloped 
political culture, unestablished rule of law, low level of the free-
dom of speech and media freedoms, underdeveloped and fee-
ble institutions, concentration of power in the hands of one 
man, established partocracy, widespread corruption – these are 
all systemic problems of the state and society in general. 
Serbia is far from a stable democratic state. However, 
Serbia is called a “stabilitocracy,” which creates confusion as it 
indicates stability. However, this is not the stability of democratic 
institutions, but of the political and security circumstances. Stabi-
litocracy is the name of the order in which democratic and libe-
ral values are pragmatically suppressed in order to achieve such 
stability. This is the sacrifice of the citizens of a transitional co-
untry that “major international actors” accept with great ease. 
As a matter of fact, as it has already been said, this 
system should more accurately be called labilocracy: an order of 
underdeveloped freedoms and the rule of law, with the façade 
democracy deprived of real contents. It is an order of unstable 
foundations, since it depends on the rating, good will of the au-
thoritarian and support received by the great powers, rather 
than on independent institutions and the balance of liberal and 
democratic principles and practices. It is the order which is fo-
unded on the phenomenon of “captured state,” where laws are 
tailored to the needs of powerful individuals and against the in-
terests of the citizens and the state. The state is captured by 
political and economic elite, extensively connected to powerful 
individuals. Public policies are in the service of private actors 
who obtain legalised privileges by means of corruption. Klepto-
cratic elites try to control civil society as a corrective of political 
processes, they found their own NGOs, finance them out of the 
state budget or EU funds, suppressing real and responsible 
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NGOs and thus rendering this important segment of democratic 
society meaningless. 
Corruption as an autoimmune disease of every society 
also exists in developed societies, but unlike captured states 
with labilocratic orders, these countries have independent judi-
ciary, which largely addresses such social deviations, as a sepa-
rate branch of power. The road of attaining democratic ideals is 
long and hard, but clearly traced. To speak metaphorically, one 
can move on from the pre-political macadam to the road of de-
mocracy only when elementary conditions for the functioning 
of a normal democratic state are secured: the rule of law, free 
media, and free citizens that may choose according to their own 
will at free elections, and the independent judiciary exists to 
guarantee all that. Only after this has been achieved can we 
think about a highway leading to the democratic community, a 
corridor towards free and democratic society. 
The first step in attaining democratic ideals is a self-criti-
cal confrontation with the reality. The next step is action. Res-
ponsibility lies with political elites, but also on the people, citi-
zens who decide on who shall represent them. Clashing people 
and elites is the fuel of populism, just as self-aware and enga-
ged citizens, together with the political elite, are the foundati-
ons of a democratic society.
The Essence of Stabilitocracy: External Stability 
Based on Autocratic Populism 
Summary 
If the essence of stabilitocracy is to be summarised in a 
single sentence then it could be said that it is a peaceful coe-
xistence of stability and authoritarianism which secures short-
term peace, while on the other hand, in the long run, it pre-
vents the peace from being built on proper foundations and 
thus become sustainable. 
(Para)political stability, i.e. stabilitocracy actually means 
something entirely different than what the name itself appa-
rently implies. The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group 
Stabilitocracy
157
– BiEPAG in one of its reports indicates that the regional stabili-
tocracies are in fact weak democracies with autocratic leaders 
who rule these captured states through extra-institutional le-
vers of power and control of the media, presenting themselves 
as pro-Western keepers of stability in the region. On the other 
hand, by supporting “useful autocrats,” the West creates aversi-
on for itself in pro-western citizens. 
It almost has become a commonplace that when it comes 
to Serbia, the West cares more for the stability, than for demo-
cratic politics and practice.18
The term of stabilitocracy with populist content is used 
with increasing frequency in everyday speech, while political 
scientists and sociologists interpret it as orders with authorita-
rian characteristics and a dominant party and leader, and unfini-
shed liberal democracy. 
President of the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro, 
Ranko Krivokapić: “Montenegro in some segments has the best 
election regulation, but also ‘the best developed system of ste-
aling elections.’” So, in his words, Montenegro essentially relies 
on kleptocracy. Stabilitocracy is, in fact, synonymous with a spe-
cific form of autocracy-democratorship. It is by no means a 
warrant of democracy. On the contrary, it is a warrant of the 
absence of democracy, as democratic and liberal principles, pra-
ctices, and institutions are sacrificed in the name of stability. 
Façade democracy and essential autocracy are the main 
characteristics of stabilitocracy and they make it unsustainable 
and unacceptable in the long run. The problem is that from the 
outside, stabilitocracy may perhaps be seen as a necessary tran-
sitional phase, yet stabilitocrats do not perceive it as such, but 
rather as an order which should maintain their rule for as long 
as possible. 
18  What is the axiom of stabilitocracy? In the name of stability and more or 
less regulated relations in the region, official Belgrade would make various 
concessions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and so on, and in return, 
they won’t be bothered much about the way in which Serbia is governed 
and what it does, or doesn’t have to do with elementary democratic stan-
dards. (Teofil Pančić https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/pancic-Vučić-
ji/28825713.html)
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In the presidential election campaign of 2018 in Montene-
gro, the key slogan was Stability and Progress. In Serbia, the most 
powerful party of the ruling coalition is called Serbian Progressive 
Party, while stability is among the key words in every campaign. 
If foreign politics is somewhat archaically defined as a re-
flection of the domestic politics outside the borders of a coun-
try, then it may be expected that autocracies must, at one po-
int, show their real face on international scale. The values of 
foreign and national politics cannot be divided in such a way, 
except for the purposes of analytics and diplomacy. A con-
sequence of tolerating domestic autocracies for the benefit of 
regional stability is lowering of the criteria in European integra-
tions, or losing a realistic perspective due to departure from 
the EU standards.19
The Balkan countries in question are not stabilitocracies, but 
rather labilocracies with international support. It is an unsteady, shaky 
system of rule, i.e. the opposite of stable, steady, and secure. 
For a number of years already, those who attempt to ju-
stify their title of “objective analysts” with meticulously measu-
red balance of praises and criticism, have used the axiom that 
“domestic politics of Aleksandar Vučić is problematic, but his 
foreign politics is on the other hand praiseworthy.” This mecha-
nistic and rather artificial division of a single politics into two 
politics that can allegedly act independently, without mutually 
clashing, is now perhaps the most strongly contested, if for no 
other reason, then for the fact that it becomes increasingly cle-
ar that Vučić’s unintentional parody of a Titoist figure has run 
its course, reached its limits and has been left without manoe-
uvring space. 
19  “I wouldn’t want to see wars again in the Balkans,” said Juncker in the 
European Parliament. If we take away European perspective from the 
states in this highly complex, and I would say tragic region, we will relive 
what we already had in the 1990s, warned Juncker, as is reported by the 
AP. The next summit of the leaders of the European Union and Western 
Balkans will be held in May in Bulgaria, yet for now, not a single state in the 
region is close to becoming a member of the EU (“Junker: Bez EU Balkanu 
preti rat (Juncker: Without EU Wars Threaten the Balkans)”, Danas-Fonet, 
Belgrade https://www.danas.rs/politika/junker-bez-eu-balkanu-preti-rat/ 
accessed on 17 April 2018)
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Liberal and Illiberal Democracy 
– Internal tension and gap between the theoretical concept 
and practical functioning - 
The term democracy is usually used as a synonym for li-
beral democracy created by joining democratic and liberal tradi-
tions which are based on different values and which, in their 
mutual contesting and complementarity, fuel political evolution 
of modern societies (Macpherson 1977). Liberal tradition (poli-
tical dimension of liberal ideology), simply said, emphasises the 
importance of individual rights and freedoms, while the demo-
cratic favours people’s sovereignty and equality of citizens. De-
mocratic tradition is based on the idea that power should rest 
in the will of the people who, directly or indirectly, via their re-
presentatives, decide on important social and state issues. On 
the other hand, liberal tradition is founded on the idea of pro-
tection from arbitrary use of power, even if this power is based 
on the majority will of the people. Inter alia, under the influen-
ce of those ideas, the democratic principle of majority is supple-
mented with the principle of respecting those who stay in mi-
nority, by protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals. The desirable consequences of such interaction are 
liberalisation of democracy and democratisation of liberalism (Ma-
cpherson, 1977) and striking a balance between the two, the 
balance which leads to the most desirable political order possi-
ble – liberal democracy. However, such balance is not easy to 
attain, so in practice, unstable democracies are much more 
frequent and this leaves the space open for the appearance of 
populism. 
The question of balance between the liberal and the de-
mocratic is one of the most important issues of political theory 
and practice, the question to which no generally acceptable an-
swer has been given. Some authors believe that the problem is 
not in the tension between liberalism and democracy, but in the 
lack of democracy, the need to improve the democratic process 
and make it more democratic (Dal 1999). A great number of 
actors and supporters of the populist perspective on democra-
cy use this as the starting point of their political engagement. 
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In the countries of the developed West, a theoretical and pra-
ctical quest for a deepened democracy is currently underway, 
for “democratising of democracy” at the level of the state, as 
well as below and above this level, which assumes a simultaneo-
us devolution of power, more transparent political action, ever 
increasing presence of civil society in the political sphere, and 
strengthening of civil political culture (Gidens 2005, 92). Some 
authors tend to perceive this as a positive side of populism, sin-
ce it did bring up and problematize many of these questions 
through its criticism and influence. 
In this sense, strengthening of the populist parties and mo-
vements and radicalisation of the political process should be per-
ceived from the perspective of looking for the answers to the cri-
sis of democracy and the economic model in Europe. Here we 
primarily refer to the crisis of representation (Mouffe, 2013) and 
looking for a possibility of a greater influence of voters on 
post-election processes and lessening the influence of elites who 
reshape electoral will with their post-electoral negotiations. This is 
the very thing that populists use to their advantage – the idea of 
returning the mechanisms of decision-making in important questi-
ons into the hands of the people. Populist rhetoric, as well as their 
political style, tactics and strategy, are in this sense also increasin-
gly used by mainstream political actors. 
The authors who identify the cause for instability of liberal 
democracies in the domination of “the democratic” over liberal 
call these systems illiberal democracies, and these are characteri-
sed by the fact that in spite of the existence of free and fair electi-
ons, the elected political class is not inclined to respecting consti-
tutional and legislative restrictions of their rule, but is instead 
ready to undermine the rights and freedoms of the citizens in or-
der to preserve their own particular interests (Zakaria 1997). In ot-
her words, liberal constitutionalism is undermined by simplistically 
interpreted and similarly practiced democracy. Such illiberal demo-
cracy is quite a frequent defect of democracy (Merkel, 2011, 26). 
Some authors reduce it to electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999; 
2002) and they essentially interpret it in the same way. 
Competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky-Way 2002; 2010) is 
the term which points to deviations in democratic systems in 
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which democratic institutions do exist, but in which political proce-
sses are such that they put holders of power in an advantageous 
position. By manipulating public resources and institutions, they 
secure advantage for themselves in political confrontations, simul-
taneously putting others at a disadvantage, thus annulling the 
principle of equal participation in electoral competition. Elections 
are held regularly, yet the position of opposition is subjugated due 
to their unequal access to financial resources, influence or control 
of the media by the regime and absence of independent judiciary. 
All this puts political elites at an enormous advantage, so such a 
competitive system is in fact a hybrid one which naturally tends to 
suppress the liberal elements of democracy, especially where insti-
tutions are weak and critical public opinion is underdeveloped. In 
case such defects are highly pronounced and they have a thorou-
gh impact on democratic processes of such “democracy,” these 
systems should not be perceived as democratic communities at all, 
but rather authoritarian political communities with elements of 
democracy. 
Defective democracies also include populist democracies 
(Rainer Knopff 1998; Šalaj 2012; 2013), which wish to avoid or 
abolish the limitations established in the democratic process in-
tended to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. In such 
communities, “the will of the people” is the measure and excu-
se for everything and any attempt to restrict that will is proclai-
med an assault on democracy. The protection of people’s will is 
in practice reduced to inclination to unlimited power, marginali-
sation of political minorities, and neutralisation of all those 
advocating for limitation of power. 
The Initial Phase of Democratic 
Consolidation in Serbia 
Based on its political practice, providing the democratic 
defects that it manifests, Serbia could be classified as competi-
tive authoritarianism, or illiberal or populist democracy. In ot-
her words, it is a political community which could not be unre-
servedly called democratic. It is not sufficient to proclaim that 
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you are pro-democratic, or just have institutions that are for-
mally democratic. In order for the real democracy to exist, it is 
necessary to have the rule of law, separation of powers, demo-
cratic political culture, respected procedures and democratic 
practice. In short, a system based on respecting human rights 
and legislation. 
If political liberalisation is designated as the first phase 
of democratisation, i.e. visible weakening of repression and 
strengthening of civil freedoms, then one might say that Serbia 
has achieved some visible results, but it could hardly be confir-
med that it has entirely finished with democratic transition and 
started democratic consolidation. It could at best be said that it 
is only in the initial phase of democratic consolidation, since it 
faces the process of amending constitutional inconsistencies as 
well as inappropriate behaviour of political elites, which certain 
authors call negative consolidation (Pridham 2002, 955). The 
next level of consolidation, the so-called positive consolidation, 
includes effective institutionalisation, the establishment of ru-
les and procedures, as well as promotion and spreading of de-
mocratic values and strengthening of democratic political cultu-
re through more active involvement of civil society. 
Consolidated democratic systems cannot be attained in 
hybrid democracies where, apart from some democratic institu-
tions, there are informal centres of power outside of the con-
trol and reach of state institutions, civil society, media and criti-
cal public: “In order for a democracy to become consolidated, it 
must first become democracy” (Linc and Stepan 1996).
If one starts from the criterion that at least three conditi-
ons need to be fulfilled to even think about democratic consoli-
dation – meaning, in addition to finished democratic transition, 
also the establishment of statehood on the entire territory and 
the government which rules democratically (Linz i Stepan, 
1996) – than for Serbia it could be said that it is yet to enter the 
phase of democratic consolidation. 
Elements of Populism in 
the Public Opinion in Serbia 
Perception of politics – Attitudes of the citizens 
towards the people and political elite – Attitude of 
the citizens towards representative democracy – 
Attitude of the citizens towards the leader – Atti-
tude of the citizens towards “dangerous others” 

The research named “Citizens of Serbia and Populism” by 
the Centre for Politicological Research and Public Opinion of the 
Institute of Social Sciences was realised between 15 June and 16 
July 2017, when 1,500 adult citizens from 100 electoral units were 
interviewed (proportional to size sampling), taking account of the 
suggestions made by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
– CSES, Module 5 and specific characteristics of Serbia. 
This was the first systematic research on dissemination of 
populist attitudes among the citizens of Serbia (Lutovac, 
2017a).20 The aim of this research was to determine how wide-
spread populist attitudes and populist potentials are in the public 
opinion of Serbia, by using attitudes concerning political elite and 
the people, democracy and its institutions, the leader and percep-
tion of “dangerous others.” By using these attitudes, the researc-
hers tried to establish to what extent the citizens of Serbia accept 
or support elements of populist ideology. Furthermore, the asse-
ssments of economic and political situation were researched, par-
ty identification of the citizens, their attitude towards certain so-
cial values, elements of collective identity and the media – in order 
to establish the attitude of the citizens towards social, economic, 
and political circumstances which define the framework for the 
appearance and development of populism. 
Perception of Politics 
The research shows that as much as 57% of the citizens of 
Serbia is not interested in politics, and the lack of interest in poli-
tics can be perceived as a favourable circumstance for the 
20  The research was realised as a poll with adult population, using a repre-
sentative sample and the method of face to face interview. 
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appearance and development of populism. As much as 58% of the 
respondents pay little or no attention to political information, whi-
ch is not a favourable condition for the development of a social 
base which would support liberal and democratic values, just like 
the fact that 44% of them believe that they understand the most 
important political problems in Serbia. This withdrawn majority of 
the citizens, disinterested in politics and burdened exclusively by 
existential personal problems is a far cry from an engaged citizen 
dedicated to public good and interested in any kind of social enga-
gement. This largely narrows down the manoeuvre space for the 
established political parties and becomes a potential social base 
for the populists of different colours and political affinities, who 
“respect their disinterest and approach them differently, in uncon-
ventional and ‘non-political’” ways. 
In support of the favourable social atmosphere for the 
survival and development of populism is the research finding 
that a relative majority of the citizens (43%) perceives politi-
cs as a “combat between good and evil.” A large portion of 
them (41%) are undecided in relation to this question, while 
only 16% of the citizens disagree with this view on politics. For 
the relative majority, thus, politics is not a public activity aimed 
at public good, but an everlasting fight between good and evil, 
patriots and enemies, “us and them”… Accordingly, almost half 
of them (48%) believe that a compromise in politics is actually 
a betrayal of one’s principles (39% is undecided, while 13% di-
sagree). So, compromise which should be the foundation of the 
politics of harmonising different interests is mainly perceived 
as a weakness and the relative majority ascribes a negative 
connotation to it. In line with this, 39% of the respondents be-
lieve that the will of the majority should always prevail, even 
over the legitimate rights of minority groups (34% disagree, 
while 27% are undecided). 
Such perception of politics and (dis)interest in it influen-
ce the creation of a social atmosphere which is much more sus-
ceptible to the development of a populist social structure than 
building a democratic plural political community, a community 
in which the will of the majority is respected, but the status of 
the minority and their opinions are also considered. 
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Citizens’ Attitude towards 
the People and Political Elite 
The research of the citizens’ attitude towards the people 
and political elite has shown that in this segment, there is a gre-
at capacity for populism to manifest, be nurtured and further 
developed. The majority of the citizens perceive the people as 
the main political subject and value more their homogeneity 
than pluralism: 52% of the respondents believe that the peo-
ple, rather than politicians, should take the most important po-
litical decisions; 56% believe that minority groups should adapt 
to the customs and traditions of Serbia. 
Even though Serbia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural so-
ciety, the ethno-centric perception of the people is prevalent 
among the citizens: 60% of the citizens believe that the survival 
of one’s own nation is the goal of every individual; members of 
the people are not determined by the citizenship, or place of 
birth, but primarily by ethnic background; 82% believe that it is 
important for a member of the nation to observe ethnic cu-
stoms, 76% that their ancestors are members of the ethnic 
community, while 47% of the respondents believe that it is im-
portant for them to be born in Serbia. So, these results indicate 
that among the citizens the traditional perception of the peo-
ple as a community of “blood and soil” is still prevalent, rat-
her than that of the community of citizens (Lutovac, 2017b: 
14-16).
Political elites leave a decidedly negative impression on 
the citizens of Serbia, and they see them as primarily corrupted 
and alienated: 87% believe that corruption is widespread 
among politicians (only 1% think that corruption does not 
exist among politicians); 75% believe that most politicians do 
not care about the people (10% do not share their opinion); 
70% that most politicians care only for the wealthy and power-
ful, while 65% citizens believe that politicians cannot be trusted 
(Lutovac, 2017b: 17-19).
In accordance with such an attitude towards the political 
elite, the absolute majority of the citizens believe that the pe-
ople, rather than politicians, should take the most important 
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decisions – a foundation of populism for the populist politi-
cians, as well as the citizens who support such perception of po-
litics. On the other hand, a relative majority of the citizens, re-
gardless of the extremely negative attitude towards the 
political elite, do not think that they are the greatest problem 
in society, which is understandable providing the grave so-
cio-economic circumstances and problems of the state’s status: 
77% of the citizens have grave concerns pertaining to unem-
ployment and being fired from their job; 76% are worried be-
cause of the low living standard and poverty; 67% are worried 
because of young professionals’ emigration, while 65% due to 
crime and corruption. Concerns about the political situation are 
less prevalent. Kosovo makes 47% of citizens seriously worried, 
for 38% of citizens worries are caused by the political situation, 
29% of citizens are concerned due to the relations with ne-
ighbouring countries, 24% because of Sanjak (Ristić - Boturović, 
2017: 78-88). 
Citizen’s Attitude towards 
Representative Democracy 
The citizens’ attitude towards democracy is yet another 
indicator of the social environment favourable for the develop-
ment of populism. The majority of the citizens accept democra-
cy in principle as the best type of rule, yet they negatively 
assess its functioning in Serbia and they have an ambivalent 
attitude towards its potential to solve social problems: over 
60% of the respondents are not satisfied with the functioning 
of democracy in Serbia, while the absolute majority believe that 
in democracy there is generally too much talking instead of effi-
cient implementation of decisions (54%), which is a potential 
foundation for authoritarian tendencies. 
Even though the will of the majority as a democratic prin-
ciple is made absolute in the political discourse of the ruling 
majority in Serbia, attitudes of the citizens show that this is not 
universally approved. It may be said that the citizens are under 
the strong influence of that attitude, but that a significant 
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number refuses to accept such perception: 39% believe that 
the will of the majority should always prevail, even when it is at 
the expense of the rights of minority groups, while 34% disa-
gree (Lutovac, 2017b: 28).
The crisis of trust in democracy in general, institutions, 
and democratic procedures is obviously rooted in distrust in po-
litical parties: as little as 14% of the citizens trust political par-
ties, which is less than even the total number of party members 
in Serbia, while they are not only the holders of political proces-
ses (which is constitutionally stipulated), but also usurpers of 
political and social life (which is constitutionally prohibited). 
Such situation leaves an open space to those who favour “the 
people” over political elites, direct implementation of “the peo-
ple’s will” over representative democracy, and the leader who 
understands “the people” over institutions (Lutovac, 2017b: 
29).
Distrust in state institutions is highly pronounced at just 
below 50%, and what is particularly worrying is that the most 
important institution of representative democracy (People’s As-
sembly) and the pillar of the rule of law (judiciary) are trusted 
by only one in three respondents. The only state institution tru-
sted by more than a half of the citizens is army (61%). Trust in 
civil society institutions: media, NGOs, workers’ unions is quite 
low, which also promotes the development of populism, just 
like the fact that among non-state institutions, with the excep-
tion of schools and faculties, the most trusted institution is the 
Serbian Orthodox Church (46%). 
Such results of the research indicate the need for exten-
sive work on the development of the rule of law and respecta-
ble institutions. The citizens’ attitude towards them indicates a 
wide space for the populist mobilisation and action. Based on 
this research, one may conclude that in the segments in which 
the presence or potential for the development of populism 
were measured – including citizens’ attitudes towards the peo-
ple, the political elite, and their dissatisfaction with the functio-
ning of democracy and distrust in institutions – there is a great 
capacity for populism to be manifested, nurtured, and even 
further developed (Lutovac, 2017b: 38).
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Citizen’s Attitude towards the Leader 
In principle, the citizens of Serbia are not inclined to aut-
horitarian solutions, i.e. they do not support authoritarian lea-
dership openly. One fourth believe that an authoritarian rule, 
with a strong leader, would be a good solution for Serbia, 27% 
of the citizens think that it would be better if a strong leader 
ruled instead of the parliament and political parties (42% disa-
gree, 31% are undecided), 27% believe that having a strong lea-
der is good for Serbia, even if that leader does not respect the 
rules while performing his task (43% disagree, 30% are undeci-
ded). However, in practice, at the elections, things do not seem 
that way. On the contrary, at the elections which could not be 
called free and fair, support to the authoritarian leader is stron-
ger than what the public opinion research may indicate. 
In principle, the relative majority (42%) of the citizens 
are against the idea of a strong leader ruling instead of the 
parliament and political parties, which is yet another finding 
which points to the civic potential for resisting an open usur-
pation of power by strong and popular leaders. However, the 
high percentage of the citizens who do not express their opini-
on explicitly (one third) indicates the possibility of either them 
siding with the resistance against autocrats once they drastica-
lly transgress the limitations of their authorities, or siding with 
autocrats when they demonstrate enough skill in justifying the-
ir transgressing the scope of their authorities. 
The relative majority of the citizens (43%) disagree that having 
a strong leader is good for Serbia, even if that leader does not respect the 
rules while performing his job – the statement met the agreement of 
27% of the respondents. This result may also indicate the potential 
for resistance to the absolutism of a strong leader. 
Citizen’s Attitude towards “Dangerous Others” 
In addition to attitudes towards the people, the political 
elite, institutions, and representative democracy in general, the 
attitude towards “dangerous others” represents yet another 
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segment of the research which reflects the presence of, or po-
tential for populism. The public opinion survey has confirmed 
the assumption that there is a strong correlation between the 
“dangerous others” that political elites define as such and the 
negative evaluation of these groups by the citizens (Lutovac‒
Marković, 2017: 98). 
The citizens perceive “dangerous others” as different do-
mestic and external actors that do not belong to either elite 
or the people and that significantly (much, or very much) put 
the people and/or the state at risk – some states, members of 
other nations, or national minorities. Due to the influence of 
media campaigns by the political elite, a considerable number 
of the respondents include certain journalists in “dangerous ot-
hers”: 44% of the citizens think that the regime is right when 
qualifying certain media and journalists as hirelings and traitors 
(24% disagree). 
As much as 71% of the citizens believe that Serbia is con-
siderably jeopardized by the NATO, while 61% believe that the 
threat comes from America (USA). 56% of them believe that 
Serbia is threatened by foreign banks and companies, while 
41% feel threatened by the EU, and as little as 11% of the res-
pondents believe that Serbia is threatened by Russia. When it 
comes to national minorities, “dangerous others” are mostly 
seen among Albanians (61% believe that Serbia is considerably 
threatened by Albanians), which is not much of a surprise bea-
ring in mind the lasting and highly pronounced ethnic distance 
which manifested even during the times of “brotherhood and 
unity” of the SFRY, when negative attitude towards other natio-
nalities was perceived as an assault against the foundations of 
the state. The percentage of those perceiving Croats as “dange-
rous others” is much lower than it was during the armed confli-
cts of the 1990s, yet it is still quite high, considering that 38% 
of the respondents believe that Croats are a threat to Serbia. 
New “dangerous others” have appeared with the big re-
fugee wave and the migrant crisis of 2015-2016, when potential 
(transiting) and real immigrants began to be perceived not me-
rely as part of a humanitarian problem and a large group of pe-
ople transiting on their way to the EU, but their longer or even 
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permanent stay in Serbia started to be considered. The resear-
ch has shown that as much as 51% of the citizens of Serbia be-
lieve that the immigrants have increased Serbian crime rate, 
while 45% believe that they have damaged Serbian culture, whi-
ch for the citizens of Serbia classifies them as very “dangerous 
others.” All in all, based on this research it may be concluded 
that the segment of attitude towards “dangerous others” 
carries a great potential for the development of xenophobic 
populism (Lutovac‒Bašić, 2017: 64).
***
The results of the empirical research show that the most 
important elements of populism are present in the absolute, or 
at least relative majority of Serbian public – which is indicated 
by the citizens’ attitude towards the political elite, the role of 
the people, the leader, democracy and its institutions, as well as 
“dangerous others.” However, there is a considerable political 
polarisation in the society when it comes to some of these ele-
ments, while the inclination to accept open authoritarianism 
enjoys support of a small minority of the citizens. Additionally, 
according to the results of the research, it may be concluded 
that the majority of Serbia consists of passive citizens wit-
hdrawn from public life, not interested in politics and burdened 
by economic and social problems, which is not encouraging in 
the context of the struggle for the establishment and consoli-
dation of democratic institutions and behavioural patterns. 
Examples of undemocratic political practice and attitude 
towards such political practice among the citizens of Serbia con-
firm that in the countries of unconsolidated democracy, populism 
cannot have a corrective role, since there are still no developed in-
stitutions and democratic political culture to allow that. In such cir-
cumstances, populism turns out to be a major obstacle in the esta-
blishment and consolidation of the key elements of representative 
liberal democracy. The gap between democratic ideals and real 
functioning in such societies is too wide and deep for the correcti-
ve role of populism to be expected. If you add to the equation 
economic and political crisis which is not an incident or transitional 
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occurrence in development, but rather a permanent state of affa-
irs, then the social and economic context in such political commu-
nities is an additional cause for the appearance of populism and all 
the accompanying elements. In such socio-economic circumstan-
ces democracy is interpreted and practiced simplistically, as the 
absolute right of the majority to exercise their will in the name of 
the people, without taking into account the rights and attitudes of 
the political minority. 
The context of undeveloped institutions, undemocratic 
political culture, and constant political and economic crises cre-
ates an extensive space for the appearance of populist parties, 
movements, and leaders, allegedly full of understanding for the 
needs of the people, ready to challenge the corrupted elites 
and dangerous others. Due to the attractiveness of such actors, 
the media are ready to give them space. Furthermore, the me-
dia do not wish to resist the political influence of the populists, 
who in return receive strong backing which they use for their 
own, rather than for the general good. 
The example of Serbia indicates that the attractiveness 
of populism is based on: 
1.  Calls for direct implementation of people’s will and 
simple folk speech 
2.  Messages of the unification of the people or homoge-
nisation around some important topics, 
3.  Anti-elitist attitudes, 
4. Distrust in state and civil institutions, and 
5. Firm attitudes towards “dangerous others.” 
In such circumstances, populists tend to additionally su-
ppress pluralism, by stifling critical thinking, limiting media 
freedoms and perceiving institutions as their own service rather 
than the general good – not contributing thus to correcting the 
defects of the political system, but quite the reverse – to the 
prevention of their correction. 
***
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What are the effects of suppressing pluralism in mul-
ti-plural societies? Social rifts in such societies are thus deepe-
ned. When in multinational societies populist homogenise the 
people, they usually homogenise the national group that they 
belong to, while others are excluded at the least, or even more 
frequently treated as “dangerous others.” Due to their diverse 
nature, multicultural societies become fields of political con-
frontations concerning identity issues. Instead of making diver-
sity management a political priority, identity differences are in-
strumentalised in political clashes. In this political context, 
populism has advantage over multiculturalism if there are no 
rules involving democratic political culture, the rule of law, 
effective separation of powers, and strong institutions prote-
cting public interest. 
Anti-pluralism is manifested through seductive theses on 
the superiority of the nation and its cultural heritage. Hegemo-
nism is presented as a natural order which establishes peace 
and stability. 
On the other hand, in multicultural societies, the fight 
for pluralism is the fight for the harmony of diversity, while 
multiculturalism is the manner of diversity management which 
leads to the harmonisation of the political community and so-
ciety. 
MULTICULTURALISM 
Multiculturality and multiculturalism – “Authentic” 
representation of national minorities – Dominance 
instead of integration, ethnification instead of civi-
lification – The Status and prospects of multicultu-
ralism between proclamations, norms and action– 
Multiculturalism, civic identity and civic values 
- Multiculturality, Europeanisation and multicultu-
ralism – Europeanisation and national identity – In-
fluence of the EU as a community of values to Eu-
ropeanisation of the national identity 
-  Constitution, multiculturalism and Europeanisati-
on of the national identity – Multiculturalism and 
the EU as a union of values – Multiculturalism and 
the effect of the EU aims and values on member 
and candidate states– Democratisation vs stabilito-
cratisation 
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When researching multiculturalism and the process of Eu-
ropeanisation in Serbia and countries of the region, one must 
first examine the status of multiculturality and multiculturalism, 
from the normative framework to states’ policies which deci-
dedly determine the nature and functioning of a political com-
munity. Starting from the fact that the context, nature and stru-
cture of a political community determines the essence of rights 
and freedoms stipulated by the constitution and laws, as well as 
that a synergy of good laws and sound policies enables an effe-
ctive policy of multiculturality, integration and interlacing of cul-
tures of diverse national communities in a society, I studied the 
proclaimed multiculturalism, with a view to ascertain whether 
such constitutional and legislative framework and policies exist, 
and if they did, whether there was concerted action between 
them. The key finding was that the states of the region support 
a civil state in principle, that they are exclusively or predominan-
tly nationally legitimised by the highest legislative acts and that 
the factual state is marked by various national cultural identities 
that are not integrated into the model of plural citizenship. It is 
here shown that there is a lack of political will to transform the 
declared support for a pluralistic civil state into public policies 
affirming the values of multiculturalism, as well as that there is a 
lack of strong institutions to support such policy.
The political and theoretical notion of multiculturalism 
emerged as a response to the failed assimilation approach to 
the integration of different national and ethno-cultural commu-
nities in some countries, initially becoming visible, but then gai-
ning a strong presence throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Ben-
habib, 2002; Inglis, 1995). In time, it became one of the terms 
used so frequently and unselectively that its meaning became 
diluted. Thus, in everyday use, but also often in academic 
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circles, the notion of multiculturalism has been used interchan-
geably with the notion of multiculturality. In this paper, the two 
terms will be differentiated in the generally accepted manner, 
whereby multiculturality denotes the existence of different eth-
no-cultural communities in a society, while multiculturalism re-
fers to the political and institutional treatment of such cultural 
and ethnic plurality. Multiculturality is therefore of normative 
and descriptive character, while multiculturalism entails the cre-
ation, implementation and evaluation of a multicultural policy 
(Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; Barry, 1997; 2001; Parekh, 
2000; Kelly, 2002; Miller, 2002; Song, 2014).
Multiculturalism policy should, on the one hand, be ai-
med at strengthening social homogeneity by contributing to 
strengthening the common values of the entire community and 
all its national and ethnic groups, while promoting differences 
and respect for pluralism on the other. All this would ultimately 
lead to increased social justice and affirming the principle of 
equality in a society, and higher involvement of all ethnic and 
national groups in the life of a political community.
However, as a result of the practice that was inconsistent 
with the proclaimed values and aims of multiculturalism, which 
led to greater divisions and closing off of some social groups 
rather than strengthen social cohesion, as well as the frequent, 
often incorrect everyday use of the term of multiculturalism, 
the notion itself gained a negative connotation in political and 
everyday life, and therefore, in response, a new term and a new 
model of managing cultural diversity were introduced – inter-
culturality or intercultural dialogue. This notion is used in the 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue of the Council of Europe 
and many authors regard it is a corrected and enhanced notion of 
multiculturalism – a clearer and more consistent application of the 
concept of multiculturalism. Intercultural dialogue21 can be 
21  The White Paper refers to intercultural dialogue as an open and respect-
ful exchange of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of 
mutual understanding and respect. It is present at all levels – within soci-
eties, between the societies and between Europe and the wider world. 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals in Dig-
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defined as an open exchange of ideas between individuals and 
groups of different national, ethnic, religious or linguistic bac-
kgrounds based on the principles of mutual respect, with the 
aim of affirming tolerance, understanding, conflict prevention 
and strengthening social cohesion. The aims of interculturalism, 
that is, improved multiculturalism, are to solve the problems of 
economic inequality, political representation and stronger inclusi-
on of different ethno-cultural groups into society and political 
community.
Interlacing of differences, rather than their conservation is 
one of the key aims of this policy. The preservation of specifici-
ties and inclusion,22 based on universal human rights and the 
rule of law are the foundations of interculturalism understood 
as such, i.e. as improved multiculturalism. The White Paper has 
set five political guidelines for promoting interculturalism:
1. democratic governance of cultural diversity,
2.  active participation of citizens in the cultural, social 
and economic life,
3. learning intercultural competences,
4. open space for dialogue and
5.  affirming intercultural dialogue in international relations.
This is the context in which multiculturalism and intercultu-
ralism (intercultural dialogue) will be understood in this paper.
The facts corroborating the existence of multiculturality 
in a society and testifying to its diversity are important for un-
derstanding the nature of pluralism in that society, just as it is 
important to understand the political community where it 
nity”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2008. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/Source/Pub_White_Paper/White-
Paper_ID_SerbianVersion.pdf 
22  The White Paper refers to inclusion (social integration) as a two-sided 
process and the capacity of people to live together with full respect for 
the dignity of each individual, the common good, pluralism and diversity, 
non-violence and solidarity, as well as the ability to participate in social, 
cultural, economic and political life. Inclusion encompasses all aspects of 
social development and all policies and requires the protection of the 
weak, as well as the right to differ, to create and innovate. 
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exists, from the normativist and institutional aspects. However, 
for a comprehensive understanding of any society, one must 
also understand the situation and perspectives of multicultura-
lism, and the creation, implementation and evaluation of its 
multicultural policy.
Multiculturality and Multiculturalism
In their daily and political lives, contemporary societies in 
the countries of the region can be characterised as multicultu-
ral societies.23 Their multiculturality is primarily based on the 
fact of “cultural diversity” of specific types – national, religious 
and cultural diversity. What makes this multiculturality particu-
larly prominent is the fact that all these differences are politica-
lly relevant and even dominant in the political sense. Members 
of majority nations view integration as a solution to the existing 
or potential political problems, while members of national mi-
norities see integration as key political demands: proportional 
representation and as wide a range of self-governing rights as 
possible, from cultural to political. 
Although multiculturalism is often declared as part of po-
litical platforms or sets of public policies as parts of “identity 
politics”, in practice, such proclamations are reduced to a wide 
spectrum of national identity politics. In everyday and political 
discourse, in particular, multiculturalism is treated as a socially 
generally accepted notion. It is a notion that apparently 
23  The term Western Balkans has been used by the EU since the beginning of 
the 21st century, denoting non-EU member states in the Balkans (with the 
exception of Turkey): Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Albania and Montenegro. Although the Croatian public has often objected 
to being considered a part of this group despite the fact that Croatia 
joined the EU in the meantime, this paper will consider it a country in the 
region, i.e. a member of the group of countries considered the Western 
Balkans. Besides the fact that the understanding and phenomenon of 
multiculturalism is in a strong connection with neighbouring countries, 
there is an important fact that in addition to the process of Europeanisa-
tion of candidate states, there is also a process of the so-called internal 
Europeanisation of the member states within the EU, which justifies this 
definition of the region in terms of methodology.
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confirms commitment to building a civil society, one that equ-
ally respects national, religious and cultural differences. In pra-
ctice, however, the proclaimed multiculturalism is reduced to 
the politics of covert or open dominance of the political elites 
of majority nations.
Multiculturalism and the Legitimating Foundations of 
the Former Yugoslav States
Although brotherhood and unity was one of the ideologi-
cal foundations of the SFRY, it failed to mitigate the consequen-
ces of the dissolution of the joint state. Quite the contrary, the 
conflicts between the nations were one of the chief instru-
ments of separation and disagreement between the former 
members of the Federation. Accordingly, the years spent in one 
country were not the foundation for the creation of civil states, 
but rather the opposite, nation-centric state creations. The con-
stitutions and practice in the republics that were separating 
from the former Yugoslav state had ethno-national characteri-
stics, while the “dangerous others” were citizens of other ethni-
cities (Lutovac, 2017: 92-94). 
The 1990 Constitution of Serbia specified that Serbia was 
a “state of all citizens living in it”. In real life, however, it was di-
fferent. Serbia was a state in the hands of radical populists and 
a strong leader, in which minority members and political oppo-
sition were treated as the “dangerous others”, as potential or 
real enemies of the state. The preamble of the Croatian Consti-
tution of 1990 defined Croatia as a “national state of the Croa-
tian people and the state of members of autochthonous natio-
nal minorities”, whereby the Serbs, who had been a constituent 
people (Article 1 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia) became a national minority. Despite the fact that Artic-
le 3, para 1 of the Croatian Constitution set forth the principle 
of national equality as one of the core values of the Constitutio-
nal system, it was quite different in practice. Instead of the Ser-
bo-Croatian, Croatian became the official language (Article 12), 
and in political life, Serbs or anyone else who opposed radical 
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nationalism were treated as a threat to the newly established 
independent state. Radical populism based on nationalism was 
a dominant phenomenon in both states and thus any mention 
of multiculturalism, if present at all, would serve propaganda 
and political purposes, rather than its true meaning.
Following the end of the war in 1995, the multi-ethnic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (“a scaled-down model of Yugoslavia”) 
was constituted as a type of ethnic (con)federation where the 
constitutional order, political and everyday life was predomi-
nantly determined by national quotas, principles and rules. Ma-
cedonians regarded Macedonia as a unitary state, but Albanians 
saw it as a two-member Macedonian-Albanian federations. Al-
bania, which unlike Yugoslavia had a non-liberal national policy 
in which members of national minorities were not even allowed 
to name their children as they wished, not to mention any colle-
ctive minority rights, was competing with Priština to become 
the Piedmont of the all-Albanian unification in the Balkans. In 
the political vocabulary of the Balkans, multiculturalism was re-
duced to the term used only in communication with neighbou-
ring countries and only when seeking rights for compatriots. 
This discrepancy between the declarative and the real is 
best illustrated by the example of the constitutional-legal order 
of Montenegro, which declaratively rests upon the civilian con-
cept of political order,24 deemed one of the “essential corner-
stones of the constitutional character of Montenegro” (Šuković, 
2009:181). Academician Šuković elaborates this concept by de-
fining the citizen as the holder of sovereignty and the equality 
of citizens› rights and freedoms regardless of their group speci-
ficities, identities and membership and, finally, by guaranteeing 
special rights for members of national minorities, which they 
may also exercise in unison with others, to ensure equal conditi-
ons for the exercise of rights. As those who adopted the Consti-
tution, the text mentions “free and equal citizens, members of 
the peoples and national minorities living in Montenegro: 
24  “Montenegro is a civil, democratic, ecological and the state of social jus-
tice, based on the rule of law” Article 1, para 2 of the Constitution of Mon-
tenegro. Constitution of Montenegro of 2007, Official Gazette of Montene-
gro, no. 1/2007 of 25 October 2001.
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Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosnians, Albanians, Muslims, Croats and 
others, committed to a democratic and civic Montenegro.” In 
practice, however, the actual holders of sovereignty are the ru-
ling political elites, and the exercise of rights and freedoms is 
primarily influenced by declared support to political parties and 
secondly by membership in certain identities. The civilian con-
cept regarded as loyalty to the political community in Montene-
gro is facing a host of systemic obstacles. Besides the fact that 
the highest legal document was not a product of a social agree-
ment and a wide consensus, the fact that one national commu-
nity, i.e. its part which supports the ruling coalition’s views on 
identity, has a privileged status and that this is considered natu-
ral – is a serious obstacle in the development of the concept of 
the civil state (Lutovac, 2015).
The nature and structure of a political community deter-
mines the essence of rights and freedoms stipulated by the 
constitution and laws, including affirmative action measures, 
which are guaranteed for members of minority communities. 
Although these rights and affirmative action measures have a 
wide scope and are based on the highest international standar-
ds, it is difficult to harmonise the aim of creating a universal ci-
vil political community with political requirements based on the 
national principle. No magical formula has been discovered to 
bring these requirements in mutual harmony, one of the key re-
asons being the fact that rather than a basic social consensus, 
the principle of implementing the will of the majority has beco-
me absolute.
Without appropriate public policies and genuine determi-
nation of political stakeholders, constitutional proclamations 
and programmes focused on creating a civil state cannot create 
a true civic identity and civil society nor, accordingly, a civil poli-
tical community. As much as a treatment of national minorities 
may look as if affirming multiculturalism on the basis of 
analysing the constitutional order and affirmative action mea-
sures, in practice it results in strengthening their (self)isolation 
rather than integration into the society.25 In their requests for 
25  For instance, in Article 79, the Constitution of Montenegro specifically 
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representation and self-governance, political representatives of 
minorities are moving towards creating ethnic exclusivity, intro-
duction of criteria for belonging to a national group as an elimi-
natory criterion for representation or advocacy.
“Authentic” Representation of National Minorities
The political requests for authentic political representation 
through “authentic mandates” is a political project focused on 
excluding civic-oriented political parties from the race for mino-
rity mandates. Unless they are ethnic (national) or have domi-
nantly national (nationalist) platforms and policies, political par-
ties are automatically excluded as possible authentic 
representatives of minorities, regardless of the fact that throu-
gh their platforms and policies they may potentially contribute 
more to the well-being of a national minority community than 
the “authentic” (nationalist) representative of that minority. In 
practice, this would mean that a democratically elected repre-
sentative of a national minority community is not its authentic 
representative if elected from the electoral list of a national mi-
nority party rather than from the list of a party advocating civic 
values and the equality of this community within them. Seen 
from another angle, the negative experiences from the dissolu-
tion of the SFRY lead to national homogenisation and fears that 
deals with members of “minority peoples and other national minority com-
munities”. However, it is not clear whom this refers to because the Consti-
tution does not specify who exactly is a member of the majority people 
and who is a member of minority peoples. If the criterion is the number of 
members of a community, then everybody in Montenegro is a member of 
a national minority community because according to the population cen-
sus, there is no community with an absolute majority. If the criterion is 
practice – those with the privileged status in the society are Montenegrins 
who are embracing the new elements of the Montenegrin identity, com-
pared to the Montenegrins who stick to the Serbian elements of their 
identity. If the principle of self-determination is taken into consideration, 
in addition to the historical criterion, then the Montenegrins of Serbian 
identity and Serbs are not members of national minority communities, 
although they are treated as such in practice. In the relative majority sense, 
those with the heritage of Serbian identity in Montenegro (primarily, the 
language) could be considered the most numerous identity group that is 
practically treated as a minority group (Lutovac, 2015).
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minority votes would be manipulated by majority peoples. This 
is the reason for the demand for authenticity and ethnification 
of the political life and of minority rights protection.
Based on the above, we can say that mere participation of 
national minorities and its wide presence and depth is not in itself 
proof of the existence of a multicultural democratic community, 
nor is it proof of a multicultural public policy. On the contrary, it 
can only reflect the depth and the wide presence of mutual mi-
strust and resentment.
Unlike the exclusionary approach to public policies and buil-
ding a political community, an integrative, inclusive model, impo-
ses itself as a win-win way to break out of the vicious circle of civil 
and national (nationalist) contradictions and controversies. Buil-
ding a democratic political culture and a wide basic consensus on 
the need for this is the basis for creating inclusive public policies 
which take into account specificities and strengthen unity.
Almost as a rule, in the countries of the region, political 
representatives of national minorities are treated within the 
policy of respecting classic minority rights, for narrow, par-
ty-centred reasons, rather than as a result of the wish to imple-
ment an effective inclusion policy. Under the cloak of protecti-
on and preservation of multiculturality, invoking affirmative 
action measures, the implemented policy enabled a privileged 
status for some members of national minorities, i.e. their politi-
cal representatives: e.g. in Montenegro, for Albanians, by intro-
ducing separate electoral units, or for Croatians, by lowering 
the electoral threshold for getting into the parliament; in Ser-
bia, Bosnian and Hungarian ethnic parties became coalition par-
tners of all groups in power, often regardless of whether the 
cooperation with them was necessary for forming the parlia-
mentary majority; in Macedonia, Albanians are a part of the par-
liamentary majority as a rule. At the same time, representatives 
of minority political parties, but also a significant number of 
majority peoples’ parties, fully ethnified their platforms and 
activities, which had an impact on the overall political scene as 
well as on supressing civic values.
Thus, rather than being an alternative to nationalism, multi-
culturalism often became its support, consciously or unconsciously. 
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Even in the everyday political rhetoric and, moreover, in constituti-
ons, multiculturalism is mixed with the liberal concept of a state, 
which entails cultural and ethnic neutrality based on individual ri-
ghts. In the reality of the countries of the region, the prevailing con-
cept in building the political community was nation-based, although 
an analysis of constitutional definitions of these communities shows 
predominantly civil proclamations. 
Dominance Instead of Integration,  
Ethnification Instead of Civilification 
As much as an ethnified politics may call upon civil princi-
ples and values, by its very nature, it does not lead to strengt-
hening the civic identity of a state or society, or reinforcing the 
legitimacy of a community. Quite the contrary, it strengthens 
separate national identities, while the treatment of a communi-
ty is measured against the narrow “national interests” of ethnic 
groups. Rather than viewing democracy as a process of seeking 
integrative elements for building a political community, politi-
cians in the region often regard democracy as a game in which 
“the winner takes all”. Under such political context and values, 
and the absence of a democratic political tradition, multicultu-
rality, as a fact of the existence of various ethnic, religious and 
cultural groups, becomes a pivotal political issue.
National minorities’ political parties support the develop-
ment of the civil political community in their countries, but at the 
same time their political programmes are extremely ethnic. Besi-
des the contradiction of their determination to support a civil sta-
te, minority parties’ political programmes are absolutely ethnocen-
tric. Together with the contradicting stances from the constitutions 
of the countries in the region, this provides a basis for the politics 
which cannot be called integrative multiculturalism. 
Regardless of the nature of constitutional definitions and 
key political stakeholders’ programmes declaring commitment 
to building multicultural or liberal societies, rather than as sta-
tes with the rule of law, the states of the region function as very 
ethnified political communities, dominantly party-centred, where 
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the status of a citizen predominantly depends on their political af-
filiation and their ethnicity is either a strength or an obstacle, de-
pending on the will of political elites and the distribution of politi-
cal power.
Due to all of the above, reducing the study of multicultu-
rality to the normative framework for the protection of minori-
ty rights is methodologically deficient. In addition, the status of 
a national community in a country is much more defined by the 
practical state policy than norms, which – without proper and 
effective policies – remain only on paper. A synergy of good 
laws and sound policies enables an effective policy of intercul-
turality, integration and interlacing of cultures of various natio-
nal communities in a society and therefore, in the study of mul-
ticulturalism, it is important to ascertain whether such laws and 
policies exist and if they do, whether there is concerted action 
between them and what the effects are of such institutional 
framework and political action. 
The Status and Prospects of Multiculturalism 
between Proclamations, Norms and Action
Respect for national, religious, linguistic and cultural di-
fferences in a broader sense is a prerequisite for a stable and 
successful multicultural society and strengthening the ele-
ments of a common political identity. However, politicising di-
fferences, i.e. political instrumentalisation of differences may 
lead to the “paradox of multiculturalism”, which turns protecti-
on and respect of differences into a policy of national or ethnic 
labelling (Ericsen, 2004: 243-247).
Interculturality is a theoretic and practical-political con-
cept that describes a comprehensive interlacing of cultures ba-
sed on the principle of mutual respect and acknowledgement 
and sets these principles as pillars of creating a harmonious po-
litical community. Discrepancy between the normatised and what 
is going on in practice is almost a rule in the countries of the regi-
on, both in those already in the EU and those in the process of 
joining. Minorities are protected relatively well by norms, 
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minority party political representatives are often present in po-
litical life above proportion, but this has a rather weak or al-
most no influence on the true inclusion of members of minori-
ties in all pores of the political community.26
In a civil state, all the rights that belong to the majority 
people would have to be available to all citizens who are se-
lf-determined, regardless of how they define their identity. Two 
complementary principles characterise a stable multicultural 
society: cultivating and strengthening what is common, on the 
one hand, and respecting the differences at individual and colle-
ctive levels, on the other; in other words: mutual engagement 
instead of exclusion, getting to know and respecting the diffe-
rences – from constitutional and legal principles, through laws 
and public policies, to a general social principle which becomes 
the foundation of the political culture in the community. Hence, 
knowledge of specificities and differences and a high degree of 
tolerance are the necessary elements for the stability of overall 
political identity (Nye, 2007: 109-123).
The countries of the region are between the commitment to 
a civil state in principle and the factual situation of strongly pro-
minent national cultural identities that are not integrated into a 
model of a pluralistic civil community. Also necessary, besides the 
commitment in principle, is primarily the political will transformed 
into public policies affirming these values, as well as cultural 
pluralism and strong institutions supporting such policy. A special 
role in this should be that of an appropriate education system and 
support by the media.
From the aspect of contemporary concepts of citizens-
hip, which insist that a citizen must have a chance to participate 
26  The practice in Montenegro, for example, does not respect the principle 
of proportional representation for national minorities (Article 79, para 10 
of the Constitution). This principle is not respected with regard to the 
people who did not declare themselves a national minority (Serbs, Monte-
negrins of Serbian identity) either. The latter are treated as a disturbing 
factor in the process of separating the formerly interlaced identity. In real 
life, they are the target of assimilationist identity pressures, focused on 
unification and creation of a homogenous identity; they are, actually, the 
main target group of the policy of identity essentialization (Lutovac, 
2014b).
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in joint decision-making in all important issues in society, i.e. 
their active participation (republican profile of a citizen) and in 
the protection of rights and freedoms from the influence of 
those with political power, as well as the possibility of the 
opposite, where citizens initiate the field of influence towards 
the people in power (liberal profile of a citizen, Bellamy, 2008: 
43), we can say that these concepts have not been fully and se-
riously understood and accepted in the states and societies of 
the Western Balkans. 
In the practice of these societies, elements of the multi-
culturalist approach to citizenship (Kymlicka, 2004), which seeks 
balance between individual and collective rights, are lost in two 
ways: through ethnification of politics and rights, which renders 
the essence of the civil principle meaningless, and through 
attempts at unification of identities of those who define their 
identity differently.
The contemporary multicultural democracy is based on 
traditional and new civic values, as well as on institutionalised 
innovations stemming from demands for wider self-governance 
and a more even distribution of power within heterogenous po-
litical communities (Marshal, 1950; ten Napel/Theissen 2009; 
Kymlicka/Norman, 2000; Lijphart, 2003).
The more recent political history has been marked by a 
group of specific demands by minority communities. Among 
those that have been established in many countries are repre-
sentation in institutions in power or self-governance in culture, 
education and information. In other countries, these demands 
are dismissed as inappropriate because they disturb the liberal 
concept of a civil society. The area between these two approac-
hes is actually the political space which could contribute to the 
establishment of a new set of collective rights both theoretica-
lly and in practice. One of the first tasks in this process is to pre-
vent the disintegrating potential which could undermine the fo-
undations of a liberal state and the basic achievements of the 
classic concept of citizenship.
In their analyses of multicultural citizenship, Kymlicka and 
other theoreticians of multiculturalism have focused their rese-
arch on the relation between the liberal concept of citizenship 
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and multicultural demands for specific rights, reaching conclu-
sions that multiculturalism and the liberal model of citizenship 
are compatible and that entitlement to some collective rights 
to participation in a political community is possible without 
threatening to disintegrate it, but also expressing many reser-
ves regarding demands for self-governance (Kymlicka, 2004: 
264-271). All strengths and weaknesses of separate rights for 
national and cultural communities were vividly demonstrated 
by the example of the former SFRY. This, however, is only one 
side of the same coin – the other side is a completely opposite 
process, one that brings additional complexity into political si-
tuations: imposing a common identity, unitarisation on the one 
hand, or insisting on differences beyond any rational degree and 
striving to institutionalise these differences on the other. When 
these two processes are viewed integratively, it becomes clea-
rer as to what difficulties may arise in developing theoretical 
concepts and their implementation in real life.
One of the answers offered for such situations is constitu-
tional patriotism, but it is not possible unless founded on the ba-
sic social consensus and a differentiated citizenship which does 
not disintegrate the political community. For civic identity to be 
institutionally based on the principles of constitutional patrioti-
sm, it has to rest upon a civic identity based on the feeling of be-
longing to the political community in which everyone has equal 
rights and status. And this is exactly where the fundamental pro-
blem of citizenship lies in the countries of the region. 
If as the model of citizenship we take the one that entails 
active participation of members of a political community in sha-
ping the core foundations and key directions for the develop-
ment of a society (Miller, 1995: 443), where citizenship includes, 
besides the system of moral ideas, norms and values, a set of ri-
ghts and the political status of members of this political com-
munity and their feeling of belonging to the political communi-
ty, we would have grounds to say that a citizenship model of 
political community still remains an aim to be reached in every 
segment of its essence. Civil state, civic values and civic identity 
are only emerging in the countries of the region, still at the sta-
ge of constitutional programme orientation and as set aims.
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Multiculturalism, Civic Identity and Civic Values
The classic concept of citizenship means that belonging 
to a political community is above the separate group members-
hips within the community, but also that such membership is not 
exclusive regarding other identities. Still, separate identities, in-
sisting on differences rather than what connects them, which 
were awakened and deepened in the 1990s are still prevailing.
The feeling of belonging to a political community, by the 
very nature of things, cannot be developed in people who are 
excluded from this community, and it is the very feeling of be-
longing and pride that Taylor (1994: 25-75) and Kymlicka (2004: 
277-278) have emphasised as necessary for creating cohesion 
within a multicultural society, in addition to respect for liberal 
and democratic values and agreement regarding procedural 
and formal rules. In other words, a universal civic identity cannot 
be built in opposition to individual identities, particularly when 
their presence is so pronounced. Rather, quite the opposite, it 
should be built on diversity, respect for differences, however 
pronounced they may be.
Civic values, which were developed historically and veri-
fied by the Treaty of Lisbon as European values (Lutovac, 
2015b: 272-275), also became programme aims in countries in 
the process of transforming from real-socialism into liberal-de-
mocratic political communities. The problems faced by coun-
tries in transition included their non-democratic political herita-
ge, façade-like constitutional and legal framework and a 
dominant “subservient-participatory political culture” (Komar, 
2010: 167-169). If we add the propensity to subject institutions 
to political will and respect selectively, i.e. that the rule of law 
is instrumentalised for political purposes and relativised, the 
challenges before countries in transition on the road to establi-
shing civic values which are inclusive in relation to “the others” 
– towards the rule of law, cultivating and protecting human ri-
ghts and consolidating a democratic order are evident.
If multiculturality is taken as a basis for civic identity “the 
feeling of belonging to a unified identity” (as Kymlicka and Taylor 
have stressed) may be based exclusively on the capacity of this 
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identity to integrate and improve individual cultural profiles within 
its framework. Here, however, it is not sufficient to insist on a so-
ciety that merely tolerates different cultures, but rather on a so-
ciety that integrates and promotes different ways of good living, 
offered in individual cultures and not threatening their specifici-
ties. Civic identity depends, inter alia, on the level of acceptance 
and respect for cultural plurality. This approach, if systematic and 
systemic, is implemented through the constitutional and legal or-
der, the education system and public policies. However, the reality 
in the countries of the region is different. Instead of focusing the 
entire education system on civil education, rather than one school 
subject under that name, the entire education, from language and 
literature, through history and all other forms of communication is 
focused on national values. Creating civil awareness, strengthe-
ning civic values and virtues are not priorities for state institutions 
or media controlled by governments. Rather, their priority is to 
strengthen national identities. 
Hence, based on the above, we can affirm that civil sta-
tes, civic values and civil identities are only at initial stages, i.e. 
that they are still, only occasionally, at the level of general pro-
gramme orientation and set aims. The necessary ingredient for 
their firm establishment is a consolidated democracy and ac-
ceptance of universal values of developed democracies, such as 
the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedoms.
Multiculturality, Europeanisation  
and Multiculturalism
Constitutional, legal, economic and other social reforms 
focused on European integration gain their full meaning if they 
are focusing primarily on values, principles and general aims 
such as the rule of law, protection and cultivation of human ri-
ghts and consolidating a democratic order. If understood and 
implemented in practice as such, European integrations can 
gain stronger support from citizens and the process of Europe-
anisation of the national identity can be widely and deeply ac-
cepted.
Multiculturalism
193
Europeanisation and National Identity
Europeanisation is the process of adopting the core va-
lues, institutional, legal and administrative order and strategic 
political aims proclaimed in the EU (Radaelli and Exadaktlyos 
2012; Ladrech 2010; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 
2002). In addition to the Europeanisation of candidate states, 
there is a process of the so-called internal Europeanisation in 
the EU of its member states, a process of integration through 
political culture, common values and developing democratic in-
stitutions. This is an incremental process “reorienting the dire-
ction and shape of national policies” in the direction determi-
ned by the European Union as a political community (Ladrech, 
1994: 69). The absence of a common origin is replaced by va-
lues institutionalised into institutions which are gaining highest 
respect. Division of power, which entails an independent judi-
ciary, an effective parliament and a responsible executive aut-
hority, and, more recently, civil society institutions – all are ac-
knowledged as values in themselves because they contribute to 
the functioning of the rule of law and civil rights and freedoms.
In the Lisbon Treaty, the notion of national identity is lin-
ked with the fundamental political and constitutional structures 
and is thus separated from the cultural, historical and linguistic 
aspects of identity: “The biggest textual difference between 
the identity clause in the Lisbon Treaty and its predecessor in 
the treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht (Art. 6(3) TEU (Am-
sterdam), Art. F(1) TEU (Maastricht)) is the link between natio-
nal identity and the fundamental political and constitutional stru-
ctures” (Bogdandy and Stephan, 2011: 11). The EU treaties that 
preceded the Lisbon Treaty did not define the concept of natio-
nal identity, so its interpretations were wider and included cul-
ture, religion and language (Puttler and Kahl, 2011: 60).
In this paper, national identity is regarded in the context 
of the Lisbon Treaty. The topics studied are primarily the ele-
ments of political identity, which would have to be, from the 
perspective of the EU, a part of the national identity of an EU 
member state: freedom, democracy, rule of law, respect and pro-
motion of human rights, including respect of human dignity and 
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minority rights. The values codified in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) are not only the values upon which the 
EU is founded, but are also the values upon which all member 
states should be founded. They are also the same values upon 
which multiculturalism is based.
European integrations are one of the key mechanisms of 
the Europeanisation of national identity. The process is, howe-
ver, rather often simplified and presented as a technical job of 
adopting the legislative heritage of the European Union. In con-
trast, European integrations should be understood as an inte-
gral process of political, legislative, economic and social inclusi-
on in the EU as a supranational and all-national community of 
values and programme aims.
The Influence of the EU as a Community of Values 
on the Europeanisation of National Identity
- Universalisation and pluralism -
Starting from the fact that the notion of Europe is not a 
replacement for historical nations, but rather complementary 
to the notion of a contemporary nation, a two-fold process is 
developing: universalisation, i.e. linking through universality, on 
the one hand, and linking through pluralism and diversity, linking 
of states through full respect of national specificities, on the 
other. This process is simultaneous, but has an uneven intensity, 
strength and scope.
In addition to statehood and sovereignty, which are ele-
ments of constitutional identity, member states independently 
determine what principles and values have the quality of funda-
mental political and constitutional structures. Article 4, para 2 
of the Treaty on EU protects “the constitutional structures idio-
syncratic to a member state”, but the EU law also contains gui-
delines in Article 2 on values that should be a part of the funda-
mental political and constitutional structure of a member state. 
“Harmonisation of national and EU orders, that is, simultaneous 
preservation of a state’s singularity and the functioning of the 
EU is based on two interlinked principles: the EU’s commitment 
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to respect the national identities of member states and the 
member states’ commitment to loyal cooperation, requiring that 
they take all appropriate general and special measures to meet 
their responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty or EU organs’ re-
gulations” (Đorđević 2014, 94).
Hence, the influence that integration processes in the EU 
have on the organisation of a state member or a candidate sta-
te is limited by the principle of preservation of member states’ 
constitutional identity. This principle entails that certain values 
and postulates fundamental to the constitutional order of a 
member (candidate) state cannot be violated by the state’s EU 
integration. In other words, the essence of the constitutional 
and political identity of a member (candidate) state is a specifi-
city of a kind in the process of integration, and EU membership 
entails a state’s commitment to the values that cannot be for-
gone, by invoking the specificity of constitutional identity.
Such is the nature of multiculturalism too, in that, on the one 
hand, it enables adhering to the principle of respect for individual states’ 
specificities by harmonising differences within it and, on the other, it ena-
bles adhering to universal principles and values which cannot be subje-
cted to creative interpretation or ignored under the pretext of preserving 
specificity, because it is based on these very values. 
Constitution, Multiculturalism 
and Europeanisation of National Identity
One of the indicators for measuring the impact of multi-
culturalism on national minorities is the constitutional and par-
liamentary affirmation of multiculturalism. In a broader sense, 
the constitution defines a social community in legal, political, 
value-related and ideological terms. Hence, the constitution is 
not only a supreme law, as often referred to one-sidedly, but 
also a social agreement, a political act regulating the rules of po-
litical processes and an act on values, sublimating the past, the 
present and the future (Dimitriјević, 2007: 113-114). 
In the context of EU member or candidate states, consti-
tutional identity gains another, supranational dimension at 
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several levels, primarily those concerning values and homogeni-
sation. Among all the roles of the constitution in a society, ho-
mogenisation is of particular importance – citizens identify 
themselves with the political community and the society as a 
whole through the constitution. As a positive legal act, the con-
stitution regulates the present, but in terms of values, it also 
refers to the past and the future, through its programme princi-
ples and aims. In transitional political communities, the value di-
mension is of particular importance because it steers the so-
ciety towards the aims transforming the political community in 
the desired direction.
The value dimension is very important for the legitimacy 
of the constitution because it strengthens social support and 
facilitates the constitution’s implementation in practice. The 
lack of a generally-accepted value dimension may reduce the 
constitution to a document which creates divisions in the so-
ciety, rather than homogenise it (Lutovac, 2015b: 37-40). The 
constitution itself is an expression of the common will to esta-
blish a political community. There are numerous examples of 
constitutions failing to exert real influence even in situations 
when disagreements on values are insignificant, when there are 
no real intentions to limit the authorities and impose the gene-
ral rules of political life. The power of the constitution to shape 
the political community as a community of values and to set the 
generally-applicable rules of the game, stems from the will of 
the citizens, the holders of sovereignty, to establish one such 
political community.
Multiculturalism and the EU as a Union of Values
The European Union, as a supranational political move-
ment rests upon, inter alia, common values. Codification of the 
EU’s core values is an important part of the process of political 
integration within the EU and the process of integration of new 
states into the EU. Just as the constitutions of individual states 
and their core values are important for the homogenisation of 
their internal political communities, the core values of the EU as 
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a supranational state are important for creating its members’ 
attachment. As the process of integration within the EU advan-
ced, its values gained more importance in this process: from the 
preamble of the Maastricht Treaty, through the partial normati-
sing in the former Article 6, para 1 of the Amsterdam Treaty, to 
the Treaty of Lisbon, which “further strengthened the value di-
mension of the EU and established the EU as a union of values 
in Article 2” (Đorđević, 2014: 23).
Although relying on the earlier Article 6, para 1 of the TEU, 
Article 2 of the TEU introduces a novelty in terms of symbolism 
and content: the term “values” (Germ. Werte) is used for the first 
time instead of the earlier term “principles” (Germ.  Grundsätze) 
and then, the list of values upheld by the EU is expanded by ad-
ding those that concern respect for human dignity, equality and 
respect for national minorities. Thus, along with freedom, demo-
cracy, rule of law and respect of human rights, the newly identi-
fied values represent the core of EU values and that of each and 
every member state and the states en route to joining the EU. Ini-
tially in the preamble, then through principles and, finally, values, 
the increasingly more demanding political determination has been 
formulated for homogenisation of the constitutional and legal 
principles of the EU with the constitutions of its member and can-
didate states. This homogeneity is to have several functions: it 
should facilitate integration of member states, strengthen the ba-
sis of legitimation for the EU, build the European identity and 
strengthen the functionality of the EU (Callies, 2011: 31-32).
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union raises the stan-
dards of a society of tolerance, justice and solidarity, characteri-
sed by, inter alia, pluralism, non-discrimination and equality 
between women and men, and opens a debate on whether the-
se characteristics refer to the societies of member states or to 
the “European society” in the making (Callies, 2011: 40). Regar-
dless of the fact that there is no universal agreement on this 
matter, it is an important fact that this has become the topic of 
an open debate and that the space for values continues to 
expand, both in the domain of public debate and in the sphere 
of constituting the EU, including its members, and the states 
that are yet to become its members.
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All in all, Article 2 of the Treaty on EU sets forth the va-
lues that are the core elements of modern constitutionality; 
rather than being mere proclamations, they are directly linked 
to EU membership and are key for admittance into the Europe-
an Union. Article 49, para 1 of the Treaty of the European Union 
specifies that any European state which respects the values 
proclaimed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and 
which is committed to promoting them may apply for member-
ship in the European Union, thus expanding the effect of Article 
2 of the Treaty on EU to non-member states: “The values re-
ferred to in Article 2 of the TEU do not only apply to EU organs 
and member states, but also include the states which aspire to 
join the EU” (Đorđević,  2014: 24).
Multiculturalism and the Effect of the EU Aims and 
Values on Member and Candidate States
The aims of the European Union are directly linked with 
its defined values. Its general aims, in addition to promoting 
the Union’s values, are to promote peace and well-being of its 
peoples (Article 3, para 1 of the TEU), and the more specific 
aims include, inter alia, creating areas of freedom, security and 
justice (Article 2, para 2) and “a whole set of aims which could 
be categorised as a type of a social dimension of the EU” (Artic-
le 3, para 3) (Đorđević, 2014: 25). In a symbiosis with the values 
under Article 2 of the TEU, these aims represent a unified cor-
pus of values.
Respecting human dignity, freedom, democracy, unity 
and the rule of law and respect for human rights, including nati-
onal minority rights – all are the values stipulated in Article 2 of 
the TEU, representing the Union’s second general aim. Howe-
ver, Article 3, para 1 does not grant special powers to the EU, it 
rather “strengthens the resolve to implement and promote the 
values stipulated in Article 2 of the TEU” (Đorđević, 2014: 26). 
The implementation and promotion of values refers to the EU 
and its member states, as well as to its relations with non-mem-
ber states. The foreign policy aspect of implementing and 
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promoting EU values is implemented through its policy towards 
third countries. Progress in the accession process, trade facilita-
tion, financial aid, etc., are conditioned upon, inter alia, the 
standards defined as values in Article 2 of the Treaty on Europe-
an Union.
Finally, the third general aim of the EU, referring to the 
promotion of well-being, has a value-based dimension and sho-
uld not be interpreted strictly through the economic prism, but 
rather, through the very important social and value-based di-
mension. Namely, this is emphasised by the specific aims defi-
ned in Article 3, para 3 of the Treaty on European Union – from 
solidarity and social justice, social development and full em-
ployment, to protecting and improving the environment. Com-
mitment to social solidarity and the welfare state concept is of-
ten characterised as one of the key or even central 
characteristics of the European identity, differentiating the EU 
from other global actors, including the USA. However, there is 
no consensus in the European Union concerning the welfare 
state, particularly following the world economic crisis at the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century, when the differen-
ces with regard to the Union’s role in market economy became 
more prominent (Weiler and Horowitz, 2004: 47). 
All in all, the proclaimed values and aims of the EU can be 
considered the foundations of multiculturalism policy. This par-
ticularly refers to respect for human dignity, freedom, demo-
cracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, inclu-
ding national minority rights – the values under Article 2 of the 
TOU, also representing the second general aim of the EU.
Democratisation vs. Stabilitocratisation
Transformation of an autocratic order (where power is 
usurped by a group or individuals who are not accountable to 
the citizens and are not subject to effective control) into a de-
mocratic order – that of the rule of law, fundamental freedoms 
and human rights, effective division of power, developed civili-
sed society and independent institutions – can be called the 
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process of democratisation. It is a process that never ends, not 
only because there are so few “pure” democracies or autocracies 
but because with time, new areas of democracy are mastered 
and new ones open. Most of states that can be formally classi-
fied as democratic also have some elements of authoritarian sta-
tes and vice versa. One of the many definitions and perceptions 
of democracy and post-democracy (Dal, 1999; Lijphart, 1992; 
Linc and Stepan, 1998; Crouch, 2007) is that of Giddens, who 
says that the rights to participate in a democracy go together 
with civil freedoms – freedom of speech and debate, along with 
the freedom to form political groups or associations and free-
dom to join them (2005: 92). Democracy indeed is, in a way, a 
process of stabilising institutions which enable the rule of law 
and political processes providing for a fair political struggle and 
preservation and broadening the space for freedoms and human 
rights. In that sense, democratisation is the fundamental postu-
late for the development of an integrative multicultural society. 
As mentioned above, the EU respects the identity of its 
member states and the specificities of their systems, but only 
under the key prerequisite that they have a democratic order. 
This, inter alia, includes the EU core system of values and certa-
in principles and rules for constituting the authorities as well as 
their behaviour, such as peoples’ sovereignty (citizens’ soverei-
gnty), free multiparty elections, equality of citizens and political 
actors in political activities, the principle of majority, limited by 
minority rights, separation of political parties from the state 
and public institutions (de-partisation)… In other words, for a 
state to become an EU member, it would have to meet certain 
political criteria, including, in addition to the abovementioned 
principles, stable democratic institutions as the foundation of a 
democratic order.
In practice, however, this general principle changes for the 
sake of stability and security: authoritarian practices and policies 
are tolerated and democracy is postponed until “better times”, 
thus postponing the development of integrative multiculturalism.
One of the instruments the EU uses to influence coun-
tries that want to become its members is the policy of conditio-
ning. Many people, including Euro sceptics, believe that this 
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external factor of democratisation can be very productive and 
useful for these countries, regardless of the end result of Euro 
integrations. Likewise, experience shows that once a country jo-
ins the EU, the process of democratisation has not ended. It is a 
continual process and if neglected, it has negative consequen-
ces on the society as a whole, weakening the effects of what 
was achieved and creating obstacles to stabilisation and expan-
ding democracy. The term “democratisation of democracy” coi-
ned by Giddens is self-explanatory in describing this process. 
However, in practice, the conditioning policy is focused on achie-
ving stability at the expense of democratic consolidation in the co-
untries of the region.
There is a general impression in the democratic commu-
nities of the countries in Western Balkans which have not yet 
joined the EU that for Brussels, especially for some of its in-
fluential members, it is more important to achieve the desirable 
diplomatic and political responses in the region than to strengt-
hen its internal democratic processes. On the one hand, the 
protagonists of the formerly problematic politics in the region 
have changed their rhetoric in foreign relations, particularly in 
their communication with high representatives of the EU, USA 
and neighbouring countries and, on the other, their internal po-
litics very much resembles the 1990s. The opposition is treated 
as an enemy and any criticism as an attack on the state and re-
forms. 
At its core, the politics of the countries in the region is 
not an instrument used by the ruling majority to achieve the ge-
nuine Europeanisation of the national identity in accordance 
with the Lisbon Treaty, but rather an efficient tool of undemo-
cratic politics used to strengthen the privileged political status 
and monopoly in the country.
The citizens in these countries still regard Europeanisati-
on rather one-sidedly, through the eyes of their political elites – 
as an administrative and technical process of adapting to the le-
gal and market system of the EU, which should directly enable a 
better life – rather than as a process of instituting and imple-
menting the rule of law and other core values proclaimed by 
the Lisbon Treaty.
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***
A universally accepted model of inclusion of diverse eth-
nic and national minorities is non-existent in the EU or beyond, 
in the developed Western countries. Multiculturalism was an 
attempt to step away from the assimilation approach, metapho-
rically called “a melting pot” and often characterised as unjust 
and immoral, towards the approach that would respect ethnic, 
national, religious or cultural differences in a broader sense, of-
ten symbolically called the “salad bowl model”. Interculturality 
attempts to overcome the weaknesses of both of these models, 
by respecting the difference and also seeking an adequate mo-
del for the inclusion of these differences into a homogenous 
political community.
This is a big challenge not only for immigrant countries 
but also for countries with autochthonous population of diver-
se ethnic, national, religious and cultural identities. Political 
parties in general, and especially those established on ethnic or 
national principles, have a significant role and responsibility in 
seeking the adequate approach to this problem. However, they 
are inherently prone to absolutising this role in their efforts to 
institutionalise the monopoly in representing and advocating 
the interests of communities on behalf of which they operate.
To a greater or lesser extent, undeveloped political culture 
and political practice that does not contribute to its establish-
ment, still underdeveloped rule of law, low levels of freedom of 
speech and free media, underdeveloped and weak institutions, 
concentration of power in the hands of strong leaders, inefficient 
division of power, partocracy in the establishment and a wi-
de-spread corruption generated by it – all are the systemic pro-
blems of countries and societies in the Western Balkans. Overco-
ming these weaknesses, as the main causes of weak states and 
societies, should be a priority in the process of consolidating a de-
mocratic community (its Europeanisation), and this would greatly 
facilitate the process of European integrations itself.
In the countries of the region, Europeanisation is predo-
minantly perceived and presented as a technical job of taking 
over the Union’s heritage, rather than being treated as an 
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integral process of political and legal adapting and, subsequen-
tly, accession to the EU as a supranational and all-national com-
munity of values and programme aims. The general social re-
forms aimed at Europeanisation will only gain full meaning if 
they primarily focus on the values, principles and general aims, 
such as the rule of law, protection and fostering of human ri-
ghts and consolidating a democratic order, and building a natio-
nal, depolitised public administration and a system of sustaina-
ble economic development.
Countries of the Western Balkans can be characterised as 
multicultural societies without multiculturalism, as societies 
with cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, yet without an inte-
grative policy to manage this diversity. In principle and to a gre-
at extent, they are committed to a civil state, but factually, they 
are still national states where nationalism is fostered as state 
ideology, supported and promoted as the highest form of patri-
otism. A logical consequence of this orientation is failure to bui-
ld a civic identity, failure based on the approach of imposing 
one identity as general, rather than introducing inclusion poli-
cies to strengthen different identities through socialisation, 
education, institutions and public policies. The demands for 
preserving and strengthening diversity are not met with adequ-
ate inclusive policies. 
This principled and verbal commitment to multiculturali-
sm has not been translated into public policies. Rather the con-
trary, in some countries this policy was assimilatory towards 
some citizens, as the policy of imposing identity, while almost 
as a rule, national minorities were encouraged to emphasise 
their differences, but adequate inclusive measures were mi-
ssing. One of the principled commitments is to building a parti-
cipatory political culture, but in practice, the prevailing and en-
couraged practice is that of subservient political culture, which 
is not conducive to a civil democratic society.
Without appropriate public policies and genuine commi-
tment by political actors, the political proclamations and spora-
dic programme stipulations in the constitutions and legislation 
of states in the region focused on building a civil state, cannot 
create a real civic identity or civic society or, accordingly, a civic 
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political community. Contradictions between the principled 
commitment to a civil state and policies of strengthening and/
or redefining national identity, on the one hand, and the de-
mands for preserving and empowering other separate national 
identities, on the other, do not lead to improved social cohesi-
on based on the so-called civic identity, rather, as it transpired, 
to strengthening political demands focused on affirming sepa-
rate national identities. However, no magic formula has been 
discovered to reconcile these demands.
An integrative, inclusive model, rather than the exclusive 
approach in the domains of public policy management and buil-
ding a political community, imposes itself as a win-win way of 
breaking out of the vicious circle of civil and national (nationa-
list) contradictions and controversies. Building a democratic po-
litical culture and a wide basic consensus on this need are the 
basis for defining inclusive public policies which respect specifi-
cities and strengthen the unity of a political community.
The prospects of integrative multiculturalism (intercultu-
ralism) will depend to a great extent on accepting and promo-
ting a multicultural dialogue, primarily starting from democratic 
management of cultural diversity, the management that rests 
upon human rights and basic freedoms and promotes apprecia-
tion of diversity as an element of political culture and strives to 
act in accordance with the maxim “from equal opportunity for 
all, to equal enjoyment of rights”. It is essential to create space 
for an intercultural dialogue and to adopt and pass on intercul-
tural values and knowledge to support greater and more mea-
ningful participation of citizens in social and political life. With 
such an approach, the principled commitment to multiculturali-
sm, followed by institutions and the normative framework su-
pporting it, can gain full meaning. 
Concluding Remarks
The three social phenomena of populism, stabilitocracy, 
and multiculturalism are interwoven on several different levels 
and have here been considered primarily as politological pheno-
mena, with all the consequences they have for society as a who-
le. It transpires that they are of considerable importance to po-
litical culture, the establishment and functioning of state and 
social institutions, as well as to shaping political and everyday 
life. A better understanding of populism and stabilitocracy 
allows for coping more easily with the defects they multiply in 
society, in the same way that a better understanding of multi-
culturality, multiculturalism, and interculturality enables us to 
seek for modalities for integrative processes in society.   
To better understand the nature of these social pheno-
mena and processes, it is necessary to penetrate more deeply 
into their structure, their reasons and favourable circumstan-
ces, so that we could find a proper way to cope with the causes 
that generate them and the consequences they entail. 
In its various dimensions and manifestations, as well as 
different social and political circumstances, but primarily as 
thin-centred ideology, populism has been contextually obser-
ved on an international level and in Serbia. The chameleonic 
and symbiotic nature of populism has been pointed out, and so 
have the causes and consequences it entails, as well as the le-
ssons that can be learnt from it. In Serbia, stabilitocracy and 
multiculturality form the political and social context for its 
appearance and manifestations, and the true means of neutrali-
sing its manifestations could be found in liberal democracy and 
multiculturalism, that is, interculturalism as its more advanced 
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version. However, as this monograph has shown, these are still 
merely a desirable outcome which might lead towards an orde-
red state of the rule of law and free society.     
The weaknesses of representative democracy open a spa-
ce for the rise of populism, and this space is far wider in the sta-
tes undergoing transformation towards liberal democracy, whi-
ch has in this monograph been shown using the example of 
Serbia. However, democracy and populism are mutually perme-
ated throughout the world, including the most developed and 
ordered democratic states, which is why the correlation 
between the two is extremely important for understanding the 
global contemporary processes that are reflected on individual 
states. 
Misbalance between democratic and liberal values in con-
temporary democracies is favourable to the development of 
populism and all the negative consequences it has for society, 
but it can also indicate the need for the strengthening of demo-
cratic values. In other words, populists and their activities can 
incite a balancing of democratic and liberal values once a consi-
derable misbalance has been created. In stabilitocracies, it is di-
fficult even to speak of establishing balance between democra-
tic and liberal values as both values are underdeveloped to the 
extent that their underdevelopment becomes the key problem, 
rather than any misbalance thereof.   
What this monograph has confirmed is that the deepe-
ned rift between the political elites and the people is certainly 
one of the most important causes of the appearance and 
expansion of populism in societies of different democratic sha-
pes and development levels. In Serbia, populism is primarily ma-
nifested through praising the people, anti-elitism, and an-
ti-pluralism, and it reflects negatively on both the institutional 
system and political life in general, preventing the development 
of democratic political culture and the establishment of liberal 
democracy. The findings of the empirical research on the un-
derstanding of politics, citizens’ attitude towards the people 
and political elites, and citizens’ stances on representative de-
mocracy, the leader, and “dangerous others” show that the so-
cial ground is favourable to maintaining populism. 
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Based on the empirical research, it can be concluded that 
the majority in Serbia is composed of passive citizens who have 
retreated from public life and are not interested in politics but 
instead burdened with economic and social problems, which is 
not encouraging in the context of the struggle to establish and 
consolidate democratic institutions and build a democratic poli-
tical culture.   
In cases such as this, populism appears to be a serious 
obstacle to establishing or consolidating key elements of repre-
sentative liberal democracy. The rift separating democratic ide-
als and the actual functioning in such societies is too deep and 
wide to expect the corrective role from populism. Adding to 
this, the almost constant economic and political crisis makes 
such a socio-economic context an additional cause of the nega-
tive consequences of populism. In such circumstances, a vast 
space opens for the appearance of populist parties, move-
ments, and leaders, who are allegedly full of understanding 
when it comes to the people’s needs and ready to deal with 
“the corrupted elite” and “dangerous others.” In this way, popu-
lists additionally suppress pluralism, repress critical thought, li-
mit the freedom of the media, and instrumentalise state and 
social institutions to suit their own needs. In this way, they do 
not remove any defects of the political system; on the contrary: 
they pose an obstacle to their removal. 
The effects of suppressing pluralism in multiply plural so-
cieties contribute to the deepening of social schisms. When po-
pulists homogenise the people in multinational societies, they 
most commonly homogenise the national group they belong to, 
that is, those within the group who politically support the po-
pulists, whereas all the others are marginalised, excluded, or 
treated as “dangerous others.” In such cases, multicultural so-
cieties, which are essentially plural, become platforms for poli-
tical conflicts focusing on identity-related issues. Instead of ma-
king diversity management a political priority, identity 
differences are instrumentalised for political purposes. In this 
political competition, populism has an advantage over multicul-
turalism, which results in the suppression of pluralism and 
strengthening of differences, in divisions instead of 
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integrations. Narratives of the superiority of the nation and its 
cultural heritage compete in political discourse, and Hegemoni-
sm is represented as the order of stability. In multicultural so-
cieties, the struggle for pluralism is the struggle for the respect 
of diversity, and multiculturalism is a way of diversity manage-
ment which leads towards the harmonisation between the poli-
tical community and society.           
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Populism, stabilitocracy and multiculturalism are three social phe-
nomena which have recently been in the spotlight of political science 
professionals, while simultaneously also capturing the attention of a 
wider public. Studying these phenomena is important not only in order 
for us to better understand their nature, but also to be able to confront 
the consequences they produce. Stabilitocracy and multiculturality 
comprise political and social habitus of populism in Serbia, while liberal 
democracy and multiculturalism constitute political goals which lead to 
a well-regulated state and free society.
Populism in Serbia, i.e. manifestations of Serbian populism primarily 
through glorification of the people, anti-elitism and anti-pluralism com-
prise the central part of this book, in addition to considerations of the 
institutional and political framework in which this populism is manife-
sted – stabilitocracy. In order to better understand populism in Serbia, 
the study includes the results of an empirical research concerning the 
perception of politics, the attitudes of citizens towards the people and 
political elite, and their attitudes towards representative democracy, 
leader and “dangerous others”.
 
When in multinational societies populists homogenize the people, they usu-
ally homogenize their own national group, while the rest of the people are 
at the very least excluded, or even more frequently treated as “dangerous 
others”. A consequence of the populist homogenization of the people is 
anti-pluralism which erodes liberal values in political communities, since in 
multicultural societies, the fight for pluralism is the fight for the harmony 
of diversity, while multiculturalism is the manner of diversity management 
which leads to harmonisation of the political community and society. 
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